materially improved upon, though, of course, it may be variously modified, as we see in the two great model governments of modern times, those of Britain and America, which, though substantially the same, have yet some noteworthy differences, the king and lords, for example, being hereditary in the one and elective in the other, and the superstructure of government in the one resting upon a much broader popular basis than in the other-the right of suffrage in the one being almost universal, while in the other it is very much restricted, so that one inclines rather too much towards a pure democracy, and the other decidedly too much towards a pure oligarchy.

Nearly allied to the foregoing idea, if not indeed a mere modification of it, another of great value is distinctly and prominently set forth by Aristotle in his Politics. It is this: as the mean is in all things the best, so the best condition for the citizens of a State is the middle one, in which they are neither rich nor poor, but moderately circumstanced, and that State is, therefore, the best conditioned in which this great middle class is proportionately the largest, and predominates most completely over both the rich and the poor, and is able, most effectually, to act as umpire or arbitrator between them in their mutual conflicts and jealousies. This is an idea worthy of the disciple of Plato and the preceptor of Alexander.

Never was a more important sociological truth uttered, nor a more just simile invented, than that which compares human society to a glass of ale, which is on the top all froth, and at the bottom all dregs, while in the middle alone is to be found good, clear ale. This great truth Aristotle seems to have thoroughly appreciated, though in forming his estimate of those who are to be regarded as of the middle class, he is, like Plato, perhaps too intensely aristocratical.

Another remark of Aristotle, in the same connection, is very just, and entitled to particular consideration. He says "the best test of a happy mixture of a democracy and oligarchy is when one may properly call the same State both a democracy and an oligarchy." This remark, too, we find strikingly illustrated (or substantially so) in the two great model governments already alluded to-the noble monuments of the political sagacity of the present age, or rather of the Anglo-Saxon race--those of Britain and America; for it will readily be discovered, even by a superficialist, that the British government may, with equal propriety, be termed a limited monarchy and a limited republic; and although it is the almost universal habit to style the great American government a republic or democracy, as it certainly is, though greatly limited and qualified therein, yet the profound political philosopher will readily discern that it might, with equal propriety, be termed a limited, elective monarchy, grounded fundamentally on democratical principles.

In ancient times the governinents of Sparta and Rome might, with equal propriety, have been cited in illustration of the same remark, as the former was by Aristotle, and the latter by Polybius.§ It should be su

*See Politics, book iv., chapters 11 and 12.

+ See Politics, book iv., chapter 9.

It is a noteworthy fact that Aristotle, though frequently alluding to Carthage, never makes mention of Rome. Probably the destined mistress of the world had, in his day, made but a very slight impression on the general attention of mankind. But only two centuries later, Greece, the land of Aristotle, had become a Roman province.

§ Polybius, in his splendid criticism on the Roman government, in fact, says it may be regarded as a democracy, an aristocracy, or a monarchy, according to the various views which we may take of it, as of the consular, senatorial, or popular power in the State.

perfluous to remark that Sparta more resembled Britain, and Rome America, in the structure of their respective governments.

The remarks of Aristotle on the tenure of property, and more particularly in reply to Plato's vagaries about a community of property, wives, and children, among his State guardians, are exceedingly just and happy, and leave almost nothing to be desired in addition thereto, as a reply and refutation to all such vagaries. On this point he cites in argument the great fact, which is sententiously expressed by the common proverb of modern times, that "what is every body's business is no body's business," which, among the various readings of which it is susceptible, admits readily of this, also, that what is every man's property, wife, or child, is no man's property, wife, or child.* And this is, of itself, a sufficient refutation of all schemes for substituting a general community of interest for individual interest, which, were it possible to render them operative, would, undoubtedly, lower incalculably the average level of humanity, relax universally the springs of human enterprise, and tend most effect ually to reduce mankind to a race of "mud gods," if we may be allowed the eccentric phraseology of Mr. Thomas Carlyle, in one of his "Latter Day Pamphlets."

The remarks of Aristotle on the subject of money, as to its true nature and functions, which, by the way, are made by him in that part of his work on Politics in which he treats of domestic economy, and not in his work entitled, "Economics," or political economy, to which it more legitimately appertains, are remarkably just and greatly in advance of his times. They are, in fact, more in accordance with what might be expected from an Adam Smith, than from a cotemporary of Alexander the Great. But these remarks of Aristotle's will be more particularly noticed in that part of this review which relates particularly to the politico-economical system of Social Philosophy.

