False imprison at ; and for six months before and up to the 22nd of August, 187, the plaintiff was in the defendant's employment a charge of as a journeyman painter. ment on felony. A partial restraint will not constitute an imprisonment. Classes of defences to action for false impri sonment. I. ARREST TION OF A WARRANT. Responsibility of sheriffs, constables, &c., making an arrest. Of justices issuing a warrant of arrest. 2. On the 22nd of August, 187-, the plaintiff came to work Pocock v. Morse, Ry. & Mo. 321.) But though there need not be an actual seizure of the person to constitute an imprisonment, the restraint on his liberty must be total. A partial restraint, as by preventing a person advancing along a particular pathway, while allowing him to retire, is not enough. (Bird v. Jones, suprà.) It may be taken that primâ facie any imprisonment of another is unlawful and actionable, and it lies upon the defendant first to plead and then to prove facts justifying the imprisonment; and this introduces the subject of defences to this kind of action. These defences may be briefly adverted to under two heads :First, where the defendant justifies on the ground that he was executing legal process; and secondly, where the defendant cannot plead that he was actually executing a warrant, but can set up that he had reasonable and probable cause for believing that the plaintiff had committed an offence for which he was by law justified in arresting him. Coming to the first of these heads of defence, a distinction must be drawn between the subordinate ministers of the law, as constables and bailiffs, and those who set them in motion. The law may be stated in a few words to be that, where sheriffs, bailiffs, or constables act within the terms of the warrant issued to them, and arrest the right persons, and use no more violence than is absolutely necessary, they are protected, although the warrant is in some respects irregular, and may even have been issued without jurisdiction. (See the 13 & 14 Vict. c. 61, s. 19, the 19 & 20 Vict. c. 108, s. 60, as to bailiffs of county courts, and the 24 Edw. 2, c. 44, s. 6, as to constables.) With respect to justices issuing the warrant, the law is otherwise. If a justice issues a warrant, having no jurisdiction in the matter, and the plaintiff is arrested on such warrant, the constable executing the same is free from responsibility, but the justice is liable in an action; but if the justice have jurisdiction, he can only be made liable in an action by the plaintiff alleging and proving that he acted maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause. It is important to bear in mind that where a justice is sued for anything done by him in his office, the plaintiff may be called on to show, as conditions precedent to his right of suing, (a) that he has given the justice one month's notice of action; (b) that any conviction or order made against him upon the warrant has been quashed; and it is also important to remember that the justice when sued can tender a sum of money as amends, and raise all the defences which he means to rely on by the general plea of “Not guilty by statute." (See the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 44, ss. 10, 11, and Addison Liability of on Torts, c. 15, sec. 3.) This is one of the few cases where, under the new system of pleading, this general mode of setting up a defence is allowed. Where the justice or judicial officer has not acted altogether mero motu, but has been in the first instance set in motion by another, it will depend upon a number of circumstances whether such person is liable as well as the justice or not. No doubt if he acted maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause, he would be liable in damages for a malicious arrest, and perhaps for a malicious prosecution; but if a man merely lays a complaint before a justice in a matter over which the justice has a general jurisdiction, and the justice grants a warrant upon which the person charged is arrested, the party laying the complaint is not responsible for a false imprisonment, although the particular case is one in which the justice had no authority to act. (Carratt v. Marley, 1 Q. B. 18.) persons setting the justice in motion. as usual in the defendant's yard, at about six o'clock in the False immorning. 3. A few minutes after the plaintiff had so come to work, the defendant's foreman, X. Y., who was then in the yard, called the plaintiff to him, and accused the plaintiff of having on the previous day stolen a quantity of paint, the property of the defendant, from the yard. The plaintiff denied the charge, but X. Y. gave the plaintiff into the custody of a constable, whom he had previously sent for, upon a charge of stealing paint. 