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release.

(which the defendant does not admit), the defendant says that A form of after that date, and before the commencement of this action, that is to say on the 30th of January aforesaid, the plaintiff by a deed bearing that date, and made between the plaintiff of the one part, and the defendant of the other part, released the defendant therefrom.

Replevin (a).

Statement of Claim in Replevin.

1. The plaintiff previously to the 25th March, 1877, was Claim in weekly tenant to the defendants of a house and premises situate replevin. at No. 38, George Street, Camberwell, in the county of Surrey.

A release of the whole of a debt given to one of two, or more joint or joint and several debtors discharges all of them, but receiving a portion of a debt from one of them, and putting an end to an action against such one, does not discharge the other or others. (Watters v. Smith, 2 B. & Ad. 889.) A qualified release of one co-debtor as where the right is reserved to make him a nominal defendant with the others, does not release the others. (Solly v. Forbes, 2 B. & B. 38.) So where the remedy is reserved against the others. (Willis v. De Castro, 27 L. J. C. P. 243.) So where on release of principal debtor the right against surety is reserved. (Green v. Wynn, L. R. 4 Ch. 204; Bateson v. Gosling, L. R. 7 C. P. 9.) In the last two cases the so called release is not strictly such, but a covenant not to sue. (S. CC.) This covenant formerly supported a plea of release on the ground of avoiding circuity of action. (Ford v. Beech, 11 Q. B. 853.) A fortiori under the present system of pleading it would support a defence alleging a release.

How far

one debtor may be re

leased without

his co

debtor.

A discharge under the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, of one joint debtor or co- Bankruptcy contractor does not release the other. (Sect. 50.) This provision extends proceedings to cases of composition (Megrath v. Gray, L. R. 9 C. P. 216) and arrange- do not ment. (Ellis v. Wilmot, L. R. 10 Ex. 10.) It has been held that a reso- release lution for composition duly registered, though binding on creditors as co-debtors. against the debtor, does not release his surety. (Ex parte Jacobs, L. R. 10 Ch. 211.) However, the contrary was held in Wilson v. Lloyd, L. R. 16 Eq. 60. But this latter decision seems to overlook the 50th section referred to.

Where the releasee has obtained the discharge by fraud or under circumstances which render it void, such as drunkenness, &c., the plaintiff should in his reply set forth this fact, and should not rely merely on a denial of the release. Even before the recent alteration of the rules of pleading it was necessary to raise this answer by the replication. (Wild v. Williams, 6 M. & W. 490.) The plea should state the form of the release, as whether it was by deed or writing, &c. (a) Where a person's goods have been taken under a distress, whether a distress for rent or damage feasant, he has a right to replevy his goods, that is to say he can get his goods back again upon giving sureties and entering into a bond conditioned to prosecute a suit against the person

Fraud, &c., in the obtaining of the release to be specially replied. The right of replevying.

Statement

of claim in replevin.

2. The said house is part of a property comprised in a lease which expired on the 25th of March, 1877. The defendants had acquired possession of the said house under or by virtue of the said lease, and all the defendants' estate and interest therein expired on the said 25th of March.

3. The plaintiff attorned to the persons entitled to the said house on the expiration of the said lease, and has ever since paid his rent to such persons.

4. On the 7th of August, 1877, the defendants wrongfully and unlawfully caused a distress to be levied on the plaintiff's goods in the said premises for the sum of £, which they alleged was due from the plaintiff to them for rent from the said 25th of March, 1877.

5. The plaintiff thereupon replevied the said goods, and gave the usual security to prosecute this action, and to return the said goods if a return thereof should be adjudged.

The plaintiff claims :

(1.) £100 damages.

(2.) Such further and other, &c.

Nature of the replevin bond when

action proceeds in Superior Court.

The procedure in replevin.

who seized the goods, and also conditioned to return the goods if a return should be awarded. By the 19 & 20 Vict. c. 108, s. 65, the action of replevin can be commenced in the Superior Court upon the replevisor (the person whose goods have been distrained), giving security for such an amount as (1) shall cover the alleged rent or damage for which the distress was made; (2) the probable costs of the action in the Superior Court; and in this case the replevisor must undertake to commence his action within a week and prosecute it without delay, and unless judg ment is obtained by default, satisfy the Court (that is, the Superior Court. for it would be otherwise if the suit were in the County Court) that he had good ground for believing either that the title to some corporeal or incorporeal hereditament, or to some toll, market, fair, or franchise was in question, or that such rent or damage exceeded £20, and to make return of the goods if a return thereof should be awarded.

