Claim for conversion of chattels. Claim for loss, or conversion, or detention of a pledge. her request to the amount of £150, and the same is now due and owing from the defendant to the plaintiff. Particulars of the said sum of £150 have been delivered to the defendant. The plaintiff claims : (1.) As to the seizure, detention, and conversion of the said. stock and goods in the 9th and 10th paragraphs stated, a return of the same or their value, and £200 damages for their detention. (2.) As to the residue of the statement of claim, the sum of £150. (3.) Such further and other relief, &c. Action against Pawnbroker for Loss of Pledge, stating Cause of Action alternatively in Trover and Detinue. 1. The defendant is, and at the time herein referred to was, a pawnbroker, carrying on business at 2. The plaintiff, at the latter end of the year 1875, in consideration of a sum of money lent and advanced by the defendant to him, delivered to and deposited with the defendant and the defendant received from the plaintiff certain silver plate, and amongst other things a silver racing trophy or cup of the value of £110 by way of pledge and security for the money so lent and advanced by the defendant to the plaintiff and interest thereon, to be redelivered to the plaintiff on his repaying to the defendant the said money and interest. 3. In consideration of such deposit the defendant undertook to take ordinary care of the said trophy and cup, and to redeliver the same as aforesaid. 4. The plaintiff has repaid to the defendant the said money and interest. 5. All things happened and were done and conditions were fulfilled and times elapsed necessary to entitle the plaintiff to have the defendant to redeliver to him the said trophy or cup, and to a performance by the defendant of his said undertaking. 6. The defendant did not use ordinary diligence in the care and safeguard of the said silver racing trophy or cup, and by reason thereof the same became and was lost. 7. The defendant did not nor would he redeliver the said silver racing trophy or cup to the plaintiff on his repaying to the defendant the said money and interest as aforesaid, but Claim for has refused and refuses to do so. loss, or conversion, or 8. In the alternative the plaintiff says that the defendant detention of wrongfully detained and detains from the plaintiff the said a pledge. silver racing trophy or cup. Trover for a Pony; Defence that the Pony was the Defendant's, and had been fraudulently obtained from him. 1. The plaintiff is a horse-dealer, and the defendant is Claim for also a horse-dealer, both living and carrying on their business conversion at 2. On the 2nd of February, 1876, the plaintiff was the owner of a certain pony which he had purchased from H. H. L. 3. The defendant, on the said day, on a false claim that the said pony was his property, seized and took and drove away the said pony, and has converted the same to his own use, and has deprived the plaintiff of the possession thereof. The plaintiff claims £50, the value of the said pony. Statement of Defence. of a pony. 1. As to so much of the statement of claim as alleges the Defence. seizure, taking, and driving away a pony of the plaintiff as alleged, and the conversion of the same, and the depriving of the plaintiff of the same and possession thereof, the defendant says that the said pony was not the plaintiff's as alleged. 2. The said pony was on and before the 21st January, 1876, the property of the defendant, and on or about the 21st January, 1876, the said H. H. L. fraudulently obtained the same from the defendant under colour of a purchase for £45, with the preconceived fraudulent intention of not paying for the same. 3. As soon as the defendant discovered the said fraud, and before the 2nd of February, 1876, he disaffirmed the said pretended purchase. 4. The alleged sale to the plaintiff by the said H. H. L. took place, if at all, on the 2nd February, 1876, and not before. 5. The defendant contends that the said H. H. L. at the time of such alleged sale had no property in the said pony, and Defence to claim for conversion of a pony. claim for Conversion of tobacco. that no property passed to the plaintiff by such alleged sale, and that the property in the said pony remained and remains in the defendant. 6. The defendant in the alternative further alleges that the plaintiff at the time of his alleged purchase of the said pony knew that the said H. H. L. had dishonestly come by it. 7. If necessary the defendant will allege the said pony to have been obtained by the said H. H. L. by larceny and by trick, and that the alleged sale to the plaintiff was not in market overt. 