v. Bray. Remarks order as may be proper for having the question so determined." Lord Justice Mellish in the case of Treleaven v. Bray (45 L. J. Treleaven Ch. 114) explained the meaning of this rule and the four following rules which give effect to it thus. He said: “We (i.e., the judges) came to the conclusion that it was not advisable to L. J. make any rules which would enable one defendant to obtain relief against his co-defendant without an independent action against him. We considered that we had power to do so, but we thought that it would be intolerable that a plaintiff who might have a good case against the original defendant should be compelled to wait for his remedy while the defendants were fighting inter se. The only object of the rule was to bind the third party conclusively by the judgment given as between the plaintiff and the original defendant. But if he wants to get an indemnity or other relief against the third party, he must bring an action of his own." But although persons served with notices under these rules are not by that fact, or indeed by any act of the plaintiff or defendant, made parties to the action, yet upon proper application to the Court they may at their own instance. be made parties to the action. Rule 20 says: "If a person not a party to the action who is served as mentioned in rule 18, desires to dispute the plaintiff's claim in the action as against the defendant on whose behalf the notice has been given, he must enter an appearance in the action within eight days from service of the notice." And rule 21 goes on: “If a person not a party to the action, served under these rules, appears pursuant to the notice, the party giving the notice may apply to the Court or a judge for directions as to the mode of having the question in the action determined; and the Court or judge, upon the hearing of such application, may, if it shall appear desirable so to do, give the person so served liberty to defend the action upon such terms as shall seem just, and may direct such pleadings to be delivered or such amendments in any pleadings to be made, and generally may direct such proceedings to be taken, and give such directions as to the Court or a judge shall appear proper for having the question most conveniently determined, and as to the mode and extent in or to which the person so served shall be bound or made liable by the decision of the question." It has been decided in Fruber v. Walker v. Balfour. one case (Fruber v. Knorp, 36 L. T. N. S. 269) that a third party brought into the action under this rule and having obtained leave to defend, may himself bring in a fourth party claiming indemnity from him on the same ground on which it is claimed from the third party; but in a later case of Walker v. Balfour (25 W. R. 511), the Court expressed great doubts as to whether this could be done. As the effect of rule 17, and the following rules is, as stated, not to make the third parties introduced into the action necessarily parties thereto, it is not proposed further to examine the decisions on those rules in this place. Those desiring information on the subject are referred to Swansea Shipping Co. Limited v. Duncan, L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 644 ; Benecke v. Frost, L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 419; Horwell v. London General Omnibus Co., L. R. 2 Ex. D. 365; and Bower v. Hartley, L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 652. CHAPTER II. ON THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF PLEADING UNDER FORMERLY the number of pleadings in any action was almost unlimited declaration, plea, replication, rejoinder, surrejoinder, rebutter, surrebutter, &c. ; but now there are seldom more than three pleadings in one action, and there cannot be more than four without the leave of the Court. "No pleading subsequent to reply other than a joinder of issue shall be pleaded without leave of the Court or a judge, and then upon such terms as the Court or a judge shall think fit." Order XXIV. r. 2. The names given to the various pleadings are also altered, statement of claim is substituted for declaration, statement of defence with or without counter-claim for plea, reply for replication, and finally joinder of issue; and in Order XIX. we have a new code of rules regulating the form of the modified system of pleading. It is not however an exhaustive code upon the subject, and where not inconsistent with any old rule of pleading, that rule will remain. "The same rules of pleading which prevailed under the old law prevail now, unless there is anything in the Judicature Act or in the new Orders or Rules which prevents it" (Jessell, M. R., v. Buck, L. R. 4 Ch. D. 434); and it follows from this that the pleader will still not unfrequently have to refer, upon some point of pleading in a case not provided for by the rules, to a standard work on the principles of pleading like the late Serjeant Stephen's book. In this place it is proposed more especially to deal with the new rules and the decisions upon them, though the old law, where it still prevails, will be referred to when necessary. Probably the most convenient way to present the subject to the reader will be to arrange the rules and