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Innkeeper (a). Claim for Goods of Guest stolen in the Defendant's Inn. Against 1. The plaintiff is, and at the time of the committing of the innkeeper for goods grievance hereinafter mentioned was, a commission agent. The stoled at his inn.
tion to the jury. (16.) Dinners, fruit, and confectionery supplied to an undergraduate out of college are not primâ facie necessaries as
coming under the head of meat. Matters of mere ornament, such as ries."
gold rings, betting-books, &c., are not within the rule as to necessaries suitable to one's condition. Mere luxuries, such as cigars, are not, in the absence of special circumstances, to be regarded as necessaries. (Bryant v. Richardson, L. R. 3 Ex. 93 n., and see Ryder v. Wombrell, supra.)
Necessaries for an infant's wife are on the same footing as those for himself. (Turner v. Tresby, 1 Str. 168.)
See decisions in particular cases as to what are and are not necessaries, collected in Roscoe Ev., 13th ed., 635, 636.
It is no defence to an action for necessaries that the infant had an allowance sufficient to buy all necessaries with ready money. (Burghart v. Hall, 4 M. & W. 727.) Nor is evidence admissible to show that the infant had a sufficient supply of necessaries. (Ryder v. Wombrell, L. R. 3 Ex. 90, Bramwell, B., dissentiente, and decision not included in
reversal in Ex. Ch. L. R. 4 Ex. 32.) Infant not Before the passing of 37 & 38 Vict. c. 62, above referred to, it was held liable on
that an infant was not liable on an account stated even for necessaries, an account and that such account was not admissible as an admission that stated even necessaries to the amount shown had been supplied (Ingleden v. Douglas, for neces 2 Stark. 36); nor for money lent, though laid out in purchasing necessaries. saries (Robart v. Knouth, 2 Esp. 28); nor on a bill of exchange for
amount of necessaries. (Williamson v. Watts, 1 Camp. 552.) Though the above Act excepts contracts, &c., for necessaries from its operation, yet as it does not expressly alter the former state of the law, but only provides that such contracts are not within the enactment, these deci. sions do not seem to be disturbed.
A person is liable on a bill accepted by him after attaining his majority, though drawn before. (Stevens v. Jackson, 4 Camp. 164.) But where goods not necessaries ordered by an infant are delivered to a carrier for him before majority, but do not reach him until after, he is
not liable. (Griffin v. Langfield, 3 Camp. 254.) Infant
When an action, though in form ex contractu, is in fact founded on
tort, as where an infant is sued for money had and received in a case liable for a where such money has been fraudulently
appropriated or embezzled by tort, but not on a
him, infancy is no defence. (Briston v. Eastman, 1 Esp. 172. And see contract
Burnard v. Haggis, 32 L. J. C. P. 189.) But if the action is for a founded on
fraudulent misrepresentation, infancy is a defence. (Liverpool Adelphi tort.
v. Fairhurst, 9 Ex. 422.) An infant is not liable upon a warranty given by him. (Howlett v. Haswell, 4 Camp. 118.)
It is no answer to a plea of infancy that the defendant fraudulently represented himself to be of full age. (Bartlett v. Wells, 31 L. J. Q. B. 57.) It is not competent to a plaintiff to treat a breach of contract as a tort for the purpose of suing the infant upon it. (Jennings v. Randall, 8 T. R. 335.)
(a) By the 26 & 27 Vict. c. 41, s. 1, no innkeeper shall be liable to make good to any guest any loss of or injury to property brought to the inn (not being a horse or other live animal, or any gear appertaining thereto, or any carriage) to a greater amount than £30, except in the following cases :-(1) Where the property shall have been stolen, lost, or injured through the wilful act, default, or neglect of the innkeeper, or any defendant at the like time was and still is the keeper of an inn Against at C., in the county of B., for the reception and accommodation
keeper. of travellers.
servant in his employ. (2) Where the property shall have been deposited Statutory expressly for safe custody with the innkeeper ; provided that in case of protection such deposit the innkeeper may require as a "condition of his liability of innthat the property be deposited in a box or other receptacle fastened and keeper. sealed by the person depositing it. By sect. 2, if an innkeeper shall refuse to receive for safe custody any property of his guest, or if the guest shall, through any default of the innkeeper, be unable to deposit his property, the innkeeper shall not be entitled to the benefit of the Act in respect of such property. By sect. 3, every innkeeper is bound to cause at least one copy of sect. 1 of the Act, printed in plain type, to be exhibited in a conspicuous part of the hall or entrance of his inn, and is to be entitled to the benefit of the Act in respect of such property only as shall be brought to his inn while such copy is so exhibited. An "inn" means under the Act any hotel, inn, tavern, public-house, or other place of refreshment the keeper of which is by law responsible for the property of his guests (sect. 4).
