plain of misrepresentation; but, perhaps, that was more than he could afford to do under the circumstances. We certainly endeavored to show in our last that statistics and facts were not always synonymous. We are, therefore, much beholden to the good intention of our opponent for placing us under the patronage of Mill in preference to that of Smith; but beg to assure him that we shall still continue to acknowledge real statistics, under such limitations as we have pointed out, and to seize upon all facts for the support of what we may think to be truth; in fact, to treat our subject in what we may happen to think the most effective manner, regardless of this or that system, which may have been used or instituted by others. Let us now attend to the subject.

Notwithstanding that, in his previous article, Mr. Baird says "he is even prepared to hazard something in expressing the opinion that these professors (English) have never established a single vital principle in political economy," he is now taken with a sudden fit of admiration for Adam Smith, the founder of the school as well as of the science itself, but assumes to find fault with his method of treating the subject. Now, this appears a little supercilious to us, but our opponent very condescendingly admits that "there are central principles in the Wealth of Nations,' which, if fully developed and elaborated, are comprehensive enough for the foundation of an enduring system of political economy; but as the author merely enunciates them, his followers of the English school have failed to recognize their vital importance, and have allowed them to pass entirely unnoticed, but have accepted many errors of his system as fundamental truths." In proof of the above, our attention is directed to two-thirds of a page of quotation from the third book and the third chapter of the "Wealth of Nations," which seems merely intended to show the benefits which might possibly arise from emigration and the division of labor, under the difficulties of removal of raw material "by land carriage and river navigation," at a time when it took an individual longer to travel between Edinburgh and London than it does now to cross the Atlantic. We are then gravely asked "if we can find among the teachings of the followers of Adam Smith, of the English school, any attempt to develop and push to their utmost limit these great principles." Now, if we believed there were any great principles involved, we should certainly feel bound to answer the question. We will, however, confess that we do not know that any one of the parties have advocated the filling up of the canals, or the destruction of the roads, for the protection of home manufactures. And if our opponent had not stopped short in his quotation, he would have perceived that Adam Smith had no intention of advocating any such system as he has attributed to him. On the contrary, he particularly said that certain manufactures to which he alluded "had grown up naturally, and, as it were, of their own accord, the offspring of agriculture," aided by the difficulty of transportation. It may be well, however, to remind Mr. Baird that, notwithstanding the great difficulties of transportation and of the protective system, which was then universal, the natural principle of division of labor has triumphed over all, and that this is the era of free trade. Let us now inquire as to some of these "central principles" which our opponent acknowledges are to be found, and might have been elaborated into a comprehensive and enduring system of political economy. If we were asked to point out one of them, we should most likely direct attention to that which Adam

Smith himself seemed to consider the most important, at least, if we are guided by the prominence he has given to it-the division of labor. The. division of labor is inherent in the nature and circumstances of man, and must have been contemporary everywhere with the dawn of civilization. It is apparent in all countries and in every situation, and when left free to develop itself, individual interest is always ready to carry it to the greatest possible extent. Attempts may be made to limit its operation, but, in the nature of things, they must always be productive of evil and never productive of good. The principle itself is also as plainly marked in the variety of soils, climate, and productions, as it is in the different capacities and tastes of individuals. But we will not pursue the subject in our own language when its operation has been so much more lucidly stated by the author, which our opponent so much admires, (Adam Smith,) and from whom he has quoted a newly found passage in support of the opposite principle. Let the author speak for himself. The following we take from the fourth book and second chapter of the "Wealth of Nations:"

"What is the species of domestic industry which his capital can employ, and of which the produce is likely to be of the greatest value, every individual, it is evident, can, in his local situation, judge much better than any statesman or lawgiver can do for him. The statesman who should attempt to direct private people in what manner they ought to employ their capitals, would not only load himself with a most unneces sary attention, but assume an authority which could safely be trusted not only to no single person, but to no council or sei ate whatever, and which would nowhere be so dangerous as in the hands of a man who had folly and presumption enough to fancy himself fit to exercise it."

"To give the monopoly of the home market to the produce of domestie industry, in any particular art or manufacture, is, in some measure, to direct private people in what manner they ought to employ their capitals, and must, in almost all cases, be a useless or hurtful regulation. If the produce of domestic can be bought there as cheap as that of foreign industry, the regulation is evidently useless. If it cannot, it must generally be hurtful. It is the maxim of every prudent master of a family never to attempt to make at home what it will cost him more to make than to buy. The tailor does not attempt to make his own shoes, but buys them of the shoemaker. The shoemaker does not attempt to make his own clothes, but employs a tailor. The farmer attempts to make neither the one nor the other, but employs those different artificers. All of them find it to their interest to employ their whole industry in a way in which they have some advantage over their neighbors, and to purchase with a part of its produce, or what is the same thing, with the price of a part of it, whatever else they have occasion for."