decisions and comment upon them under the heads of the particular pleading to which they belong. in Evans Old rules of pleading force when not inconsistent with the new en actments. A concise statement of the ma terial facts required. Statement of Claim. "Every pleading shall contain, as concisely as may be, a statement of the material facts on which the party pleading relies.” (Order XIX. r. 4.) This rule applies, it is true, to the statement of defence, counter-claim, reply, or other pleading, as well as to the statement of claim, but it applies in a special degree to the latter. It requires in terms a specific statement of the material facts on which the party relies as founding his right of action; and, as the rule goes on," such statement being divided into paragraphs, numbered consecutively, and each paragraph containing, as nearly as may be, a separate allegation." This rule sweeps away the old common indebitatus count which figured in so many declarations. That pleading was couched in the vaguest and most general terms, and could give the defendant very little information as to the nature of the claim against him. Thus a common indebitatus count for goods sold and indebitatus delivered would run: "Money payable by the defendant to abolished. the plaintiff for goods sold and delivered by the plaintiff to the defendant" (Bullen and Leake, 3rd ed. 38). There was here no specific statement of the material facts relied upon, not to mention the part of the rule that relates to separate allegations in numbered paragraphs; and it is needless to repeat that such a pleading is now quite inadmissible. Common count Notice in lieu of statement of claim. There is, however, one kind of statement of claim allowed by the new practice which does not altogether comply with the rule under consideration, and this seems the most convenient place for mentioning it, the more so as it is frequently used in the class of cases which were formerly dealt with by a common indebitatus count. Order XXI. r. 4 provides: "Where the writ is specially endorsed, and the defendant has not dispensed with a statement of claim, it shall be sufficient for the plaintiff to deliver as his statement of claim a notice to the effect that his claim is that which appears by the indorsement upon the writ, unless the Court or a judge shall order him to deliver a further statement. Such notice may either be written or printed, or partly written and partly printed, and may be in the Form No. 3 in Appendix (B) hereto, and shall be marked on the face in the same manner as is required in the case of an ordinary statement of claim. And when the plaintiff is ordered to deliver cases of demand. such further statement, it shall be delivered within such time as by such order shall be directed, and if no time be so limited, then within the time prescribed by rule 1 of this order." Now by Order III. r. 7 the plaintiff may specially indorse Applies his writ wherever his claim is for a debt or liquidated only to demand only; and the indorsement, besides stating the nature debt or of the claim, shall state the amount claimed for debt, or in liquidated respect of such demand, and for costs respectively. It is sufficiently evident, by a consideration of this latter rule, and then by a reference to the forms of special indorsements given in Appendix A, Part II., sect. 3, that the particulars of demand given to the defendant by the plaintiff when he specially indorses his writ, are more minute than the particulars which were formerly given in a common indebitatus count, and are generally, in a given case of the kind, quite sufficient to inform the defendant of the nature of the plaintiff's claim. This being so, rule 4 of Order XXI. comes in and says-for that is what it amounts to-that the plaintiff may substitute the indorsement on his writ for a statement of claim, by giving the defendant notice in a specified form, subject to a power reserved in the Court of requiring the plaintiff to deliver a further or better statement of claim. It must be carefully noted by the pleader, This notice however, that the notice mentioned in Order XXI. r. 4 with a pleading the indorsement on the writ incorporated in it, is a pleading ject of within the meaning of Order XXVIII. r. 1, and therefore demurrer. may be the subject of a demurrer if it does not disclose a good ground of action. This was decided by Mr. Justice Lindley on demurrer in the case of Robertson v. Howard (26 W. R. 683). There the plaintiff claimed 1007. upon an alleged agreement. The particulars of his claim had been indorsed on his writ, and then, under Order XXI. r. 4, a notice had been delivered to the defendant that the plaintiff's claim was that which appeared by the indorsement on his writ. The defendant demurred on the ground that no consideration was shown on the face of the pleading for the alleged agreement. On the hearing the plaintiff contended that an indorsed writ with notice was not a pleading within Order XXVIII. r. 1, such as Robertson could be made the subject of a demurrer. The learned judge, v. Howard. however, held that the demurrer was sustainable, and that Lindley, J. the language of the rule made the notice a claim for all pur and a sub Decision of |