denying altogether the existence in Mr. Gladstone's Cabinet of any such feeling on the Afghan question as Lord Cranbrook suggested. He said that while we were 66 dreaming that all was quiet, we were slumbering on the volcano of second-rate Indian official Chauvinism;" and that, when the war broke out, the Government threw the blame of it on the blindness and dilatoriness of their predecessors in office. Quoting from the history of Lord Northbrook's communications in 1873, both with the Ameer of Afghanistan and with the Home Government, Mr. Childers proved elaborately that the inferences drawn by the whole public from Lord Cranbrook's despatch, and certainly intended to be so drawn, were absolutely false; that Lord Northbrook was authorised by Mr. Gladstone's Cabinet to give the Ameer of Afghanistan very much stronger assurances of support against Russian aggression— which, however, they did not fear-than he had ever before received; and that the delay in entering upon detailed arrangements was due, not to the Viceroy or the Cabinet, but to the Ameer. Mr. Childers further pointed out that, after the accession of the Tory Government to office, the policy of Lord Northbrook received the hearty adhesion of Lord Derby, who, in the House of Lords, in 1874, spoke explicitly for Lord Salisbury (then Indian Secretary), as well as for himself, and that the change of policy— a great change it was-occurred later, namely in 1875. "Lord Cranbrook's despatch, so far as it fixes on 1873 as the critical point of our Afghan policy, and makes the hesitation of the Liberal Cabinet responsible for it, is simply a falsification of history. The despatches now published prove that Lord Northbrook advised, in most grave and weighty terms, against the new Afghan policy, and protested strongly against it. Lord Lytton, therefore, was specially selected to carry it out."

Mr. Childers also made some severe comments on the growth of personal government under Lord Beaconsfield," the personal government of the Minister, using and misusing the Sovereign's name and the Sovereign's powers." The great feature of this Government had been, he said, the degradation of Parliament. "The favourite method is mystery and secrecy. Information is withheld, evasive answers, if not worse, come from Secretaries of State; papers are promised in a few days, and kept for three or four months; assurances are given, true perhaps in the letter, but anything but true in the spirit." And so Parliament is degraded, one of Lord Beaconsfield's aims for forty years back. "The House of Commons is to be reduced to something like the old French Parliament, registering the decrees of the Ministers, with the power, indeed, to protest, and perhaps to censure, but with the knowledge that it can only disapprove what has already been done in the Sovereign's name."

The Duke of Argyll (the Liberal Indian Secretary) at the same time contributed to the papers an account identical with that of Mr. Childers. But he further pointed out that up to the Umballah

Conference of 1869, the object of Ameer Ali's demands had not been protection against Russia, but a guarantee of his dynasty against internal rebellion. But in 1869 there was one important demand upon which he asked and received full assurance, that "no European officers would be placed as Residents in his cities." Now this assurance had been in effect withdrawn by the present Government. "So long as Lord Northbrook was Viceroy, he objected to this change of policy, and postponed the adoption of it." But the policy dictated to Lord Lytton involved a complete cancelling of the formal promise given on this head by Lord Mayo. It was the anti-Russian policy which gave rise to this great change. Quetta was occupied in 1876; British Residents were urgently pressed on the Ameer of Afghanistan immediately afterwards. "All round it was a policy of fuss and fear," and the demands on Shere Ali were finally pushed to the extreme length of a suspension of all friendly relations with Cabul. The Duke concluded by expressing very strongly his personal belief that we can never allow Afghanistan to become "in any way subordinate to Russia;" a declaration which must prevent any indifference to the Russian advance being justly attributed to the Duke of Argyll's policy.

Parliament was now summoned for a December session, and the war began in the passes of Afghanistan. Whether the invasion was popular or not, the success of our arms was immediate, and the telegraphic intelligence welcome, which almost photographed the story of the operations as fast as they took place, a curious change in the annals of these frontier-wars. After the issue of the proclamation no time was lost in commencing work, and Lieut.-Gen. Sir Samuel Browne, commanding the Peshawur Valley force, entered the Khyber district early on the morning of Nov. 21 with his headquarters and the Third Brigade of the First Division. Ali Musjid Fort, the scene of the repulse of Sir Neville Chamberlain's Mission, was the first point of attack, and of the capture of this stronghold, and the fighting in the Khyber Pass, the correspondent of the Daily News, under date Nov. 21 and 22, gives the following graphic account :-

"At daybreak to-day (Nov. 21) General Browne stood on the little plain beyond Jumrood, watching the march to the front. The advance guard, under General Appleyard, first passed; next the wing of the Fourteenth, the Sikhs, a splendid regiment; then the wing of the 81st Queen's; then two companies of Native Sappers, followed by a Mountain Battery and Manderson's Horse Artillery. When these had passed the staff trotted to the front. The road is roughish till Shadi Bhugiar Glen is reached; it is then easier, especially on General Mackeson's road.

