Negligence plaintiff's said cattle were illegally removed by the defendant of agister. from his land without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiff, and were sold by the defendant for very much less than their value. Several of them had been, through the defendant's negligence, previously attacked with the said disease, and thereby much depreciated in value. 5. The defendant has not accounted to the plaintiff for any part of the money received by him upon such sale, and the plaintiff by reason of the aforesaid breaches of contract by the defendant, and of the defendant's disobedience of the law and want of reasonable care and ordinary diligence, has lost and been deprived of his said cattle and of their value. The plaintiff claims £100 damages. Statement of Defence and Counter-claim. 1. In or about May, 1874, the plaintiff and the defendant agreed for the agisting of certain cattle for the plaintiff by the defendant for twenty weeks at 50s. per head, and the cattle were agisted accordingly. There was no agreement with respect to the said cattle that they should be kept in any particular fields or only with any particular kind or quantity of stock. 2. The agreement of 1875, stated in the 1st paragraph of the statement of claim, was in writing, and was contained in a letter from the plaintiff to the defendant, and in another letter from the defendant to the plaintiff, and was to the effect that the cattle referred to in the statement of claim should be agisted on the same terms as last year (meaning the terms on which cattle were agisted as above mentioned in 1874). Neither by the said agreement of 1875, nor in any other manner did the defendant ever promise or agree as alleged in the statement of claim with respect to the two fields, or to the not keeping other stock. 3. The defendant did in fact (though not bound to do so by agreement or otherwise) keep the plaintiff's cattle in two fields called Low Field and Parkhouse Meadow (which the defendant supposes to be the two fields referred to by the plaintiff), and with no other stock except some bullocks of the defendant, not exceeding five in number, and the plaintiff's cattle escaped from and continued out of the said two fields without any act or Negligence default of the defendant. of agister. 4. The defendant denies that the land on which the plain- Defence. tiff's cattle were kept was at any time overstocked, and he denies the alleged effects of the alleged overstocking, and he denies any breach of the said agreement. 5. Early in August, 1875, one of the defendant's cattle then being in a field in which two of plaintiff's cattle were being agisted, became ill. The defendant immediately called in a veterinary surgeon, and subsequently another, and adopted all proper measures. For some days he was not informed, and did not know, and had not reason to believe that the disease was contagious, or was pleuro-pneumonia, and when he was so informed, he forthwith gave due notice to the proper authorities. Such notice could not have been given more than one day earlier than it was given, and the defendant in not so giving it one day earlier acted without any wilful default, and without negligence, and in ignorance of the nature of the disease. Afterwards, and before any of plaintiff's cattle became infected, defendant communicated all the facts to the plaintiff, and asked for instructions. Plaintiff refused to take his cattle away, and asked the defendant to make the best of them for him. Defendant accordingly made endeavours to dispose of plaintiff's cattle for him, but could not obtain proper terms, and while he was still making such endeavours with all proper diligence, two of plaintiff's cattle became infected without any act or default of the defendant, and were slaughtered by the police. On the 23rd September, defendant caused plaintiff to be informed that defendant would, in pursuance of the said authority, sell four of plaintiff's cattle the next day, to which plaintiff agreed. On the 24th September, defendant accordingly sold the plaintiff's four cattle for £19 2s. nett, which was the best price he could get; afterwards the only one remaining of the seven agisted cattle, which did not belong to the plaintiff, but to one Procter, was sold by the defendant for Procter, who ratified the sale and received the proceeds with the plaintiff's consent. 6. The defendant denies that he was guilty of any such wrong or breach of contract or of duty in reference to reporting the disease, or adopting measures or using care and diligence, or to having the cattle slaughtered, or to removing and selling Negligence the cattle, or any of them, or in any other respect as alleged in of agister. the statement of claim, and he denies that the alleged resulting disease, depreciation, and damage, or any of them, were or was caused by his act or default, and that any right to compensation was forfeited by reason of anything done or omitted by him. for which he is liable to the plaintiff, and he also says that in everything which he did, he acted by the authority and with the consent of the plaintiff, and in good faith, with reasonable care, judgment, and diligence, for the purpose of making the best of the cattle for the plaintiff, in pursuauce of such authority. The defendant further says that even if (which he denies) the said removal and sale were wrongful, the plaintiff has waived the wrong, and elected to claim the proceeds of the sale. Defence of Defence of payment into Court. Counterclaim. 7. With respect to so much of the statement of claim as alleges that the defendant has not accounted to the plaintiff for proceeds of sales, the defendant further says, that he always was and still is ready and willing to pay the same to the plaintiff, and that before action he duly tendered and offered the same to the plaintiff, who refused to accept the same on the ground that he was entitled to a larger sum, and on no other ground, and waived any objection to the form of tender. 