網頁圖片
PDF
ePub 版

PART V.

Scheduled Districts, Punjab.

The Districts of Hazára, Peshawar, Kohát, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khán, Dera Ghazi Khán, Lahaul and Spiti.

[blocks in formation]

The Chief Commissionership of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

PART IX.

The Chief Commissionership of Ajmer and Mairwara.

Interpretation-clause.

'chapter :'

PART X.

The Chief Commissionership of Assam.

PART XI.

The Hill Tracts of Arakan.

PART XII.

The Pargana of Mánpur.

PART XIII.

The Cantonment of Morar.

2. In this Act, unless there be some

6

thing repugnant in the subject or contextchapter' means a chapter of this Code: 'district' means the local limits of the jurisdiction of a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction (hereinafter called a ' District Court'), and includes the local limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of a High Court every Court of a grade inferior to that of a District Court and every Court of Small Causes shall,

'district:"
'District Court: '

for the purposes of this Code, be deemed to be subordinate to the High Court and the District Court:

High Court means the highest Civil Court of Appeal in any place-Clause 11, section 2, Act I, 1868.

District Court.-See nJoyarayan Singh vs. Mudhoo Sudun, I. L. R., 16 Cal., 13, and Clause 21, section 4, post.

pleader' means every person entitled to appear and plead for another in Court, and includes an advocate, a vakil, and an attorney of a High Court:

'pleader: '

'Government Plead

'Government Pleader' includes also any officer appointed by the Local Government to perform all or any of the functions expressly imposed by this Code on the Government Pleader :

er: '

Precedence.-The Advocate-General and Officiating Advocate-General for the time being are entitled to pre-audience-Bourke, 422.

Advocates.-Advocates have precedence over pleaders-Englishman, May 21st, 1872. They can appear and plead on the Appellate Side of the High Court, but not act,-i.e., they can appear and represent their clients in the various stages of the litigation at which it is necessary their clients should be present in person or by representative; but they cannot take any steps in the Court or its offices necessary in order that the cause may be properly laid before the Court-Kali Kumar vs. Nobin Chunder, I. L. R., 6 Cal., 585, p. 590, and therefore cannot file an appeal or any other application in the Registrar's office-Ram Taruck Barrik, petitioner, 13 W. R., 60. They may be instructed by clients direct, without the intervention of any pleader-Gobind Chunder vs. Andrews, 24 W. R., 15. They cannot enter into any binding contract, sue, or be sued for their fees-Reference, I. L. R., 9 Mad., 140; Smith vs. Guneshee Lall, 3 Alla., 83; Achamparambath vs. Ganz, I. L. R., 3 Mad., 138. It is otherwise with a Barrister, who is not an Advocate-Kristna Rowe vs. Muttukistna, 4 Mad., 244; Land Mortgage Bank vs. Elmes, 25 W. R., 332.

son,

Robing.-If an Advocate or Pleader appears before the Court as a litigant in perhe must not address the Court from the Advocate's table or in robes, but from the same place and in the same way as any ordinary member of the public -In the matter of West Hopetown Co., I. L. R., 9 Alla., 180.

Authority to bind Client.-In England, counsel have complete authority over the suit, the mode of conducting it, and all that is incident to it; such as withdrawing the record, withdrawing a juror, calling no witnesses, and other matters which properly belong to the suit and the management and conduct of the trial-Swinfen vs. Lord Chelmsford, 29 L. J. (Ex.), 397 ; Jang Bahadur vs. Shankar, I. L. R., 13 Alla., 272. See Matthews vs. Munster, 20 Q. B. D., 141; Urquhart vs. Butterfield, 37 C. D., 357, p. 369; In re West Devon Mine, 38 C. D., 51. And where a counsel consents to withdraw a juror, the compromise is binding on the client notwithstanding he may dissent, unless this dissent is brought to the knowledge of the opposite party at the time-Strauss vs. Francis, L. R. 1 Q. B., 379; and generally a consent order will not be set aside on the ground of mistake except for reasons sufficient to set aside an agreement-AttorneyGeneral vs. Tomline, 7 C. D., 389; Davis vs. Davis, 13 C. D., 861. But if the consent has been given against the express wish of the client-Carrison vs. Rodrigues, I. L. R., 13 Cal., 115; or under a misapprehension; or through a misstatement or want of materials, or if all the information which a counsel ought to have when he gives his consent is not before him, the client is not bound-Holt vs. Jesse, 3 C. D., 177.