"A piquet of the enemy's cavalry was visible in front on the top of the Shagai ridge, quite beyond range. The advance guard marched briskly on, and presently crested a height, whence, at ten o'clock, a skirmishing fire was opened on the enemy's piquet.

The latter retired after a desultory reply. The force pressing on, and occasionally firing, reached the Shagai ridge, whence Ali Musjid is clearly visible. At 2,500 range the front was cleared by our skirmishing fire; then the Sikhs went to the right to work round Ali Musjid, while other detachments operating on the left front occupied without resistance the village of Lalla Chena, and occupied the tower on the hill beyond.

"At noon Ali Musjid fired the first shell, which burst in the air. A second, well aimed, flew over the staff on Shagai, and fell, without bursting, beyond. A long halt was necessary to allow our heavy battery to come up, and the interval was utilised by the Horse Artillery placing guns on the height to our proper right. Ali Musjid Fort replied, and the firing became somewhat brisk. Meanwhile firing was heard to the proper left of Ali Musjid. Some conjectured it was Macpherson's turning movement on our right coming into operation; but the Afghans about Ali Musjid held their ground, although thus apparently threatened on their flank as well as in front. Our Horse Artillery fire was fairly served, but the Afghans replied with spirit from Ali Musjid at first, but afterwards were more silent.

"At one o'clock the 40-pounders reached the scene and came into action, as also Magennis's 9-pounders. The horse-guns moved off the ridge and gave place to the 9-pounder battery, while the 40-pounders played against the right prolongation of the Afghan position. The Afghan guns slowly but steadily replied, making good practice, especially from 7-pounders in the central bastion.

"About two o'clock, two 40-pounder shells crashed into the central bastion of Ali Musjid and crumbled a great portion of it, and apparently dismounted the guns which had been so stubborn. Our infantry now moved forward, covered by the artillery fire, and the skirmishers began to mount the steep slopes of the Rhotas. On our right the musketry of our turning brigade on the top of the Rhotas was now apparently audible.

"Soon after two o'clock the infantry advanced briskly. The Fourth Brigade took the left slopes of the valley, pressing on through the rocks towards Ali Musjid, while the Third Brigade took their right side. When the last rocky ridge on the left slope was crossed a rocky plateau followed, nearly up to the foot of the Ali Musjid rock, and the skirmishers pushed on steadily, firing briskly, and evoking a sharp reply from the enemy, who were studding the rock-strewn slopes.

"Meanwhile Manderson's battery moving on along the bed of the stream had come into action. Four guns, previously silent, came into action, and the enemy developed guns in new places. In view of the expected co-operation from the two brigades despatched on the turning movement, and the sun setting, while as yet much had to be done, the operations were reluctantly suspended till to-morrow, precautions being taken to protect our positions, and the troops bivouacking where they stood on our left.

"The Third Brigade had gained a position very close to the right flank of the Ali Musjid position, and, indeed, were almost within storming distance. General Appleyard was well to the front, and as I send this off at 4 o'clock there seems every chance that this part of the Ali Musjid position, enfolding the rest, will be taken."

"ALI MUSJID, Nov. 22.-After the despatch of yesterday afternoon's message, and the realisation of the fact that there was no hope of co-operation from Macpherson, there was no alternative but to suspend the enterprise for the night. The dispositions accordingly were made. Appleyard's advance of the Third Brigade, consisting of a detachment of the Twenty-seventh Brigade of infantry, had pressed forward on the steep slope leading to the peak forming the right flank of the enemy's position so eagerly that hopes rose of success; but Major Birch, who commanded the gallant band, found successive lines of entrenchment occupied by the Afghans, and at dusk the order reached him to abandon the impossible effort and fall back on his supports. In doing so the detachment was severely handled. Major Birch and Lieut. Fitzgerald were killed. Lieut. Maclain was wounded, as were about a score of Sepoys. A few other Sepoys and four men of Manderson's battery completed the casualties.