4. The defendant was present at the time when the plaintiff prisonment on a charge of felony. II. ARREST WARRANT. So far attention has been directed to the class of cases where an imprisonment is justified on the ground that the defendant was acting in the execution of a warrant, but in certain cases a man is justified in arresting another although he is not the holder of a warrant for his arrest. The chief of these cases are: 1. Where a constable has reason to believe that a felony has been committed, and that the plaintiff has committed it, he may arrest him without warrant. 2. Where a felony has actually been committed and there is reasonable and probable cause for believing that the plaintiff has committed it, a private individual may arrest another without warrant. 3. Either a constable or a private individual may while an affray is going on, and to prevent the continuance of a breach of the peace, make an arrest. 4. By the Malicious Injuries to Property Act (24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s. 61) it is provided that any person found committing an offence under that Act may be arrested without warrant, (a) by a constable; or (b) by the owner of the property injured, his servant, or any person authorised by him, as the occupier. 5. Any person found committing an indictable offence, whether a felony or a misdemeanour, in the night-time, i.e., between 9 p.m. and 6 a.m., may be arrested without a warrant. 6. Vagrants may be arrested without warrant. Cases 7. So any person guilty of riotous or indecent behaviour in any church when this or chapel. 8. By the 2 & 3 Vict. c. 47, s. 54, special powers are given is justifito the metropolitan police to arrest persons committing numerous offences able. of a disorderly kind, enumerated in the Act within the Metropolitan limits. 9. Special powers of arrest are also given by the Merchant Shipping Acts to the masters of passenger ships. (See the 25 & 26 Vict. c. 63, s. 37.) 10. A bail whenever he pleases may render his principal into custody. 11. By the Larceny Act, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 103, and by the Act relating to the coin, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 99, s. 31, any person may arrest a person committing an offence against either of these Acts. 12. It is lawful to restrain the liberty of a dangerous lunatic without any warrant or authority, but this can only be done for a short time. The statutes 8 & 9 Vict. c. 100; 16 & 17 Vict. c. 96, establish a mode of proceeding with respect to the confinement of lunatics, and any deviation from it will render the detention of a lunatic a false imprisonment. 13. Many Acts of Parliament under which railway companies are incorporated, authorise an officer of the company to arrest any person whose name and residence shall be unknown, and who shall commit any offence against the Act, and convey him before a justice without any other warrant or authority than that given by the Act. Except in the cases enumerated, and perhaps one or two other, it is not lawful to arrest or imprison without a warrant; thus no one may arrest another for a misdemeanour, as perjury or conspiracy or false pretences, without a warrant. (Matthews v. Biddulph, 3 M. & G. 390.) on a charge of felony. False im- was given into custody, and authorised and assented to his prisonment being so given into custody; and in any case, X. Y., in giving him into custody, was acting within the scope and in the course of his employment as the defendant's foreman, and for the purposes of the defendant's business. Defence. 5. The plaintiff, upon being so given into custody, was taken by the said constable a considerable distance through various streets, on foot, to the Police Station, and he was there detained in a cell till late in the same afternoon, when he was taken to the Police Court, and the charge against him was heard before the magistrate then sitting there, and was dismissed. 6. In consequence of being so given into custody, the plaintiff suffered annoyance and disgrace, and loss of time and wages, and loss of credit and reputation, and was thereby unable to obtain any employment or earn any wages for three months. The plaintiff claims £- damages. Statement of Defence. 1. The defendant denies that he was present at the time when the plaintiff was given into custody, or that he in any way authorised or assented to his being given into custody. And the said X. Y., in giving the plaintiff into custody, did not act within the scope or in the course of his employment as the defendant's foreman, or for the purposes of the defendant's business. 2. At some time about five or six o'clock on the being the evening before the plaintiff was given into custody, a large quantity of paint had been feloniously stolen by some person or persons from a shed upon the defendant's yard and premises. 