In India an agreement by counsel, not to appeal provided the decision be confined to a certain point, is binding on the client-Moonshee Amir Ali vs. Moharani Inderjeet Sing, 14 Moore, 203.

Proof of Admission.-Where a High Court stated in its judgment that plaintiff had by way of confession agreed to take a certain boundary, their Lordships of the Privy Council upheld the consent, though denied, as there was nothing to show that the errors, if any, had been brought to the notice of the High Court-Radha Gobind vs. Inglis, 7 C. L. R., 364, p. 367.

Pleaders and Vakils.-Pleaders of the High Court in Calcutta are entitled to practise in the Calcutta Small Cause Court-Re Toolsee Dass Seal, 7 W. R., 228; but

not pleaders of the High Court in Bombay-In re The Pleaders of the High Court, I. L. R., 8 Bom., 105; nor pleaders of the Mofussil Courts in Bengal-Shushee Bhoosun Bhadooree, 10 W. R., 82. They can plead in the Criminal Courts on behalf of either prosecutor or prisoner--Chunder Charan vs. Chunder Coomar, 14 W. R., Cr., 23. The Courts in which a particular pleader is entitled to plead will depend upon the terms of his certificate-See The Legal Practitioners' Act, XVIII, 1879, sections 7, 10, and Schd. II.

Control of Case.-The senior pleader present has the entire control of the case; and a junior will not be allowed to argue points in appeal waived by him-Sreeneebash Roy vs. Umbika Churn, 12 W. R., 375. A pleader using improper expressions during the course of argument should be stopped-In the matter of Cruise, 14 W. R., Cr., 53; and if he misconducts himself, the Court may decline to hear him, but it cannot dismiss the case in which he is engaged without trying it on the merits-Lal Chand vs. Shakeer Mahomed, 6 W. R., 67. No pleader should be called upon to produce his instructions; he is responsible for any statement he may make-Rajkessen Surmal, petitioner, S. D. Sum. Dec., Sept. 16, 1846; see Evidence Act of 1872, sections 149 (illus.), 150.

Binding Client.-Parties are bound by the bona fide acts of their pleaders within the scope of their authority, and mere error of judgment affords no valid ground for avoiding them-Pesh vs. Kasee Madud Hossein, S. D. N. W., 1855, p. 66; Sheik Burkut Hossein, petitioner, S. D. Sum. Dec., March 29th, 1842; Gour Churn Mookerjee vs. Kishen Mohini Dabee, S. D. Sum. Dec., July 19th, 1843; but the greatest caution should be exercised by Courts before acting upon vakil's statements out of the ordinary scope of their authority in the peculiar matter in which they are employed-Venkataramanna vs. Chavela, 6 Mad., 127. If a pleader conducting a case makes an admission as to payments made and the state of an account between the parties, it is binding on his client-Berkley vs. Chittur Kooar, 5 Alla., 2; Kaleckanund vs. Gireebala, 10 W. R., 322; Rajundar Narrain vs. Bijai Govind Sing, 2 Moore, 253, and a record of an admission made by a pleader, must be taken to be correct until contradicted by an affidavit of the pleader, or admitted to be wrong by the Judge-Hur Dyal vs. Heera Lall, 16 W. R., 107; but if a pleader be examined as a witness, his evidence is not treated as an admission-Rash Behary Mookerjee vs. Juggadumba, 2 Sev., 88. Under a vakalutnama couched in general terms, a vakil has power to withdraw a suit and bind his client-Ram Coomar vs. Collector of Beerbhoom, 5 W. R., 80; but it is not within the ordinary scope of his authority to compromise the suit he is engaged inPrem Shookh vs. Pirthee Ram, 2 Agra, 222; Sirdar Begum vs. Izzutoolnissa, 2 Alla., 149; or, instead of conducting the defence in the usual way to refer it to arbitrationThakur Pershad vs. Kalka, 6 Alla., 210; Sadashiv vs. Maruti, I. L. R., 14 Bom., 455; or bind his client to abide by plaintiff's oath-Mussamut Hakeem Oonnissa vs. Beldeo, 4 Agra,3 61; Sadashiv vs. Maruti, I. L. R., 14 Bom., 453; (but see Rajender Chunder vs. Mahmud Aymoodeen, W. R., 1864, p. 143); or to give up a portion of the property in dispute-Ram Kant vs. Brindabun Chunder, 16 W. R., 246; Gour Pershad vs. Seookdeb Ram, 12 W. R., 279; Sheikh Abdul Sobhan vs. Shib Kisto, 3 B. L. R., App., 15; or to pay an exorbitant fee to an attorney or counsel-Shamsoonisa Begum vs. Carrapiet, 1 Boulnois, 339; and see Keshav vs. Narayan, I. L. R., 10 Bom. 18; or allow a decree to pass against other property-Avul Khadar vs. Andhu Set, 2 Mad., 423; or transfer a decree -Nohur vs. Jaffer Hossein, 2 Alla., 195. See on this subject, Story on Agency, King vs. Pinsonealt, L. R., 6 P. C., 245, and the authorities there referred to.