8. The defendant says the said pony was of the value of £45, not £50. Action for Conversion of Tobacco. 1. On or about the 3rd of December, 1875, the plaintiff, who is a tobacco manufacturer, bought of one H. and became the absolute owner and entitled to the possession of fifty hogsheads of tobacco, then lying in bond at the London and St. Katharine Dock. 2. Afterwards H., without any authority from and in fraud of the plaintiff, affected to transfer the tobacco to the order of the defendants, and delivered to the defendants the dockwarrant or other receipt issued by the dock company in respect of the goods, and the defendants otherwise became possessed of the dock-warrant and tobacco in wrong of the plaintiff. H. afterwards absconded. 3. The plaintiff applied to the dock company for delivery of his tobacco; but they, following the ordinary course of business, refused to comply with his request until the dock-warrant should be produced to them duly signed or indorsed in his the plaintiff's favour. 4. Thereupon the plaintiff applied to the defendants for the dock-warrant and for delivery of his tobacco, but they refused to part with or deliver the same to him, and claimed and still claim to retain the same as security for advances alleged to have been made by them to H. at the time of the delivery to them of the dock-warrant, as in the 2nd paragraph mentioned. The plaintiff claims : Use and Occupation (@). Claim for Use and Occupation. 1. The plaintiffs are a railway company who were authorised by the M. R. (T. H. E.) Act, 1864, to take for the purposes of (a) Use and occupation.]—This action is given by 11 Geo. 2, c. 19, s. 14, which provides that it shall be lawful for landlords, where the agreement is not by deed, to recover a reasonable satisfaction for the lands, tenements, or hereditaments held or occupied by the defendants, in an action for the use and occupation of what was so held or enjoyed; and if on the trial of such action, any parol demise, or any agreement (not being by deed), whereon a certain rent was reserved shall appear, the plaintiff shall not therefore be non-suited, but may make use thereof as evidence of the quantum of damages to be recovered. The plaintiff must prove-1. That the defendant came in under him or acknowledged his title by payment of rent or otherwise; 2. The occupation by the defendant; and 3. The amount of rent either expressly reserved or due on the footing of a quantum meruit. Title.]-If the plaintiff has not demised or given possession to the defendant, it would seem he must show that the legal estate was vested in him at the time from which he claims. Mortgagees may maintain this action. (Ronson v. Eicke, 7 Ad. & E. 451.) Tenants in common may join in the action where rent has been paid to their joint agent, that being evidence of a joint letting. (Last v. Dinn, 28 L. J. Ex. 94.) The plaintiff's title is generally established by the production of a writing or agreement, which is proved in the usual manner, or in its absence, by payment of rent by the defendant or other circumstance, such as his submitting to a distress. It would appear that there need be no interest or reversion left in the plaintiff to maintain this action, as where a person demises all the residue of his term to the defendant (Pollock v. Stacy, 9 Q. B. 1033), though it has been held that such a demise operates as an assignment (Beardman v. Wilson, L. R. 4 C. P. 57.) Claim for use and occupation. The origin of the action of use and occupation. What the plaintiff must prove. What title the plaintiff must have. Occupation of defendant.]—A person who has agreed to take premises Occupation but has not entered, cannot be sued in this action, as an occupation, by the either actual or constructive, is necessary (Towne v. D'Heinrich, 22 L. J. defendant C. P. 219); and it seems that a constructive occupation will not be suffi- essential. cient in the absence of an actual demise. (Atkins v. Humphrey, 2 C. B. 654.) An occupation prior to the date of assignment of the reversion to the plaintiff will not enable him to recover for use and occupation prior to the assignment. (Mortimer v. Preedy, 3 M. & W. 602.) Adverse possession by the defendant will not enable plaintiff to maintain the action, as the occupation must be with his permission. (Tew v. Jones, 13 M. & W. 12); but a tenancy at sufferance, arising from occupation after expiry of lease is sufficient, though the