REMARKABLE TRIALS.

I.

BAGOT V. BAGOT.

As this case was considered at the time a cause célèbre, we append a very brief report of it. The trial occupied twenty-two days, from April 25 to May 20. It was opened on Thursday, April 25, 1878, in the Court of Probate, before the Hon. Judge Warren and a special jury of the City of Dublin. Several noblemen and medical practitioners of eminence were in attendance for the purpose of being examined. The will in dispute was that of the late Mr. Christopher Neville Bagot, of the county of Galway, who died on May 23, 1877, leaving an immense fortune, which he divided between his relatives. The will was propounded by the executors and trustees, Messrs. Bernard W. Bagot, a brother of the deceased, and Arthur Holmes, and was disputed by the testator's wife, Mrs. Alice Emily Bagot, who is the daughter of the late Sir W. Verner, on the grounds that it was not executed according to the statute that the testator was not at the time he made the alleged will of sound mind, memory, or understanding, and did not understand or approve of its contents, and that the instrument was obtained by the undue influence and fraud of Messrs. John L. Bagot and Bernard Bagot, brothers of the testator, and Mrs. Catherine Maher, a sister.

The Solicitor-General (Mr. Fitz-Gibbon) Mr. Samuel Walker, Q.C., Mr. Munroe, Q.C., and Mr. William Anderson, appeared for the plaintiff, Mrs. Bagot; and Mr. Macdonogh, Q.C., Right Hon. Hugh Law, Q.C., M.P.: Mr. James Murphy, Q.C., Mr. A. M. Porter, Q.C., Mr. T. P. Law, and Mr. T. L. O'Shaughnessy, for the defendants. Mr. William D. Andrews, Q.C., and Mr. Dames, Q.C., appeared for the intervenient-William Hugh Neville Bagot, a minor.

The details of the case are entirely unfit for publication in any decent work the speech of Mr. Macdonogh, Q.C., dwelt on them at considerable length, and embodied scandalous charges of all kinds against Mrs. Bagot and her family, with the assistance of a body of "medical evidence." He left his money from his wife's child on the suggestion that it was not his Her contention on this point was that he was under a delusion through the influence of his relatives; and the jury upheld that view. We add a report of the "twenty-second day," from a pamphlet of 163 closely printed pages, to which the curious in such matters may refer. It was published by an "enterprising" London firm.

own.

Judge Warren, on resuming, asked the jury which was the more probable, that Miss Verner, a young woman, an attractive woman, with 10,000. and with fine connections, would have formed an illicit connection with N. Bagot through some form of marriage, or that, having some liking for

the man, as she said she had, and coveting, as perhaps she had been justly charged with, the enjoyment of a succession to the great property this man possessed-5,000l. a year and 50,000l.—would go through a kind of marriage with him? Her only chance of getting a right to the property would be as his wife.

The Jury left the court at half-past one. They returned into court at ten minutes to three o'clock.

Mr. W. F. Lawlor (a juror)—We cannot agree.

Foreman-I am instructed to say, my lord, that the jury cannot agree. Judge Warren-Perhaps, gentlemen, I can give you some assistance.

Mr. Sullivan-I think, my lord, if you will define the difference between a man labouring under an insane delusion and unsoundness of mind in other respects, it might throw some light upon it.

Mr. Kelly (a juror)-Dr. Banks, Mr. Porter, and other gentlemen who were examined gave clear evidence that he was of sound mind, memory, and understanding at the time,

Judge Warren-They were speaking of general intellectual capacity, on which there can be no doubt. Their attention was not called to the fact that the man was or was not labouring under any delusion, and it was impossible for anybody, physician or otherwise, to form an opinion about it unless his opinion was particularly called to the subject. There are numbers of men and there can be numbers of men who are able to transact their business, and yet be labouring under an insane delusion on one or two particular subjects, or be the subjects of monomania. A man may be, as Dr. Banks says, of perfect intellectual capacity as regards the transaction of business in ordinary matters, and may have a latent insane delusion that would make him utterly unfit to make a will. The question in this case is whether that insane delusion existed, and it is perfectly consistent with the evidence of the doctors on the subject of capacity, that yet there was an insane delusion.

After a minute's consultation, Mr. Lawlor said, the juror is not quite clear on the subject yet. (Laughter.)

Judge Warren said there were a variety of forms of unsoundness of mind, any of which would make a man unfit to make a will, or would make him an incompetent testator-such as old age, sickness, or anything of that kind. A man might be in the strength of body, and apparently of mind; he might be able to transact his business, and nobody might suspect there was a delusion, yet he might be labouring under an insane delusion. The question was whether this man was labouring under an insane delusion on the subject of his child.

The Jury again retired at three o'clock,

Mr. Macdonogh said the great object of the Judicature Act was to prevent repeated trials. It appeared to him that if the jury should disagreeand it was only in that event—it would be very expedient, if it met with his Lordship's approbation, that a finding should be had on the due execution and the general competency, irrespective of the alleged insane delusion, and then that if he was right that there was no evidence of insane delusion and no evidence of fraud, a verdict should be entered in his favour.

