Libel in a

5. The defendant meant thereby that the plaintiff had by newspaper. his course of conduct as an officer given just cause of complaint to the military authorities for a long time.

Instances

A definition of qualified privilege.

The plaintiff claims £5000 damages.

vileged (Davison v. Duncan, 7 E. & B. 229, 233); so words spoken by a of absolute judge in the course of judicial proceedings (Scott v. Stansfield, L. R. 3 Exch. 220); so the words of counsel in a like case (per Kelly, C.B., in privilege. Lewis v. Higgin, ex rel. editoris); so the evidence of a witness (Seamen v. Nethercliffe, 45 L. J. 798; 46 L. J. 128); so reports made in the course of his duty by a military officer to his superior officer, and evidence given by him at a court-martial. (Dawkins v. Rokeby, Lord, L. R. 8 Q. B. 255, 268; 45 L. J. 68.) In all these cases and a few others, though the matter be ever so defamatory and false, and the motive of the defendant ever so bad, the privilege is absolute and no action lies. The class of cases where a qualified privilege only arises is much more extensive, though the extent of the protection is not the same. A very good, though not an exhaustive, definition of this kind of privilege is given by Lord Campbell in Harrison v. Bush (5 E. & B. 344). "A communication made bonâ fide upon any subject matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contains criminal matter which without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable." Thus it has been held that where any representation is made to a public officer, as the Postmaster-General, to obtain redress, a qualified privilege arises. (Woodward v. Lander, 6 C. & P. 548.) So words spoken in confidence and by way of advice, as where a servant's character is given, or where defamatory words are written or spoken bonâ fide with a view of investigating a fact in which the party is interested. (Hopwood v. Thorn, 8 C. B. 293.) So a substantially fair and correct, though not a verbatim report of judicial proceedings, whether published in a newspaper or a pamphlet (Milissich v. Lloyd, 46 L. J. 404); and it makes no matter though the hearing is before a Court which does not have jurisdiction (Usill v. Hales, 38 L. T. N. S. 65; but a fair report of the proceedings at a meeting of a Board of Guardians where statements reflecting upon the plaintiff were made, is not privileged. (Purcell v. Sowler, 46 L. J. 308.) This is nothing like an exhaustive enumeration of the cases where privilege has been held to arise. The subject is a large one and can only be mentioned here.

A denial of the publication.

No defa. matory meaning.

Accord and satisfaction.

3rd. A third defence is that the defendant did not publish the alleged libel or slander. This is a fact to be determined by the jury. In addition to what has been already said on the subject of publication, the decision in Parkes v. Prescott (L. R. 4 Exch. 169), may be mentioned; there it was held by three judges against two that where a man makes a request to another to publish defamatory matter, of which, for the purpose, he gives him a statement, whether in full or in outline, and the agent publishes the language to some extent as his own, the man making the request is liable to an action as the publisher.

4th. Another defence is that the words used do not really have the defamatory meaning imputed to them. See Mulligan v. Cole, (44 L. J. Q. B. 153), where it was laid down an action will not lie in respect of words published if any ordinary reader would not understand them in a defamatory sense, and they cannot be made actionable by being alleged to bear a meaning which the evidence does not support.

5th. Another that they do not apply to the plaintiff.

6th. Accord and satisfaction is a good defence if duly pleaded. In Boosey v. Wood (L. J. 34 Exch. 65), a defence that after the commencement of the suit, the plaintiff and defendant agreed together to accept

Defence.

1. The defendant does not admit the allegations in paragraph Libel in a 1 of the statement of claim.

newspaper.

2. As to the residue of the statement of claim, the defendant Defence. denies that he published the said libels.

3. The defendant wholly denies that the said words in the said residue of the statement of claim were printed of the plaintiff and of his conduct as an officer in the army, with the meanings severally and respectively alleged in paragraphs 3 and 5, or with any defamatory meaning.

4. The defendant further says that the alleged libels and Privilege. words were and formed part of an article printed and published by the defendant as a public journalist in the said and which said article was a fair and bonâ fide comment upon a public matter of public and national interest, and was printed and published bona fide and without malice, and for the benefit of the public and not otherwise, and without any malicious intent or motive whatever.

Libel in respect of Matter appearing in a Newspaper Report.

report.

1. The plaintiff was at the time of the committing of the Libel in a grievance hereinafter mentioned, and still is, a physician and newspaper surgeon, practising at K., in the county of C., and was and still is also the duly appointed medical officer of the K. Work

mutual apologies, to be published by them in their weekly journal in satisfaction of the right of action, and that these apologies were published accordingly, was allowed.

7th. Then of course there is a plea of the Statute of Limitation. In the case of libel the statute bars the remedy after the lapse of six years from the publication of the libel; but the sale of each copy of a libel being a separate publication, proof of the sale of a single copy within six years, rebuts a plea of the statute. (Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer, 14 Q. B. 185.) In the case of slander the statute runs in two years; but this important distinction must be borne in mind that where the slander is actionable in itself the time runs from the publication of the slander, but where the slander is only actionable because of special damage then this time runs from the happening of the damage.

The Statute of Limitation.