The procedure in a case which ultimately resolves itself into an action of replevin will be as follows:-A.'s goods or cattle are taken by distress. A. then goes before the registrar of the County Court and enters into a replevin bond to prosecute an action against the distrainer either in the County Court or the Superior Court, and upon executing this bond and giving security, he gets his goods or cattle back. In the replevin action. the replevisor is the plaintiff, and the distrainer is the defendant, and after the issue of the writ or plaint, as the case may be, the action proceeds in the ordinary way, the onus at the trial resting on the plaintiff to show that the defendant acted wrongfully in distraining his goods.

Rescission (a).

Reward (b).

1. The defendant is a jeweller, &c.

2. On the

Claim for a reward promised

defendant.

of August, 1877, the defendant caused an advertisement to be inserted in a newspaper called the Daily by the News offering a reward of £100 to any person who should give such information as should lead to the detection of a person alleged in the said advertisement to have stolen certain property belonging to the defendant. 3. On the of September, 1877, the plaintiff gave information to the defendant which ultimately led to the apprehension and conviction of the person who stole the said property.

4. All conditions were performed, things happened, and times elapsed necessary to entitle the plaintiff to be paid the said reward of £100.

5. The defendant has not paid the said £100. The plaintiff claims £100.

Statement of Defence.

1. The defendant denies the allegation in the 3rd paragraph Defence. of the statement of claim. The defendant admits that the

(a) Rescission is the putting an end to a simple contract before breach by mutual consent. The rescission may be by parol agreement, even where the Statute of Frauds requires a writing signed for the validity of the contract. An agreement by parol to vary a written contract valid under the Statute of Frauds is not valid for that purpose, and it has been held that it does not rescind the original contract. (Noble v. Ward, L. R. 1 Ex. 117; L. R. 2 Ex. 135, Ex. Ch.)

(b) Where the defendant promised a reward to whoever would give such information as would lead to the conviction of a felon, and the plaintiff gave the necessary information, it was held that the service rendered was a sufficient consideration for the promise, and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the reward, although he was a constable and police officer of the district in which the felony was committed. (See England v. Davidson, 11 Ad. & E. 856; Smith v. Moore, 1 C. B. 438; Turner v. Walker, 6 B. & S. 871; L. R. 1 Q. B. 641.) A person may advertise a reward for a return of stolen property, but if he puts in his advertisement a clause to the effect that no questions will be asked, he exposes himself to a penalty of £50, which can be recovered by any common informer in an action of debt. (See the 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 102.)

How con

tracts may be rescinded or varied.

Rewards offered for recovery of stolen property may be recovered.

But stating

that no question will be

asked ex

poses to penalty.

Defence to claim for a

reward.

plaintiff gave certain information respecting one A. B., but the defendant was at the time he received such information from the plaintiff in possession of the same information, and much more relating to the said A. B., and which said last-mentioned information led to his arrest and conviction, and the information given by the plaintiff was wholly useless to the defendant.

Against vendee

for not accepting

delivery.

Generally contract of sale of goods need not be in writing.

Exceptions

to this rule, under Statute of Frauds.

Essential difference in the evidence of the contract where the

goods are above or below £10 in value.

Sale of Goods (a).

Action against Vendee for not accepting Delivery.

1. The plaintiffs are cotton-spinners carrying on business at B., in the county of L. The defendant is a manufacturer carrying on business at S., in the county of C.

(a) The rule may be taken to be that an ordinary contract of sale of goods need not be in writing; but this rule is subject to exceptions in two classes of cases. 1. By the 17th section of the Statute of Frauds it is provided that no sale of goods, wares, or merchandise (and by Lord Tenterden's Act, 9 Geo. 4, c. 14, it makes no matter though they may be intended to be delivered at some future time, or may not at the time of the contract be actually made, or fit or ready for delivery), for the price of £10 or upwards, shall be good, except the buyer shall accept part of the goods so sold and actually receive the same, or give something in earnest to bind the bargain or in part payment, or some note or memorandum of the said bargain be made and signed by the parties to be charged by such contract or their agents thereunto lawfully authorised. 2. By the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds no action shall be brought to charge any person upon any contract which is not to be performed within one year from the making thereof, unless the agreement or some note thereof is in writing signed by the party to be charged or his agent. This latter section is general in its terms, and is by no means confined to the sale of goods; in fact, it will seldom apply in such a case. It has been decided that it applies only to contracts, the complete performance of which is of necessity extended beyond the space of a year. (Souch v. Strawbridge, 2 C. B. 815; Knowlman v. Bluett, L. R. 9 Ex. 1 and 307.) Therefore a contract which can be performed on either side within a year is not within the section. (Donellan v. Read, 3 B. & Ad. 899; and see on the subject 1 Smith's Leading Cas., 7th ed., 335, notes to Peter v. Compton.)