Nor should notice be omitted here of another idea of Aristotle's, wonderfully in advance of his times, and of great sociological importance, though one which might be passed over by many without exciting any special attention. The idea is one relating to the treatment of the great chronic disease of human society, pauperism, which has not particularly arrested philosophical attention until subsequently to the development of Malthusian philosophy. Aristotle's idea on this point is this eminently just and profound one, that it is a very bad plan, and one of little or no avail, to distribute alms to the poor, from time to time, and by piece-meal, as their pressing necessities may require, which he very happily compares to pouring water into a sieve. The true plan, he says, is to hoard up that portion of the public revenue intended for the relief of the poor, until it amounts to a sufficiency, and then apply it to the purpose of fitting them up with some kind of establishment or permanent possession, as a house or a field.

It is not a little remarkable that this is the very idea, substantially, which a very recent writer of the Malthusian and most advanced school of Social Philosophy, Mr. William Thomas Thornton, in his work on "Over-Population and its Remedy," has set forth, as his most cherished

*See Politics, book ii., chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, of Walford's translation, which is more convenient for reference, and, perhaps, more generally reliable than that of Gillies.

+ See Politics, book i,, chapter 9.

See Politics, book vi., chapter 5.

idea concerning the proper modes of attempting to remedy over-population and its inevitable consequence, destitution. The leading and controlling idea of his very valuable work is, that all remedial schemes of of that character are ineffectual which do not strike directly at the poverty of the poor, by tending at once to lift them out of their depressed condition.* Little did Mr. Thornton imagine, most probably, (so little are the ancient philosophers now consulted,) that this leading idea of his carefully prepared and well digested work, had been distinctly announced twenty centuries ago by a Greek philosopher, who had not enjoyed any of the advantages of those recent discussions, in which the Malthusian philosophers have poured such a flood of light upon these abstruse and momentous questions in Social Philosophy.

After these commendations of Aristotle, as a Malthusian, a political economist, and political philosopher, it is due to the severity of truth that we should allude to some of the prominent faults of his work, as a mere disquisition on Politics. As a mere disquisition on Politics, his work is distinguished by a very similar, if not precisely the same fundamental, fault which characterizes it considered as a disquisition on Sociology in general. As in the one case he commits the error already referred to of aining at the welfare of the State rather than of the individuals composing the State, so in the other he commits the error of aiming at what is favorable to the form of a government rather than directly at what is favorable to the government itself, essentially considered. Thus throughout his work we find him repeatedly and elaborately inquiring what is most favorable, under various circumstances, to a monarchy, an oligarchy, and a democracy, and what most favorable to a royalty, an aristocracy, and a republic, (which he, perhaps, over-nicely attempts to distinguish from the three former,) instead of coming at once to the real question, what is most favorable, under the various circumstances in which mankind may be placed, to good government.

This error, which is in fact a characteristic one of Aristotle, and, to a great extent, of the Greek philosophers in general, it must be admitted, is another testimony to the general correctness of Comte's favorite theory, as to the tendency of the human mind to pass through the theological or fictitious stage, and the metaphysical or abstract, before coming to the positive or scientific. For upon the supposition that Aristotle, and the Grecian philosophers in general, were in this second or metaphysical stage, as Comte regards them, the general characteristics of their reasonings would be entirely consistent with the theory, as we see strikingly illustrated in the leading characteristics of Aristotle, as a sociologist and mere political philosopher, so conspicuously discernible in those fundamental errors now under review. For these errors betray nothing so conspicuously as a tendency to dwell upon abstractions rather than positive sub

stance.

* See Thornton on Over-Population, chapters 7 and 8.

The word which Aristotle uniformly uses for that form of government which he seems to consider the best, and of which he regards democracy as a corruption, is Politeia, which may be lite ally rendered a polity. And so Mr. Walford, in his Oxford translation, uniformly, or for the most part, renders it. Mr. Gillies, on the contrary, renders it republic, which seems to the author of the present inquiry decidedly the best rendition.

Comte does not take the same view of Aristotle as that here given. In the brief allusion which he incidentally makes to the Politics of Aristotle, he rather regards it as containing the germs of the Positive Philosophy and being decidedly in advance of his times, which was undoubtedly true. But had Comte examined Aristotle on politics more closely, he would have discerned that the work was much more in violation of the positive philosophy than in accordance with it, and that a powerful illustration of the truth of his leading theory might be deduced from that very fact.