Judge Warren-Do you agree, Mr. Solicitor-General ?

The Solicitor-General-By no means. We have not exhausted the evidence we might have given, even from Mr. Fry's bill of costs.

The jury having been again called out,

Judge Warren to the Solicitor-General-What do you desire I should do? The Solicitor-General-I cannot assent to the discharge of the jury.

Judge Warren-Without the consent of the parties I would not think of discharging them so soon.

Judge Warren said he considered it his duty to ask the jury to give the case some further consideration. He asked them to consider whether, assuming C. Neville Bagot was of perfect mind when he executed the will, whether he was not under a delusion as to his child. If they would tell him that Mr. Bagot was under an insane delusion as to the child, he would tell them what verdict to find.

Another Juror-There are eleven to one.

Judge Warren-Well, gentlemen, you had better retire again, and it is to be hoped the eleven will persuade the one, or the one will persuade the eleven. (Laughter.)

The jury again retired, and having come out several times and been sent back, a juror having intimated that eleven jurors were agreed to a verdict, Judge Warren refused to discharge them until five o'clock.

At a quarter past four the jury returned into court, and the foreman having handed down the issue paper said-We have agreed to the second issue, with the proviso which is mentioned on the face of it.

Judge Warren-They find that the deceased at the time of the execution of the will was of sound mind, memory and understanding, except as regards the paternity of the child. (Addressing the jury.) Do you mean that he was not of sound mind as regards the paternity of his child?

Foreman-Yes, that he was under a delusion as regards that amounting to an insane delusion.

Judge Warren-In that case I desire you to strike out the words "except as regards the paternity of the child," and put in the word "Not."

A Juror (Mr. Kelly)—I can't agree to the word "Not." I agree to what is in the issue paper.

Judge Warren-Are you of opinion that he was of unsound mind as regards the paternity of his child?

Foreman-Yes.

Judge Warren-Well, I will take the verdict in that way. If you are of opinion that he was not of sound mind as regards the paternity of the child, on that finding I direct you to find that he did not know and approve of the contents of the will. Mr. Solicitor-General, do you consent, on the part of the plaintiff, that in the event of a decree condemning the will the plaintiff will pay the defendants' costs properly and necessarily incurred in consequence of the phrase "undue influence and fraud ?”

The Solicitor-General-Yes, my lord.

The Solicitor-General proposed that, owing to the lengthened period of the trial, the jury should be paid the amount that had been suggested in the course of the trial-one guinea a day.

Mr. Macdonogh strongly objected against any extra fee being paid. Judge Warren said he was sorry that an arrangement had not been come to.

The usual guinea each for the whole trial having been handed to the jury, who returned to their room,

Mr. Macdonogh still protested against the payment of any other money,

and afterwards asked his lordship to allow him to serve notice for a new trial.

After some discussion it was decided that a motion for a conditional order for a new trial should be made.

II.

COOMBE V. EDWARDS.

COURT of Arches, Monday, Nov. 4. Before Lord Penzance, Dean of Arches.

This was a suit commenced under the Public Worship Regulation Act, in which a monition had been pronounced. The present proceedings were instituted for disobedience to the monition. Dr. Dean, Q.C., and Mr. Blakesley for the promoter. Mr. Edwards did not appear.

Lord Penzance-The court reserved its judgment in this case until the rule for a prohibition in the case of Mr. Mackonochie had been decided; for, although the cases are not identical, a prohibition granted in the one would hardly leave room for this court to take compulsory measures in the other. That decision has now been made, and I venture to think that the result has caused a very general surprise. It has been a surprise, I imagine, to the learned members of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to learn that the court of Her Majesty in Council is an "inferior court," and, as such, subjected to the control and supervision of the common law courts; and still more so to find that this supervision, by a sweeping use of the word "jurisdiction," extends to the regulation of their own procedure and practice. Nor will the reason given for this asserted authority be, perhaps, wholly satisfactory. That the common law courts have been used to issue writs of prohibition to the Court of Delegates when they handled matters not within their jurisdiction is undoubted. And that the Sovereign in Council now exercises, among many other functions, the functions which the delegates used to discharge in ecclesiastical suits, is also beyond dispute. But does it follow from these premisses that, when this ecclesiastical jurisdiction was transferred by Act of Parliament to a tribunal of the highest dignity, in which the Sovereign (herself signing the judgment) takes a part, this tribunal became at once an "inferior court," and subject as such to the writ of prohibition, simply because some of the duties which it discharges are those which an inferior court had previously been used to discharge? In a word, is it the character and position of the court itself, or is it the character of the jurisdiction which it exercises, which makes it liable to be controlled by prohibition? It occurs to one to ask what, before the Judicature Act, was the position of the Courts of Probate and Matrimonial Causes? The entire jurisdiction of these courts was one which had previously belonged to the Ecclesiastical Courts, and in respect of which prohibitions had been very freely and constantly granted. Did the right