"During the night dispositions were arranged to strengthen our left attack, which had prospered best yesterday. In the night intelligence reached Major Cavagnari that the garrison of Ali Musjid had heard of Tytler's arrival in the rear, and were evacuating. The dawn showed some flags and a few people still visible about the works. A pause ensued to facilitate the combined action between the right and left, and a general advance to the point overlooking the abandoned Afghan tents and the cannon in the bed of the stream below the fort.

"As we gazed and speculated, a horseman was seen advancing from the fort. He neared, and proved to be young Chisholm, of the 9th Lancers, who had gone on a reconnaissance, and found already some Sepoys and two officers in occupation of Ali Musjid, and made his way back to report to the General's headquarters. We immediately hurried on, descended the steep slope, crossed the stream, and found ourselves standing in Fort Ali Musjid. Above was the fluttering canvas of the abandoned tents opposite. In all twenty-one guns and a few prisoners were taken."

The fall of Ali Musjid having removed the first obstacle to the advance of the Peshawur column, Sir S. Browne, having remained there during the night of the 22nd, pushed on the next day towards Dhakka and Jellalabad. General Macpherson's brigade met with difficulties, but at length reached the pass above Ali Musjid. Both his and Tytler's brigade rejoined the main advance. The occupation of Dhakka, on the Cabul river, at the western end of the Khyber Pass, took place unopposed; while the chief of the Mohmunds, a native tribe inhabiting Lalpoora, opposite Dhakka,

with all the district north of the Khyber, hastened to come in and offer his submission. This example was followed by the headmen of all the villages in the Khoord Khyber district. It is said that Mir Akhor, the Afghan Governor, with General Ghoolam Haidar, escaped from Ali Musjid by the Choora Pass, leaving the garrison, with sick and wounded, to be taken prisoners. One despatch stated that General Tytler's brigade had cut off the retreat of the Ameer's troops and captured many prisoners. Major Cavagnari reported that the Afreedis had intercepted 500 men of the Afghan army, and taken from them their arms and clothing.

Meanwhile the Khoorum advance force, under Major-General Roberts, assembled at Thull, in the Kohat district, about seventy miles from Kohat town, and found itself on Afghan soil immediately after beginning its march. Kapuyan Fort, on the Afghan side of the border, an insignificant position, was found deserted. Marching eight miles further, General Roberts came to Ahmadshana, where he occupied another fort, which also showed marks of having been recently evacuated. Halting there, he convoked an assembly of the hill tribes, and arranged with them for the supply of forage and fuel. At daybreak on Saturday the 23rd the headquarters of this division moved to a place called Hazari Pir, about twenty miles from Kapuyan. The road immediately beyond Ahmadshana was terribly bad, boulders of rock, several tons in weight, blocking up the way. The Royal Horse Artillery was unable to advance for several hours, until the pioneers had blasted a way. It was officially reported that the Khoorum fort was occupied on the 25th, and that the Afghans had retired to Peiwar.

The first news that followed upon this opening was bad. The correspondent of the Daily News reported the closing of the Khyber between Jumrood and Ali Musjid, by hillmen, who beat back convoys with supplies on their way to Dhakka. On Monday, December 2, a telegram was also published from the Standard correspondent in the Khoorum, showing that General Roberts had on Saturday, November 30, commenced an attack on the Peiwar Kotel, or "Crest," and had been repulsed, the fire from the Crest being so severe that orders were issued to retire to the Khoorum Fort. It was not supposed probable that General Roberts intended this to be the serious assault, as his troops were weary with twenty-four hours' marching, and without food, though he may have been deceived by the native reports that the Afghans were in full flight. They were only retreating from the Habees Killa, the Afghan cantonment in the valley, to their position, a strong crag upon the crest of the Peiwar; but General Roberts hoped to secure their guns. However that may be, the movement failed, and as it was certain that the General could not accept failure, the result of his attack was expected with great anxiety. A defeat would have made all the hillmen soldiers of the Ameer, and perhaps have created a deep sensation in India, while it must have been repaired by an expenditure of valuable English lives.