Another great fault of Aristotle, as a political as well as a mere fundamental social philosopher, is that he reposed too much confidence in the efficacy of mere political regulations, wherein he practically disregards the great truth which, as we have already seen, he theoretically recognizes, that causes, more fundamental than merely political ones, really determine the destiny of nations. Thus we find him repeatedly dwelling upon the great advantages, in respect to the mode of appointing to office, of an aristocracy, which he uses in its strict and literal sense, as the government of the best, and in which men are elected to office, not in reference to any property qualification, or because they are rich or because they are poor, not yet by lot, but in reference to their merit and fitness for the office. Where is the government, in modern times, nay, we might almost say, in any times, that does not theoretically recognize the correctness of this principle? But where is the tyro-the merest child in political science, in modern times, who could not inform this great philosopher of Greece that the theoretical recognition of this principle does not, by any means, or to any very important extent, insure its practical realization? In the great American republic, or, as Aristotle would have termed it, the great American Aristocracy, because, forsooth, men are universally elected to office therein, theoretically and in contemplation of law, on grounds of merit and personal qualification, is it not notorious that, in point of fact, there is as little electing of real merit to office as there could well be if the mode of appointing to office were the choosing by lot from the great body of citizens possessed of even a very moderate share of intelligence-nay, if anything, really less, since in choosing to office by lot the wise and good would stand a fair chance with the rest, while under the present system they stand none at all, or, at the best, a very unequal one.

But the most specifically faulty portion of Aristotle's work, as a disquisition on mere politics, is that in which he discusses the very important question-how far the lowest order of society, the great body of those who are without property, and, for the most part, without intelligence, shall be permitted to participate in the affairs of government. The conclusion at which he arrives is, that they should be totally excluded from office, but be allowed the right of voting in the popular assemblies, not only in the electing of magistrates, but in the decision of those judicial as well as legislative affairs, which, in Grecian republics, as well as in that of Rome, were decided in the popular assemblies.*

Now, it would seem that the very reverse of this should be considered the wiser plan, namely, to render all, of whatever condition, eligible to office, but to exclude those of this class from the right of voting. The common opinion, even of the present enlightened age, is to be seen with Aristotle on this point. But this is rather another proof that mankind do not, on all points, progress in knowledge. What should appear more obvious than that the field, from which the selection of the magistracy of States is to be made, should be as extensive as possible, but that the number of those who are to make the selection, should be restricted to persons of undoubted qualification for so responsible a trust. Is the creature to be considered greater than the Creator in politics, any more than in theology? Or is it a light error to confer on those who are utterly

unfit to hold office themselves the power of deciding who are fit to be office holders.

It must be admitted that Aristotle argues the matter well, in favor of universal suffrage, and as plausible as it can well be presented. He admits the general proposition that "to elect a person in any line is the business of those who are skilled in it." But he argues, further on, "In some particular arts it is not the workman only who is the best judge of them. Thus, he who builds a house," he says, "is not the only judge of it, for the master of the family who inhabits it is a better; thus, also, a steersman is a better judge of a tiller than be who made it ;" and by parity of reasoning we might argue still further along-the passengers on board a ship are better judges of good sailing than the commander.

Nevertheless, and despite the specious plausibilities of Aristotle, prudent men will still doubt whether a general interference on the part of those who wish to have houses built with the plans of their architects, will tend to improve the style of architecture; and they will still doubt whether "universal suffrage" on the part of "those who go down to the sea in ships," is the best plan for improving navigation, or for taking a ship safely through the dangers of a stormy sea.

Polybius, who flourished about two centuries after Aristotle, and when Greece had become completely overshadowed by Roman power, in his justly renowned general history, has made some remarks on government which proves him to have been an eminently profound and accurate political philosopher. In the political disquisitions of Plato and Aristotle, we find much to condemn as well as to approve, but in that of Polybius we find matter only for unqualified approbation. In his disquisition we find none of the vagaries of Plato, nor the frivolities of Aristotle. His remarks are replete with solid sense and sound political doctrine.

As to the structure of government, Polybius, like every true philosopher, discards at once the idea of a simple government, or one grounded solely upon any one of the three elementary principles of human society, (monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy,) and declares the best government to be that which is mixed or compound, and embraces all the three principles, like those of Sparta, Carthage, and Rome.

rect.

The remarks of Polybius on the natural transitions to which human societies, and more particularly their governments, are subject, are well deserving of consideration, and are, doubtless, in the main, entirely corAfter distinguishing, with more precision than Aristotle, between the three elementary forms of government, and their respective corruptions, as between royalty, aristocracy, and democracy on one hand, and monarchy, (or tyranny,) oligarchy, and what may be termed a mobocracy* on the other, he proceeds to remark that the first government, in the course of nature, is the monarchy, or the forcible government of one man, by virtue of superior strength and courage, which gradually becomes improved into a royalty, or government of one man by the consent of the governed, which government, in time, becomes corrupted into a monarchy again, or tyranny. Then follows an aristocracy, or government in which the superior classes of society, rebelling against the tyranny, take the government of the State into their hands, and this, in time, degenerates

*This word is the coinage of the author of this review. The translator of Polybius, Mr. Hampton, uses the phrase government of the multitude, for which the liberty has been taken by the present reviewer to substitue mobocracy as more expressive as well as more concise.