"What is prudence in the conduct of every private family can scarcely be folly in that of a great kingdom. If a foreign country can supply us with a commodity cheaper than we ourselves can make it, better buy it of them with some part of the produce of our own industry, employed in a way in which we have some advantage. The general industry of the country being always in proportion to the capital which employs it, will not thereby be diminished, no more than that of the above mentioned artificers, but only left to find out the way in which it can be em-, ployed with the greatest advantage. It is certainly not employed to the

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greatest advantage when it is thus directed towards an object which it can buy cheaper than it can make. The value of its annual produce is certainly more or less diminished when it is thus turned away from producing commodities evidently of more value than the commodity which it is directed to produce. According to the supposition that a commodity could be purchased from a foreign country cheaper than it can be made at home, it could, therefore, have been purchased with a part only of the commodities which the industry employed by an equal capital would have produced at home, had it been left to follow its natural course. The industry of the country, therefore, is thus turned away from a more to a less advantageous employment, and the exchangeable value of its annual produce, instead of being increased, according to the intention of the lawgiver, must necessarily be diminished by every such regulation." "The natural advantages which one country has over another, in producing particular commodities, are sometimes so great, that it is acknowledged by all the world to be in vain to struggle with them. By means of glasses, and hot beds, and hot walls, very good grapes can be raised in Scotland, and very good wine, too, can be made of them at about thirty times the expense for which at least equally good can be bought from foreign countries. Would it be a reasonable law to prohibit the importation of all foreign wines, merely to encourage the making of claret and Burgundy in Scotland? But if there would be a manifest absurdity in turning towards any employment thirty times more of the capital and industry of the country than would be necessary to purchase from foreign countries an equal quantity of the commodities wanted, there must be an absurdity, though not altogether so glaring, yet exactly of the same kind, in turning towards any such employment a thirtieth or even a three-hundredth part more of either."

This quotation could be lengthened with advantage, but space will not allow.

It will be seen that Adam Smith, instead of advocating protection, as our opponent would have us believe, advocates the utmost freedom of trade; and founds its necessity among nations, upon the same the principle of action (profit) which has enforced it so rigorously, all the world over, among private individuals. His reasoning upon the subject is so clear and cogent, that it is difficult to believe that any candid inquirer can fail to be convinced. And whatever discrepancy may seem to appear in his writings, nothing can be clearer than his decision against the protective system. Therefore, to hold up any part of his writings as favorable to that particular system, is, in our humble opinion, not only unjust to the author, but impertinent to the public.

Dr. Smith lays it down as an axiom, that no country can have more than the legitimate profit of its own capital; and if it be diverted by arbitrary legislation to other employments than those in which it has peculiar facilities of production, it will obtain a less rate of profit than it would otherwise have done. And it seems almost unnecessary to say, that no man holding these views, upon this particular point, could consistently advocate the protective system. We must now turn to another part of our subject.

Mr. Baird has furnished us, in the July number, with the amount of production of wheat per acre in several States-the production, accord

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ing to this statement, is about ten and a half bushels to the acre. instead of denying the indisputable fact, shown by the census report, that the New England States had decreased in agricultural production, while they had increased in population-showing that manufactories had not in this instance reacted upon the land to increase its fertility, as assumed by Dr. Smith, Mr. Baird contents himself with showing that, notwithstanding this decrease of production of the manufacturing States, they still produce more corn and grain per acre than several of the other States; but forgets to tell us whether the difference arises from the peculiarities of soil, or climate, or both. The difference, however, is but slight, being in some instances only one bushel in favor of Massachusetts; but this fact has nothing to do with the decrease of the fertility of those particular States.