It has been held that the word wilful in the words “ wilful act, default, or neglect" in the 1st section, must be read with “ act " only, and not with default” or “neglect.” (Squire v. Wheeler, 16 L. T. N. S. 93, per Byles, J.)
It has been held that a mere verbal error in the copy of sect. 1 of the Act will not vitiate the notice so as to make it ineffectual, provided the notice states correctly the provisions of the Act; but the omission of a material How it portion of the statute will render the notice ineffectual to protect the inn. may be keeper. (Spice v. Bacon, 46 L. J. 713, App.) And the accidental omis. lost. sion of the word “ act" in the recital of the first section of the Act was held to be a material omission. (IV.)
An innkeeper is bound at common law to receive persons who present themselves as guests at any hour of the day or night, provided they offer themselves in proper condition to be received into the inn and are ready to pay for the accommodation, and provided there is room to ac. commodate them ; but he is at liberty to set up an inn for the reception of a particular class of persons, and in such a case he is only bound to do what he publicly professes to do. (See per Parke, B., in Johnson v. Midland Railway Co., 4 Ex. 373.) Coffee-house keepers who do not profess to
Who are lodge guests, boarding-house keepers, lodging-house keepers, and the
innkeepers. owners of public-houses who do not let bed-rooms, are not innkeepers at common law. To constitute a person an innkeeper, he must profess to entertain and lodge all travellers. (See 2 Kent Com. 559–6.) Some of these persons, however, would come under the definition of the above statute.
The real innkeeper is the person liable, and not a manager in whose name the licenses have been taken out. (Dixon v. Birch, L. R. 8 Ex. 135.) This would, semble, hold in cases which the above statute includes.
An innkeeper has a lien for his charges upon all goods brought by the The innguest to his inn; but until the other day he could merely retain the keeper's goods until payment. He might not sell them and satisfy his debt. lien and However, by an Act of the present session, which came into operation on right of the 8th August, 1878, an innkeeper may sell the goods on which he has a sale under lien, provided (1) he keeps them six weeks before doing so, and (2) adver- it. tises the sale as directed by the Act a month before the sale.
Defences.]—In actions against innkeepers, where they are under the protection of the above statute they can set up the defence that the guest did not comply with the statute. On the other hand, if the innkeeper
Against an innkeeper for goods stolen at his inn.
2. On or about the 1st of October, 1876, the defendant received into his said inn the plaintiff as and being a traveller.
3. The plaintiff brought with him into the said inn a portmanteau containing articles of wearing apparel, and he placed the same in the bedroom allotted to him by the defendant in the said inn.
4. During the night of the 3rd or morning of the 4th of October, 1876—and while the plaintiff continued to abide in the said inn as a traveller and guest—some person or persons effected an entrance into the plaintiff's said bedroom, and stole thence the said portmanteau and its contents, whereby the same were wholly lost to the plaintiff.
5. The said loss to the plaintiff was brought about by the negligence of the defendant in not providing proper bolts and locks for the door of plaintiff's said bedroom, and by his negligence in employing dishonest servants, and by his negligence in allowing dishonest persons to have access to the premises of his said inn.
The plaintiff claims :
Statement of Defence. 1. The defendant does not admit the allegations contained in the 3rd paragraph of the statement of claim.
2. The defendant denies that the plaintiff's portmanteau and its contents were stolen as alleged in the 4th paragraph of the statement of claim, or at all.