3. At about 5:30 o'clock on the evening of the the plaintiff, who had left work about half-an-hour previously, was seen coming out of the shed when no one else was in it, although his work lay in a distant part of the yard from, and he had no business in or near, the shed. He was then seen to go to the back of a stack of timber in another part of the yard. Shortly afterwards the paint was found to have been stolen, and it was found concealed at the back of the stack of timber behind which the plaintiff had been seen to go. 4. On the following morning, before the plaintiff was given into custody, he was asked by X. Y. what he had been in the False imshed and behind the stack of timber for, and he denied having prisonment on a charge been in either place. X. Y. had reasonable and probable cause of felony. for suspecting and did suspect that plaintiff was the person who had stolen the paint, and thereupon gave him into custody. False Imprisonment on the Defendant's Business Premises. 1. The plaintiff is a milliner and dressmaker, and at the time of the grievance hereinafter mentioned was in the defendant's employment. False imprisonment on defendant's 2. The defendant is a draper, carrying on his business at premises. Nos. 8 and 9, M. Street, in C. 3. On the 1st of October, 1875, the defendant falsely accused the plaintiff of having stolen a number of valuable feathers, and on the said false charge he caused the plaintiff to be imprisoned in a private room in his business premises in M. Street aforesaid. 4. The plaintiff was unlawfully detained and imprisoned therein for several hours, and was not liberated until the defendant found the said feathers. The plaintiff claims : £100 damages for the said false imprisonment. Action against a Governor of a Gaol for Detaining a Person in 1. The plaintiff was and is a solicitor residing at Against the Gaol, in governor of a gaol for detaining plaintiff after the the county of 3. On the day of, 187-, the plaintiff was arrested on a writ of attachment for non-payment of money, and on that expiry day was committed to the custody of the defendant. 4. He remained in such custody until ——, 187—, when by force of the statute in that behalf, he became and was entitled to be discharged, and could not by law be detained in custody any longer, as the defendant had notice. 5. There was then no other detainer against the plaintiff to cause him to be detained longer in custody, as the defendant well knew. of his sentence. Against a gaol for sentence. in writing to the defendant, and demanded his discharge from custody, but the defendant wrongfully and maliciously kept and detained the plaintiff in custody and imprisoned him until when the plaintiff obtained his discharge by an order of the judge. 7. In consequence of the premises the plaintiff was greatly injured and suffered in his health, and was put to expense in applying to the Court to obtain his discharge, and was otherwise damnified. The plaintiff claims £500 as damages. Claim for personal injuries caused by a savage dog. The gist of the action the keeping with knowledge of the ferocity. What amounts to such knowledge. Ferocious Animals (ɑ). Action for Injury done by Bite of a Ferocious Dog. 1. The plaintiff is a post-office letter-carrier. The defendant is the landlord of the Pump Inn, at B., in the county of (a) The owner of an animal which is ordinarily vicious, as a lion or a bear, is liable generally for its acts of ferocity, for he is bound to keep it secure at his peril; but the owner of a domestic animal, as an ox or a dog, is only liable if he knows that the animal is accustomed to do mischief. (R. v. Huggins, 2 Ld. Raym. 1583.) The gist of the action is not the negligent keeping, but the keeping at all with knowledge of the mischievous propensity. (May v. Burdett, 9 Q. B. 101; Jackson v. Smithson, 15 M. & W. 563.) The essential ingredients in an action against the owner of a dog or other domestic animal which has injured a man or woman, are-1. that the defendant knew the animal was vicious: 2. that after this knowledge he continued to keep the animal; and 3. that it inflicted an injury upon the plaintiff. Knowledge of the vicious nature of the animal need not be brought home to the defendant personally; knowledge by a servant who has charge of the dog is enough (Baldwin v. Casella, L. R. 7 Ex. 325; Applebee v. Percy, L. R. 9 C. P. 647; Gladman v. Johnson, L. J. 36 C. P. 153); and as to the extent of the defendant's knowledge of the animal's viciousness it need not be shown that he knew the animal had actually bitten anyone before. It is sufficient if it has evinced a savage disposition, as by flying at anyone and attempting to bite. (Worth v. Gilling, L. R. 2 C. P. 1.) The fact that the defendant has warned another to beware of the dog is evidence that he knew it had a vicious disposition. (Judge v. Cox, 1 Stark. 285.) The defendant is liable though the animal is not really his property, if he knowingly harbours it on his premises; but where a defendant had done all that was reasonable to get rid of a stray dog which had come on to his premises, he was held not liable for an injury done by it. (Smith v. Great Eastern Rail. Co., L. R. 2 C. P. 4.) A person who keeps a vicious animal about his premises, except for the purpose of protecting his property, which he is entitled to do (Brock v. Copeland, 1 Esp. 203), is responsible though he has taken every precaution, as he fancies, to prevent its escaping and doing mischief. (Jones v. Perry, 2 Esp. 482.) |