It is a remarkable fact that three of the most eminent men of the world for virtue and the general purity of their lives, in respect to chastity, as well as to every other virtue, three men, indeed, who bear a striking resemblance to each other in many prominent points, though widely separated in time and nationality, Plato, Swedenborg, and Fourier, were all distinguished by sentiments in regard to the sexual relation that must incur the censure of rigid moralists. Swedenborg, with all his piety, has provoked the displeasure of this class, by some of his too liberal remarks on conjugal love; and Fourier repeatedly speaks in sorrowful tones of the harsh judgments of society, in relation to "the proscribed passion."

Remarkable as this fact may be, however, it should not appear inexplicable, on a little reflection. For all experience will show that none are so mild in their censure of vice as the truly virtuous; and it is an old proverb that no one is so loud in crying "stop thief," as the thief himself. In truth, men of such exalted sentiments as Plato, Swedenborg, and Fourier, are so much superior to the generality of mankind in many of their sentiments, and rise so far above the atmosphere in which abound the petty strifes and ignoble jealousies of men, that they are unqualified, perhaps, duly to estimate the influence of many human sensibilities.

However this may be, and whatever may be the sentiments of a Plato, the vast majority of men are under the dominion of jealousy in matters of conjugal love, and demand exclusiveness in the objects of their affection. In short, every man wants his own wife, and every women her own husband. And Plato's scheme of a promiscuous blending of husbands and wives, for making every man the husband of every women, and every women the wife of every man, so far from tending to promote harmony and unity of feeling, at which he aimed, would be fatally destructive of both. As for his project for making every man the father of every child, and every child the progeny of every man in the community, Aristotle, in allusion to it, has justly and somewhat facetiously remarked, and thereby sufficiently refuted the idea, that it would be better to be a nephew, after the old fashion, than to be a son upon Plato's plan.

Another fundamental question in Sociology, much discussed recently, was also canvassed by Plato in his Republic-"the woman's rights question," as it has been termed. Upon this question Plato advances opinions quite as radical, or, as some would prefer to say, "progressive," as any that our "latter-day philosophers" have brought forth. In fact, not only in Sociology, but in nearly every other department of Philosophy, the germs of nearly all subsequent theories may be found in the writings of this profound and far-seeing philosopher, who, like many profound and far-seeing philosophers, however, was not uniformly a very accurate or judicious one, particularly in matters of detail and practice.

Plato inclines decidedly to the opinion that there is a substantial equality between the sexes, though their functions and powers of execution are somewhat different. He says, if the only real difference between men and women be, that one begets children, and the other bears them, which he very plainly intimates that he considers the only dif ference, then there is no good reason why women should not follow the same employments with the men, though the lighter part of the work should always be assigned to the women. Accordingly, he recommends that the women should go to war with their husbands, and come naked into the gymnasium, there to dispute with men for the prizes of athletic skill.

From these observations it should appear manifest that there is much more to censure than to approve in the social doctrines of Plato. Some of his ideas are, however, highly valuable. Much to be commended especially is his remark, that until philosophers become statesmen, or statesmen philosophers, there is little prospect of an end to the miseries of States, and no hope of seeing his plan of government realized.

Another remark of Plato's in the same work is pregnant with meaning-"Never, as Damon says, and I agree with him, are the measures of music changed, without affecting the most important laws of the State." This is substantially the same remark which has been reproduced in modern times by the English statesman who said, "If you let me write the songs of a nation, you may make their laws." The idea is above the average of the ideas of Plato on Sociology, and those of the Greek philosophers generally. It is a partial recognition of the great truth, even now but partially recognized, but then almost wholly unperceived, that there are forces determining the character and destiny of nations far more fundamental than political regulations, than mere human laws, and in comparison with which these are impotent.

The great importance attached by Plato to State education, though unwisely restricted by him to his great middle class, or State guardians, as he termed them, is much to be commended, and should instruct and admonish modern statesmen, who are still everywhere too little attentive to this vitally important consideration.

The Malthusian idea, as to the tendency of population to outrun subsistence, too obvious in some of its features to escape the discernment of the wise in any age, though vehemently assailed in modern times by certain profound ignoramuses, did not escape the observation of Plato.. But he summarily disposed of it, by remarking that he left this matter to the rulers of the State who should provide for it in their regulations respecting the number of marriages-a remark, which, like many others of Plato on Sociology, is not very valuable or profound, since it should be obvious to a little reflection, that it is no easy matter for State rulers to regulate these matters, even allowing that such attempts were consistent with the just and legitimate functions of political authority.*

The disquisition of Aristotle on Politics is, beyond dispute, a much more valuable work than that of his illustrious predecessor and preceptor, Plato. It is a work of far more compass of thought and variety of matter, and far better adapted to practical ends. Plato's political ideas, in fact, are, for the most part, adapted only to men such as he desired they should be, and possibly imagined that they might be, rendered by proper training; Aristotle's are adapted to men as they are.