8. The defendant now brings into Court the sum of £19 2s., and says that the said sum is enough to satisfy the plaintiff's claim in respect of so much of the statement of claim as is herein referred to. By way of set-off and counter-claim The defendant says that he is entitled under the agreement mentioned in the 1st paragraph of the statement of claim, to be paid by the plaintiff at the aforesaid rate for the agisting of the cattle of the plaintiff as therein mentioned for seventeen weeks as respects two of the said cattle, and for nineteen weeks as respects the other four. The defendant claims £13 15s. in respect of the said agistment. Reply. 1. The plaintiff joins issue upon the statement of defence. 2. With regard to the counter-claim, the plaintiff admits that the cattle mentioned therein were agisted by the defendant for the time therein mentioned, but says that the value of such agistment was wholly lost to the plaintiff by reason of the Negligence defendant's breaches of contract, disobedience of the law, and of agister. want of reasonable care and ordinary diligence, as appears by the statement of claim. Alteration (a). Defence of Alteration to Action on Deed or Written Contract. in a con tract. The written contract (or deed) in the paragraph of the Alteration statement of claim mentioned was, after the signing (or execution) thereof by the plaintiff and the defendant, and whilst the same was in the possession and under the control of the plaintiff, materially altered without the consent or knowledge of the defendant, namely, by the introduction of the words, "subject to the approval and right of rejection by the said William Jones," at the end of the third clause [or such alteration as may have been made]. Annuity. (a) An alteration in a contract made by the plaintiff is a good defence to an action on it; as, for instance, by the attaching a seal to a written document so as to give it the appearance of a deed, even though it is sued on as a simple contract only (Davidson v. Cooper, 13 M. & W. 343, Ex. Ch.), unless it be done by mistake (Novelli v. Rossi, 2 B. & Ad. 757) ; and an alteration which has absolutely no effect on the liability of either party will not vitiate it. (Aldous v. Cornwell, L. R. 3 Q. B. 573, overruling the second resolution in Pigot's case, 11 Rep. 27, a.) Alterations made by a stranger will not invalidate a contract unless made while in the safe custody of the party suing on it. (Crookewit v. Fletcher, 26 L. J. Ex. 153.) See Ib., per Martin, B., as to the degree of diligence required of the party having the custody of a document. See also on same subject, Bank of Hindoostan v. Smith, 36 L. J. C. P. 241. If the parties agree to make an alteration, this rescinds the old contract and a new one consisting of the old one as modified is thus created. The agreement so made generally requires a fresh stamp, and if it be one which cannot be stamped after execution, it cannot be used in evidence. (Roscoe, Ev., 13th ed. 257, 627.) Effect of alteration made in a contract. Action for misconduct of an apprentice. What apprentice not bound after 21. Apprentice (a). Action against the Bondsman for Misconduct of the Apprentice. 1. The plaintiff is a blacksmith and wheelwright, residing and carrying on business at F., in the county of L., and the defendant is a silk-weaver, residing at L., in the county of S. 2. By an indenture of apprenticeship, dated 10th August, (a) A contract of apprenticeship can only arise where there is an undertaking on one side to serve and learn, and on the other to teach. Therefore if there is an engagement on the part of the servant to serve and learn, but no express or implied engagement on the part of the master to teach, so that no action could be maintained upon the contract against the latter for neglecting to teach, the contract is one of hiring and service only, and not of apprenticeship. (R. v. Shinfield, 14 East, 541; R. v. Burback, 1 M. & S. 370.) As the contract is always made for more than a year, it must be in writing, but need not always be by deed; but it is essential to the validity of the contract that the consideration or premium paid be duly set forth upon the face of the instrument, in order that the proper amount of stamp duty may be secured thereon. (Westlake Apprentice V. Adams, 27 L. J. C. P. 271.) Except in cases to which the custom of the City of London applies, an apprentice is not bound by an indenture of apprenticeship upon his attaining his twenty-first year, and he can then with perfect impunity, so far as he personally is concerned, leave his master's service though the term of service has not yet expired. The master is not however necessarily without any remedy, for it is usual in apprenticeship articles for some person, frequently the apprentice's father, to covenant for the apprentice's good behaviour during the term of service, and where there is such a covenant, though the apprentice may, on attaining twenty-one, leave his master's service, the bondsman would remain liable. (Cuming v. Hill, 3 B. & Ald. 59.) In the articles of apprenticeship it is usual for the master to enter into a set of covenants that he will properly instruct the apprentice, and for the apprentice and his bondsman to enter into covenants that the apprentice will faithfully serve; but it has been decided that these covenants are perfectly independent covenants, and that breach of the one cannot be pleaded as a defence to breach of another. (Winstone v. Linn, 1 B. & C. 460; Phillips v. Clift, 28 L. J. Ex. 153.) Thus, if the bondsman were sued for the misconduct of the apprentice in absenting himself, it would be no defence to the bondsman that the master had neglected properly to instruct the apprentice. The bondsman's proper course would be to add to his defence, whatever it might be, a counter-claim against the master. It is, however, a good defence to an action against the bondsman for a desertion by the apprentice of his service that the master had abandoned one of the trades which he had covenanted to teach the apprentice. (Ellen v. Topp, 6 Exch. 424); and it is a good defence to an action for breach of the covenant to teach and provide for an apprentice that he quitted the service without leave. (Hughes v. Humphreys, 6 B. & C. 680.) It is said that a master takes his apprentice for better or for worse, and if, therefore, the apprentice become ill so that he cannot work, or meet with an accident, so that the master is put to additional expense on his Covenants by master and bonds man independent covenants. Master bound to maintain |