defendant continues to hold as tenant to a stranger. (Hellier v. Sillcox, 19 L. J. Q. B. 295.) Occupation by a third person by permission of defendant, or by his tenant or assignee, is sufficient, provided in the latter case the plaintiff has not recognized the assignee as his tenant. (Shins v. Dillon, i Ir. R. C. L. Ex. 227.) If two persons sign an agreement to become tenants, and one enters, both can be sued for use and occupation. (Glen v. Dungey, 4 Ex. 61.) But where one of two joint lessees holds over, the other is not liable for the occupation of the former. (Draper v. Crofts, 15 M. & W. 166.) It is not necessary that there should be an express contract creating Claim for use and occupation. The relation of landlord and tenant may be implied. The expiry What amounts to such a surrender of a term as constitutes a defence. their said Act certain warehouses and premises in Gravel Lane, Aldgate, in the city of L., which belonged to the defendants. the relation of landlord and tenant, as it may be implied; as where a vendee enters after contract, and the sale goes off, and he remains in occupation afterwards. (See Crouch v. Tregonning, L. R. 7 Ex. 8S.) But the action will not lie where the defendant enters under an agreement for a lease, which, it turns out, the plaintiff cannot grant for want of title. (Rum ball v. Wright, 1 C. & P. 589.) One co-tenant who occupies a house or farm alone taking the full benefit thereof, without excluding the others, is not liable to them for use and occupation. (McMahon v. Burchell, 2 Phill. Rep. 127; Henderson v. Eason, 12 Q. B. 986.) DEFENCES. 1. Expiry of plaintiff's title.]-If before the occupation in reference to which the claim is made, the plaintiff's interest has expired, this is a good defence, assuming that the defendant has paid his rent to the person claiming as against the plaintiff, as where the plaintiff's interest has become forfeited to the lord of the manor under whom the defendant has commenced a fresh holding and paid rent, after having renounced the plaintiff's title. (Balls v. Westwood, 2 Camp. 11), or where he has paid rent to a bona fide claimant really entitled to the premises, under whom he has commenced a fresh tenancy. (Mountnoy v. Collier, 22 L. J. Q. B. 124); or where he has paid the rent to a mortgagee of the plaintiff under legal compulsion. (Hickman v. Machin, 28 L. J. Ex. 310.) 2. Surrender accepted.]—If the landlord has accepted another person as tenant, and the latter has entered with the consent of the defendant. this operates as a surrender (Nickells v. Atherstone, 10 Q. B. 944), even though the demise be by deed. (Davison v. Gent, 26 L. J. Ex. 122.) If the landlord has accepted the key of the premises, this operates as a surrender without the acceptance of another tenant. (Dodd v. deklora, 6 M. & G. 672.) Or, if after refusal of the key, which the tenant leaves behind, the landlord enters and puts up notice that the premises are to be let. (Phené v. Popplewell, 31 L. J. C. P. 235.) Anything which amounts to an agreement by the tenant to abandon and by the landlord to resume possession, creates a surrender. (Ib.) Where a tenant on lease has quitted the demised premises before the expiration of the term, and has sent the key to the landlord with the intention of giving up possession. the mere fact that the landlord has received the key and attempted unsuccessfully to re-let does not estop him from alleging that the tenancy still subsists. And if afterwards, before the expiration of the term, the landlord re-lets the premises, the surrender by operation of law takes effect from such re-letting, and does not relate back to the original receipt of the key. (Oastler v. Henderson, 46 L. J. Com. Law, 607, explaining Phené v. Popplewell.) In certain cases the consent of the landlord is not necessary to complete the surrender, as where furnished lodgings are let in a state unfit for occupation on account of being infested with vermin, and the tenant leaves in consequence. (Smith v. Marrable, 11 M. & W. 5; Campbell v. Wenlock, 4 F. & F. 716; Wilson v. Finch Hatton, 46 L. J. 489.) This would not apply to the case of an unfurnished house. (12 M. & W. 68, 86.) A landlord omitting to repair pursuant to his covenant whereby the premises become unfit for profitable occupation would not exempt the tenant from liability for rent in the event of his quitting. (Roscoe, Ev. 13th ed. 345.) Eviction.]-An eviction by the landlord of the tenant or his sub-tenant is a defence (Prentice v. Elliot, 5 M. & W. 606; Burn v. Phelps, 1 Stark. |