Certifying.-A pleader, appealing to the High Court, cannot certify his own grounds of appeal-Thakoor Doss vs. Ameer Mundul, 14 W. R., 168. If a pleader, having signed the memorandum of appeal, subsequently refuses to argue the case on the ground of being unprepared, he can be dealt with by the Court for neglect of duty as a pleader; or be sued by his clients-Buldeo Misser vs. Syad Ahmed, 15 W. R., 143. In the High Court he is bound to move for an order as soon as the period fixed for the return has elapsed, and if he does not do so, the case may be taken up in his absenceHossanee Begum vs. Dumree Mahtoon, 2 W. R., Mis., 51.

Remuneration.-Under Act XVIII of 1879 a pleader can agree with his client for past or future services, and such agreement excludes further claims if not excepted. It will not absolve the pleader for negligence and, unless it is in writing and registered within 15 days it cannot be enforced-Krishnasami vs. Kesava, I. L. R., 14 Mad., 63. This agreement does not refer to taxed costs but something different, and if the pleader cannot show that it was fair and reasonable, the Court may cancel it and assess the feesRaziuddin vs. Karim Baksh, I. L. R., 12 Alla., 169; and in any case where there is no written registered agreement, a suit for work and labour done will lie-Rama vs. Kunji, 1. L. R., 9 Mad., 375; Krishnasami, supra.

Where the Legal Practitioners' Act does not apply it had been decided that there is nothing wrong in a pleader contracting for additional remuneration if successful in gaining the suit-Khajeh Ameen-oodeen vs. Mohomed Yaheea, S. D., N. W., 1860, p. 405; before or at the same time he accepts the position of pleader to his clientParsham vs. Hiraman, I. L. R., 8 Bom., 413; but when a pleader has accepted a vakalutnama or a certain suit, a subsequent agreement to give a sum over and

above the usual fees, if successful is nudum pactum-Ramchandra vs. Kalu Raiu, I. L. R., 2 Bom., 362. A contract to be rewarded by a share of the amount in the suit could not be enforced in the North-West, unless the pleader could show its fairness, and that no undue advantage had been taken of his client-Nuthoo Lall vs. Budree Pershad, 1 Alla., 1; it is prohibited in Madras-Achamparambath Cheria vs. Ganza, I. L. R., 3 Mad., 138; and if a pleader acts under an engagement constituting himself the client's agent or legal adviser, the onus of showing the fairness of any contract between them lies on the pleader-Ranee Usmut Koowar vs. Taylor, 2 W. R., 307; 4 W. R., 86; Fuzeelun Beebee vs. Omdah Beebee, 10 W. R., 469; Pushong vs. Munia Halwani, 1 B. L. R. (A. C.), 95. In the North-West, a pleader receiving a fee for prosecuting or defending a suit is bound carry it to an end, and to make all applications in the execution department without further fee, and no second fee is allowable for applications in the execution-department unless it can be shown that the services of the pleader originally employed are not available-Takee Ali vs. Gool Mahomed Khan, 1 Alla., 123. In a suit for fees the cause of action does not ordinarily arise until the pleader has completely discharged his duty in the conduct of the suit, or his client has dispensed with his services -Buckpatnam Thathacharlu vs. Kajamiya, 6 Mad., 265.