In looking at these circumstances, it appears singular that our opponent and Mr. Carey should not be able to see that the evils of which they complain would only be aggravated, instead of remedied, by a protective tariff. The land produces upon the average ten-and-a-half bushels to the acre-deducting seed, say nine bushels. How would it be more profitable to those who have to live out of the nine bushels, to pay one bushel more than necessary for their clothing? This would lessen the rate of profit upon capital in general. Who, then, would be benefited? Not the manufacturer; for he could not obtain a superior rate of profit to that obtained from the land—or if he did for a short time, capital would soon be attracted to manufactures, and bring down the rate to the common level. But if we were to admit, contrary to experience in this country, that the land around the manufacturing cities would increase in fertility, it could not increase the general rate of profit-the extra amount would certainly go into the pocket of the neighboring land owner, in the shape of increased rent. Therefore, in our opinion, no other person can really be benefited by what is called the protective system. On the contrary, great evils would accrue from excessive fluctuation, without any good to balance the evil. But suppose the system to be adopted; how would it effect the general farming interest of the nation? If, in the neighborhood of manufacturing cities, the increase of fertility should be sufficient to lower the price of raw produce, the condition of the farmer elsewhere would be deteriorated; but we know from experience, that would not be the case. On the other hand, admitting the price not to be affected, the land owners in the neighborhood of the manufacturing cities would be the only gainers. The only remedies that we can see for the evil of a decreased rate of profit, are to be found in a more economical system of taxation, improved agriculture, and steady industry, promoted by the removal of all causes of fluctuation, both in currency and tariff. One thing, however, is certain, that if the land only produces ten bushels of wheat to the acre, the profit of twenty cannot be divided, by any system of legerdemain we may chose to adopt. The saving of 7-32ds, or 5-16ths of a penny upon the cost of transportation of a pound of cotton to and from the manufacturers, while we increase the price of the manufactured article 20 or 30 per cent by a tax, would only increase the evil. But we do not believe this would be exactly the case notwithstanding. Why should high duties act differently in this country than they do in others? We find a paragraph in the Daily Tribune, of December 6th, 1859, to the following effect:-"A French Protestant journal asserts that

the high duties on English manufactures have failed in preventing competition. Light goods from Manchester, suitable for the Arab market, were ordered, by way of experiment, and notwithstanding import duties. and expenses, they were found to be 10 per cent lower than the same kind of French goods." Our opponent can account for this little circumstance at his leisure. We will now pass to Ricardo's Theory of Rent.

Our opponent, in introducing the subject, states his case in his own way; to which, however, we have no particular objection, except we think it is not quite complete. But it is now twenty years since we read Ricardo's work, and as we have it not at hand, it is quite possible we may be mistaken. But it strikes us, that in attempting to account for the enormous increase of rents in the neighborhood of large towns, he attributes it to the different relative amounts of capital laid out upon their cultivation, which he calls doses. These different amounts or doses of capital, being in the end sacrificed to the land owner, because it was more profitable than extending cultivation upon the poorer soils. Now, however this might seem to accord with the rest of his theory, it was not exactly true in fact. Adam Smith stated the principle of rent more correctly, though, as our opponent would say, he did not elaborate it; and yet Ricardo, like Malthus, was indebted to him for the foundation of his doctrine. We quote from book 1st chapt. 11th, (Rent of Lands) "Wealth of Nations."-"The rent of land, says the writer, not only varies with its fertility, whatever be its produce, but with its situation, whatever be its fertility. Land in the neighborhood of a town gives a greater rent than land equally fertile in a distant part of the country. Though it may cost no more labor to cultivate the one than the other, it must always cost most to bring the produce of the distant land to market. A greater quantity of labor, therefore, must be maintained out of it; and the surplus, from which are drawn both the profit of the farmer and the rent of the landlord, must be diminished." The principle of rent is here clearly and concisely stated, and it is as perceptible at every street corner, where a business-house is to be built, as it is in the case of land contiguous to a city, used for agricultural purposes-a saving of labor, and an increase of capital, are synonimous operations. All produce being sold at the same price in the market, an extra profit is obtained, over and above the common rate upon other investments, by land that happens to be comparatively more fertile, or nearest the point of consumption. The principle of rent, no doubt, produces inequality in society; but denying its existence will not destroy it, nor render it less effective. There is only one equal or democratic mode of taxation; that is, the tax direct. If the principle of rent, laid down by Smith and Ricardo be not true, will Mr. Baird explain, in his next, how it is that the money value of land, as well as the rent, has more than doubled since a free trade has been established in food in Great Britain? We pass now to the principles of Malthus, which are, as Mr. Baird seems to think indissolubly connected with that of rent.

We quote the passage which he has given us, in his last article. It is as follows:-"That population has a constant tendency to increase beyond the means of subsistence, and that it is kept to its necessary level by the absence of the means of subsistence. The difficulty arising from want of food must be constantly in operation, and must fall somewhere, and must necessarily be severely felt in some one other of the various forms of misery by a large portion of mankind."