Putting out of account the few contracts of sale that might come within the 4th section, the law regarding the sale of ordinary merchandise, is essentially different where the value of the goods sold is less or more than £10. In the former case, the contract of sale is complete as soon as the parties have come to a verbal agreement. A. enters a shop and sees a watch. He asks the price, and the shopman says £7. He says he will purchase, and the shopman agrees to sell it. The contract of sale is then complete, and if A., the purchaser, leaves the shop without taking with him the watch, or paying the price or any part of it, or signing any acknowledgment of the contract, the sale is nevertheless complete, the watch is his, remains in the shop at his risk, and he is liable to the shop

2. On the 15th September, 1875, the plaintiffs, through Against their agents Messrs. W. and R. K. L., of M., sold to the defen- vendee dant 50,000lbs. of yarn of a certain quality and description at accepting

for not

delivery.

Difference

in the evidence of the contract where the goods are above or below £10

in value.

keeper for its price. But suppose in the case stated the shopman had fixed the value of the watch at £13, and A. had agreed to purchase and the shopman to sell at that sum, and nothing more had taken place, but A. had left the shop without the watch, without paying the price or any part, and without signing any memorandum of the contract-in that case there would have been no contract, the property in the watch would not pass to A., and he would not be liable in any action to the shopkeeper. To constitute a valid contract of sale of goods, wares, or merchandise which are above the value of £10, one or more of three things must happen. Either the purchaser or his agent must sign some memorandum of the contract, or he must pay the price or part of it, or give some earnest to bind the bargain, or the purchaser must accept and actually receive the goods. There are to be found in the books an infinite number of decisions upon what constitutes a good satisfaction of these conditions -the effect of which can only be given here. The memorandum in writing.]-The note of the contract upon which What the reliance is placed need not be made at the time the contract is entered into, though it must be made before action brought (Bill v. Bament, 9 M. & W. 36); and several documents, if sufficiently connected the one with the other by internal evidence, will constitute a good memorandum within the statute. (Jackson v. Lowe, 1 Bing. 9; Saunderson v. Jackson, 2 B. & P. 238; Warner v. Willington, L. J. 25 Ch. 662.) The note or notes which make up the memorandum must contain all the terms of the agreement. (Kenworthy v. Schofield, 2 B. & C. 947.) It or they must contain the names of both the contract parties or their agents (Williams v. Brynes, 1 Moo. P. C. N. S. 154, 198), the subject-matter of the contract, and the price and mode of payment if agreed upon. Where it appears by parol that the price has been agreed upon, and it is omitted in the note of the contract, the written memorandum is imperfect, and cannot be given in evidence. (Elmore v. Kingscote, 5 B. & C. 583; Goodman v. Griffiths, 1 H. & N. 574 ; L. J. 26 Ex. 145.) But where no price was really agreed upon, the contract will be good, and a reasonable price will be presumed. (Hoadley v. McLain, 10 Bing. 482.)

It has been stated that a good memorandum within the statute can be made up of several documents, as where there is an unsigned memorandum containing the order, and then a letter (not necessarily addressed to the other party to the contract (Gibson v. Holland, L. R. 1 C. P. 1) signed by the defendant, in which he refers to the memorandum. (Saunderson v. Jackson, 2 B. & P. 238; Buxton v. Rust, L. R. 7 Ex. 1, 279, Ex. Ch.) And it has even been decided that where the vendee wrote a letter to the vendor, in which, after referring to all the essential terms of the contract, he stated he had not received and declined to have the goods, because they had been damaged by the carriers, there was here a sufficient note in writing, notwithstanding the repudiation (Bailey v. Sweeting, 9 C. B. N. S. 843; L. J. 30 C. P. 150; Wilkinson v. Evans, L. R. 1 C. P. 407); but the plaintiff cannot avail himself of a subsequent letter from the defendant, in which, though he recognises the order, he disaffirms or adds to the terms of the memorandum. (Cooper v. Smith, 15 East, 103.)

memorandum must

contain.

The effect of the omis sion of the price from the note.

Where the

note is

made up

of several documents.

As to the signature to the note, it is enough if it is signed by the de- As to sigfendant (Laythoarp v. Bryant, 2 N. C. 735; and it makes no difference nature. that there is no remedy against the party who does not sign. (Allen v. Bennett, 3 Taunt. 169.) It is quite immaterial where the signature

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