The work of Aristotle is one of great merits and great defects. Perhaps, however, it is more to be criticised for its defects than commended for its merits. Its merits are rather superficial, its defects fundamental and profound. The most fundamental and comprehensive defect of the work, perhaps, is that already alluded to, as a leading characteristic of Grecian Sociology in general, and incidentally referred to also, as render

*The language of Plato on this point, as rendered by Mr. Davis, the translator, is as follows:-"But as to the number of marriages, this we leave to the rulers that they may as much as possible keep up the same number of men, having regard both to wars and diseases, and all other such matters, so that as far as possible our State may be neither great nor small." See Plato's Republic, book V., chapter 8.

H

ing the Social Philosophy of Aristotle, in particular, liable to criticism,* that it subordinates the individual to the State, instead of the State to the individual; that it regards the individual as the creature of the State, rather than the State as the creature of the individual, or rather aggregation of individuals; that its great leading aim accordingly is to build up the State, rather than the citizens of the State; that, in fact, it is so far carried away by this delusive abstraction of the State, that it only takes notice of the individual citizen, or at least, for the most part, only in so far as he may be made a means of advancing the State, instead of regarding the State only in so far as it may be made the means of advancing the citizen, thus palpably mistaking the means for the end, and committing an error very similar to that of the miser, who is so devoted to the money, which is in reality only the means of commanding wealth, that he absolutely suffers for real wealth, which consists in actual comforts and substantial enjoyments.

Another great defect in the Sociology of Aristotle, nearly akin to that just referred to, and perhaps equally as fundamental and comprehensive, is that, in so far as it does aim at the welfare of the individual, as an end, it aims at too much, and that, too, by means altogether insufficient, even for a less end. In fact, the Social Philosophy of Aristotle is palpably amenable to the criticism, that it violates the great cardinal rule, laid down in the first part of this review, in respect to the fundamental principles of philosophizing in general, that a science cannot be too comprehensive in the scope of its attention, but may very easily be too comprehensive in the scope of its intention.

It is precisely this rule which the Social Philosophy of Aristotle, like a great many other schemes of philosophy, violates. It intends too much, and attends to too little. It aims at too great a result, and seeks to employ too small means. It takes to itself too large an end, and makes altogether too inadequate an induction of the causes tending to produce even a much smaller end.

Thus Aristotle tells us, both in his treatise on Ethics and Politics, that the great end of political science is to promote human happiness, not in the narrow sense of providing mere external goods, but also in respect to the happiness of the soul. This is the sublime aim of Aristotle, to promote the happiness of the soul, and that, too, by mere State contrivances, by such wretched influences as the custodians of mere political authority can dispense. Had Aristotle been a more accurate and profound sociologist, he might have discerned that political science takes quite enough to itself, and quite as much as can safely be entrusted to it, when it proposes to take the guardianship of the material interests of men, without any special concern about their souls, and that to insure the well-being even of these only, the concurrence of a great many other causes, and far more fundamental than mere political ones, is indispensably necessary.

It is, however, due to Aristotle and to truth to state, that while he is altogether too much carried away with his adoration of the State, and with the idea that, in order to promote the social welfare of a people, it is only necessary to secure for them a well governed State, he incidentally,

See part third of this review, where Aristotle, as a Social Philosopher, is compared with Confucius. December number of Merchants' Magazine, p. 662.

+ See October number of Merchants' Magazine, page 410.

yet very distinctly, recognizes the important truth that there are causes more fundamental than merely political ones operating to determine the social condition of mankind, and without a due regard to which it is not possible even to organize a State upon any permanent foundation.

In the fourth book of his Politics, in which he treats mainly of the different forms of government, Aristotle says:-" But every Legislator ought to establish such a form of government as from the present state and disposition of the people who are to receive it, they will most readily submit to and persuade the community to partake of."* Very well said, indeed. Guizot, the great political savan of France, and among the greatest of living political savans, could not have said it better, nor have uttered a much more pregnant and important sociological truth. Again he says in the same connection:-" All laws ought to be framed with reference to the State, and not the State with reference to the laws." In other parts of his work, also, he distinctly recognizes the important truth that every people are not qualified for the best government, and are not, therefore, fit to receive it- a truth, by the way, which should silence a great deal of the indiscreet clamor by which the good sense of this age is distracted.

The merit of the recognition of these important truths by Aristotle is greatly detracted from, however, by the fact that he does not deduce from them adequate conclusions, or such as are commensurate with their importance; that, in short, while he nominally recognizes, he virtually ignores them, by giving greater prominence to others that are incompatible, if not essentially at variance, with them.