3. If the plaintiff's portmanteau and its contents were stolen
The mere loss or injury of goods establishes a primâ facie case against the innkeeper.
has not brought himself within it by not complying with its requirements, such as exhibiting the printed copy of sect. 1, the plaintiff may in his reply state such omission. In one case it was held that in actions founded on the common law liability of innkeepers, it is a good defence that neither they nor their servants were guilty of any negligence or default in keeping the goods. (Dawson v. Chamney, 5 Q. B. 164.) But the loss of the goods raises a presumption of negligence, and throws on the innkeeper the onus of proving that there was in fact no negligence. He may do this by showing the precautions taken by him, or by showing that the loss happened by the negligence of the guest himself (Armistead v. Wilde, 20 L. J. Q. B. 524 ; Burgess v. Clements, 4 M. & S. 306); but it must be shown that the loss would not have happened if the guest had used the ordinary care of a prudent man. And in Morgan v. Rarey, 6 H. & N. 265, it was laid down generally that an innkeeper, though guilty of no negligence but even diligent, is liable for the loss of or injury to goods of his guest not arising from the negligence of the guest, the act of God, or the Queen's enemies.
or lost, the defendant says that the same were not stolen or lost Against an in consequence of the negligence alleged in the 5th paragraph innkeeper
for goods of the statement of claim, or of any negligence on the part of stolen at
his inn. the defendant or his servants.
Action against Hotel-keeper for injury to Goods. 1. The plaintiff is a civil engineer. The defendant is a hotel keeper, and the proprietor of the “ Beaconsfield Arms,” in H., in the county of - which is an inn or hotel for the reception, entertainment, and accommodation of travellers.
2. On the 8th of September, 1877, the plaintiff was received by the defendant into his said hotel as a traveller. 3. The plaintiff brought with him into the said hotel, among Against an
innkeeper other goods, a box containing several valuable instruments con
for injury nected with his profession of a civil engineer, and also certain to goods documents, plans, and maps ; and placed the said box and its at his inn. contents on a table in a private sitting-room assigned to him in the said hotel by the order and direction of the defendant's manager.
4. On the 9th of September aforesaid the said box was by reason of the negligence of the defendant's servants thrown from the table on which it was so placed as aforesaid on to the floor of the said sitting-room.
5. The said contents of the said box were so injured and damaged in consequence of being so thrown that they became and are wholly worthless to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff claims £150 damages.
Statement of Defence. 1. The defendant denies that the plaintiff brought to his inn the goods mentioned in the 3rd paragraph of the claim.
2. The defendant denies that his manager ordered or directed the said goods, or any goods, to be placed in a private sittingroom.
3. The said box and its contents were not thrown down from the table on to the floor and damaged or injured by any negligence of the defendant's servants.
4. The defendant does not admit the allegations contained in the 5th paragraph of the statement of claim.
5. The defendant further says that the said box and its coninnkeeper. tents were property brought to the defendant's inn (not being a Defence of horse or other live animal
, or any gear appertaining thereto, or the 26 & 27 Vict. c. 41. any carriage) within the provisions of the 26 & 27 Vict.
C. 41, 8. 1.
6. The defendant, at the time he received the plaintiff into his inn, and thenceforth while the plaintiff resided therein, had exhibited and kept exhibited in a conspicuous part of the hall or entrance to the said inn a copy, printed in plain type, of section 1 of the above-mentioned Act.
7. The said box and its contents were not deposited expressly for safe custody with the defendant, as such innkeeper.
8. The said box and its contents, if injured at all, were not injured through the wilful act, default, or neglect of the defendant as such innkeeper, or by any servant in his employ.
Defence of insanity.
Insanity (a). Defence of Insanity to an Action on a Contract. 1. The defendant, at the time when he made the alleged agreement (or executed the said deed, or accepted the said bill, or as the case may be], was of unsound mind, and was thereby incapable of making (or executing, or accepting, &c.], or understanding the same.
2. The plaintiff, at the time of the making of the said agreement (or as the case may be] knew that the defendant was then of unsound mind.
1. The plaintiff denies that he knew the defendant was of unsound mind, as alleged in the 2nd paragraph of the statement of defence, and he says that the said agreement was made fairly and in good faith.
(a) If a contract is made with a person of unsound mind, with knowledge of the fact by the other party, such contract cannot be enforced against him. If, however, such party was ignorant of the insanity, and the transaction was fair and bona fide on his part, the contract will be valid. See Molton v. Camroux, 2 Exch. 487; 4 Exch. 17; Baxter v. Earl of Portsmouth, 5 B. & C. 170; Read v. Legard, L. J. 20 Exch. 309.