Rules.-Changing sides.-As to the confidential nature of communications between client and pleader when he changes sides, see Pallonji vs. Kallabhai, I. L. R., 12 Bom., 85.

Dealing with Mukhtars.-A pleader cannot give a percentage on his fees to his client's mukhtar without his client's knowledge, especially before the fee has been earned-In the matter of Peary Mohun Gooho, 11 B. L. R., 312.

The rules relating to pleaders' fees in Lower Bengal do not defendants who have a separate interest and consent to a decree. in such case is in the discretion of the Court-Ramputty Kooer vs. 14 W. R., 94.

apply to the case of The amount of costs Kalee Churn Singh,

Struck off the Rolls.-Pleaders cannot be removed except for a criminal offence, misbehaviour, or neglect of duty-Noor Ahmed, 17 W. R., 336; Sree Nath Roy (id.), 405; petition of Mahomed Manaff, 10 W. R., 332; Vamanaji Konera's case, 1 Bom., 136; Kishoree Lall Sircar, 14 W. R., 217; In re Quarry, I. L. R., 13 Alla., 93. See as to the procedure in such cases, Act XVIII of 1879; Gonesh Chunder Gangooly, 13 W. R., 456; In the matter of Ram Kinkur Sein, 13 W. R. 67; Komla Kant Deghal, petitioner, 11 W. R., 127.

Purchase by.-It is not expedient for a pleader to purchase the decree of his client-Goshain Jug Roop v. Chingun Lal, 2 Alla., 46; nor join with the decree-holder in purchasing the property of his client the debtor-Nundeeput vs. Shaw, 13 W. R., 209; and he is prohibited from purchasing any actionable claim falling under the jurisdiction of the Court in which he pleads-Act IV of 1882, section 136.

Attorneys and Solicitors.-There is no rule which prevents an attorney from taking security from his client for the payment of costs actually due with interest thereon at a fair and reasonable rate-Monohur Doss vs. Romanauth Law, I. L. R., 3 Cal., 473; but he cannot take security for future costs-In re Forster, 2 D. F. & J., 105; (but quære, if this rule would apply to an attorney doing mofussil business for an attorney in the mofussil ?-Shumsoonnissa vs. Carrapiet, Boulnois, 331); or agree to be remunerated conditional on success-In re Attorneys' Act, 1 C. D., 573. But though where an attorney acts regularly as a vakil in Mofussil Courts he may be entitled to the same remuneration as a vakil, yet where the business done in the mofussil does not fall within the duty of a vakil he will be dealt with as an attorney-Shumsoonnissa Begum vs. Carrapiet, Boulnois, 329, 331, 337. An attorney cannot take security for costs and charge 10 per cent. commission on the amount recovered, together with 10 per cent. on the amount of his client's claim-ibid.

Bind Client.-He has no power to compromise a suit after judgment, and his authority only extends to doing his best for the purpose of obtaining the fruits of the judgment for his client-Lovegrove vs. White, L. R., 6 C. P., 440; but see Butler vs. Knight, L. R., 2 Exch., 109; Lady De La Pole vs. Dick, 29 C.D., 351; Hester vs. Hester, 34 C. D., 607, p. 616.