On this point the remarks of Comte, in his Positive Philosophy, are so exceedingly apposite, and intrinsically valuable, that they should not be omitted here:-"Disultory indications, more literary, than scientific, can never supply the place of a strict philosophical doctrine, as we see from the fact that from Aristotle downwards, (and even from an earlier period,) the greater number of philosophers have constantly reproduced the famous aphorism of the necessary subordination of laws to manners, without this germ of sound philosophy having had any effect on the general habit of regarding institutions as independent of the co-existing state of civilization, however strange it may appear that such a contradiction should live through twenty centuries. This is, however, the natural course with intellectual principles and philosophical opinions, as well as with social manners and political institutions. When once they have obtained possession of men's minds, they live on, notwithstanding their admitted impotence and inconvenience, giving occasion to more and more serious inconsistencies, till the expansion of human reason originates new principles of equivalent generality and superior rationality."‡ Aristotle, like Plato, dwelt with great emphasis on the importance of educating youth, as a part of every political system, with the paramount importance of which the Grecian philosophers seem indeed to have been much more thoroughly imbued than those of more modern times. Yet even on this point the overweening prominence which Aristotle gives to the State, rather than the individual, crops out conspicuously. Thus we find him in the fifth book of his Politics, exclaiming, "But of all things hitherto considered, that which contributes most to preserve the State is,

* See book iv., chapter 1, Walford's translation.

See Comte's Positive Philosophy, book vi., chapter 8.

+ See same book and chapter.

what is now most despised, to educate children with reference to the State."* He would have the children educated with reference to taking care of the State, instead of their being educated with reference to taking care of themselves, which being effectually done by all the citizens, it must follow, as the shadow the substance, that the State will be taken care of.

The tendency of population to outrun subsistence, and the necessity for restraining it, did not escape the discernment of Aristotle. His plan for combating this tendency was even simpler than that of Plato, and far less humane. He recommended infanticide and abortion-" for a limit must be fixed to the population of the State;" so argued this enlightened and renowned philosopher of the Greeks. This was Malthusianism with a vengeance. The humane Plato, like Malthus himself, recommended only a resort to the preventive checks to population, and especially the moral restraint. But Aristotle enjoined a resort both to the positive and preventive, and that, too, in their most elementary and repulsive forms.†

The foregoing remarks on the famous disquisition of Aristotle on Politics are predicated on a view of it as a scheme of Social Philosophy, or as a disquisition on Sociology, which, indeed, it seems to have been intended for by its author. As a disquisition on mere Politics, however, which is very nearly all that it can claim to be, essentially, and in so far as it relates only to the legitimate province of political science, it is deserving of a far higher estimate than has been thus far placed upon it in this review.

As an analysis of political institutions, as a disquisition on the true principles, both of political right and political expediency, and moreover as a review, historical and critical, of the different forms of government which had flourished before and during his time, which last is, for the most part, its essential character, the work of Aristotle on Politics is, un doubtedly, one of distinguished merit. And although its defects are great, even as a work on mere politics, there need be little hesitation in saying that its merits are much more conspicuous than its defects.

Leaving out of view any criticism on the want of directness in his declarations of approbation and disapprobation, and on his failure to give clear and distinct prominence to leading ideas, as contradistinguished from subordinate ones, which are rather faults of rhetoric than of logic, and other noteworthy defects, both of matter and manner, it is abundantly manifest, from the whole scope of his work, that the form of government which he most approves is a highly aristocratical republic, or, what may more properly, perhaps, be termed, a limited democracy—a form of government in which all the three elementary forces of societythe one, the few, and the many, or king, lords, and commons-are represented and respected, though fundamentally democratical, or republican. This, indeed, was also substantially the idea of Plato, and has been that of the wisest men in all ages; nor is it probable that the idea will ever be

* See Politics, book v., chapter 9.

+ See Aristotle, book vii.. chapter 16, of Walford's translation; also book iv., of Gillies' translation, which is not divided into chapters and in whose transl tion book iv. corresponds with book vii. in Walford's, which latter is more usually confo med to. It is r ther amus ng to see how in this passage, as in others, Mr Gillies glosses over the objectionable ideas of his idol, Aristotle whom he obviously employing, throughout, as his own spokesman, to cry down the democratical tendencies of the pr sent age. One would glide over this part of Aristotle's work, in Gillies' translation, without having his attention arrested with anything especially obnoxious. Indeed, in reading the two translations, one is hardly aware that he is reading the same author so much do they differ, and he may well be at a loss to know which more to contemn, the intolerably stupid translation of Walford, or the intolerably uncandid one of Gillies.