8th. Another plea, which, however, only applies in favour of the pub- Defence of lishers of newspapers or other periodicals, is given by Lord Campbell's an apology Act (the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96). It provides that a publisher of a newspaper under Lord or periodical sued for a libel published therein, may plead that the libel Campbell's was inserted without actual malice or gross negligence, that a full apology Act. was made at the first opportunity, and that a sum of money has been paid into Court as amends. In such a case if the action proceeds and the jury find the allegations in the defence proved in favour of the defendant, a verdict is entered for him.

Libel in a

house at K., which said workhouse is within the A. union for newspaper the administration of the laws for the relief of the poor.

report.

2. The defendants were at the time of the committing of the grievance hereinafter mentioned, and still are, the printers and publishers of a daily newspaper called the " M. C.," printed and published at M., and having a wide circulation, in particular in L. and C.

3. The defendants, being such printers and publishers as aforesaid, on the 30th of December, 1875, printed and published of and concerning the plaintiff and of and concerning him in his said profession of physician and surgeon, and of and concerning him in his said office of medical officer aforesaid, the words following, that is to say :-[Here follow the words of the alleged libel set out in detail with appropriate innuendos, at the end of which the claim continues] meaning thereby and imputing to the plaintiff that he had been and was guilty of gross misconduct in his profession of physician and surgeon as aforesaid, and had acted in his said profession and his said office negligently, improperly, and with great cruelty.

4. In consequence of the premises, the plaintiff has been and is greatly prejudiced and injured in his credit and reputation, and in his profession of physician and surgeon as aforesaid, and in his office of medical officer as aforesaid.

The plaintiff claims:

Statement of Defence.

1. The defendants admit that the words set forth in paragraph 3 in the plaintiff's statement of claim were printed and published by them, but they deny the other allegations in that paragraph contained.

2. The defendants are public journalists, and the said words were printed and published by them as such public journalists, in a public journal bonâ fide and without malice, and for the public benefit and not otherwise, and were and are a correct, fair, impartial, and honest report and account of proceedings of public interest and concern.

3. The defendants deny each and every the allegations contained in the 4th paragraph of the statement of claim.

Alternative Claim against two Defendants for Libel.

1. The plaintiff is a clergyman of the Church of England. 2. The defendants, or one or other of them, are or is the proprietors or proprietor, printers or printer, and publishers or publisher of "Gazette."

3. On the 13th of July, 1875, the defendants, or one or other of them, falsely and maliciously printed and published of the plaintiff in relation to his profession, the words following, that is to say-[Here follow the alleged libellous words]meaning thereby that the plaintiff was slothful and careless in the discharge of his clerical duties, and was unfit to be a clergyman of the Church of England.

The plaintiff claims :

Statement of Defence of the Defendant M. G.

Alternative statement of claim

for libel against two defendants.

Gazette," nor has he any con

first defendant.

1. The defendant M. G. says that he is not the proprietor, Defence of printer, and publisher of " nection in any capacity with the said " Gazette."

2. He denies that he falsely or maliciously or at all printed and published the words set forth in the 3rd paragraph of the statement of claim.

Statement of Defence of the Defendant C. G.

Denials.

1. The defendant C. G. admits that he is the printer and Defence publisher of the " Gazette."

2. The defendant C. G. further says that the alleged libel complained of by the plaintiff in his statement of claim was contained in a public newspaper called " Gazette," and was inserted in such newspaper without actual malice or gross negligence.

3. The defendant C. G. further says that at the earliest opportunity after the commencement of this action, he inserted in such newspaper a full apology for the said libel.

4. The defendant C. G. brings into Court the sum of £10 by way of amends for the injury sustained by the plaintiff by the publication of the said libel, and says that the said sum is enough to satisfy the claim of the plaintiff in respect thereof.

of second defendant

under Lord Campbell's Act of apology and payment

into Court

U

Statement

Action for Publishing a Libellous Letter.

1. The plaintiff carries on business as a merchant at of claim for Street, in the city of London; and the defendant is the general showing a libellous manager of the L. & G. Bank. letter.

Defencesjustification and

privilege.

2. Prior to the 31st of May, 1877, the plaintiff had had considerable business transactions with one J. H., also a merchant, from which he had derived large profits, and several such transactions were then in progress between the plaintiff and the said J. H., and the said J. H. would have continued to have such transactions with the plaintiff but for the publication hereinafter referred to, and the said J. H. had offered the plaintiff to take him into his employment as manager, upon terms which would have given the plaintiff a salary of from £3000 to £4000 per annum for his services.

3. On the 31st of May, 1877, the said J. H. called upon the defendant, and the defendant then falsely and maliciously published to the said J. H. the following letter of and concerning the plaintiff.

[Here follows the alleged libellous matter.]

4. Owing to the conduct of the defendant set forth in the preceding paragraph, the said J. H. refused to have any further transactions with the plaintiff, and the plaintiff lost the profits he would otherwise have made thereby, and the said J. H. alsorefused to take the plaintiff into his employment, as he would otherwise have done, and the plaintiff has lost the benefit of such employment and the emoluments thereof, and has been much injured in his credit, reputation, and business, and has been otherwise damnified.

The plaintiff claims £2000 damages.

Statement of Defence.

1. The defendant does not admit that he published the said letter or any part of the same, or that he published the same falsely and maliciously as alleged, or at all.

2. The statements contained in the said letter are true in substance and in fact, according to the fair and ordinary meaning of the words used in the said letter.

3. The publication of the said letter to J. H., if made, was privileged, and was made bonâ fide and without malice. J. H.