Lien-A solicitor has the same lien on translations as on other documents, and cannot be compelled to produce them when discharged by his client unless on terms which will secure him from fraud-Bai Kesserbai vs. Narranji, I. L. R., 4 Bom., 353. If, in effecting a mortgage of his client's property, he also acts as solicitor for the mortgage, he cannot claim, as against the latter, a lien on the title-deeds or mortage deeds for costs due by the mortgagor-In re Mason and Taylor, 10 C. D., 729; Sheffield vs. Eden, 10 C. D., 291; In re Snell, 6 C. D., 105. In England the Courts will make an order to change a solicitor without making any provision for payment of his costs-Grant vs. Holland, 3 C. P. D., 180; it is not certain that this rule would be followed in India-Ghose vs. Ghose, Boulnois, 340. Where several defendants who have paid money into Court appear by one attorney, they can join and make one application for the payment of it out of Court-Queen vs. Kurballi Mahomed, Fulton, 328. An attorney who discharges himself from his client's service

[blocks in formation]

loses his lien over his client's papers-In re McCorkindale, I. L. R., 6 Cal., 1; and will be prevented from acting for the opposite party in the suit-Ramlall Agarwallah vs. Moonia Bebee, I. L. R., 6 Cal., 79. An attorney has no lien for costs on papers belonging to an estate which is being administered by the Court-Belaney vs. French, L. R., 8 C. D., 918.

Infant-Where the client is an infant, the attorney may in some cases recover, his costs as necessaries-Watkins vs. Dhunnoo Baboo, I. L. R., 7 Cal., 140; but see Steed vs. Preece, L. R., 18 Eq., 192.

Taxation.-Declining an attorney's offer to have his bills of costs taxed will not (at least in some cases) bind the client to pay without taxation-Monohur Doss vs. Romanath Law, I. L. R., 3 Cal., 473.

'Collector:'

'Collector' means every officer performing the duties of a Collector of land

revenue:

This definition includes Deputy Commissioners in Non-Regulation Provinces.

'decree: '

'decree' means the formal expression of an adjudication upon any right claimed, or defence set up, in a Civil Court, when such adjudication, so far as regards the Court expressing it, decides the suit or appeal. An order rejecting a plaint, or directing accounts to be taken, or determining any question mentioned or referred to in section 244 but not specified in section 588, is within this definition: an order specified in section 588 is not within this definition:

Decree. See note under section 206, post, and Meenakshi vs. Subramaniya, 14 Ind. App., 160; Shanks vs. The Secretary of State, I. L. R., 12 Mad., 120.

Suit.-Any proceeding which terminates in a decree, such as a proceeding in execution ending with an order under section 244, post, is a suit within this sectionManjunath vs. Venkatesh, I. L. R., 6 Bom., 54, and the decision in any such proceeding is binding on the parties in the original suit of which it is a continuation-Ram Kirpal vs. Rup Kuari, I. L. R., 6 Alla., 269.

An Order directing Accounts to be taken.-In a suit an order was made by which it was declared that defendants were liable to pay such sums as the Government Surveyor might certify. He declared his inability to decide one of the matters referred to him, and the suit was determined in Court. Held, the order was not an order directing accounts to be taken or a decree, and that the particular cases mentioned in the last sentence were not explanatory, but exhaustive-Coverji vs. Morarji, I. L. R., 9 Bom., 183.

'order'

' order: '

means the formal expression of any decision of a Civil Court which is not a decree as above defined :

Order not Decree.-Admitting a plaint-The Justices of the Peace for Calcutta vs. Oriental Gas Co., 8 B. L. R., 433; 17 W. R., 364. Order under section 97, post-Bessessur vs. Murli, I. L. R., 9 Cal., 163. Order refusing to restrain proceedings in a suit on the ground that the costs of a previous suit had not been paid-id.; Chetto Sheikh vs. Kazee Muzzur Hossein, Hyde, 212. Order directing the addition of a party to a suit-Kumara Upendra Krishna Deb Bahadoor vs. Nobin Krishna Bose, 3 B. L. R., 113. A decision given upon the settlement of issues, that a certain hibbanama relied upon by the defendants was invalid-Ebrahim vs. Fuchhrunnissa Begum, I. L. R., 4 Cal., 531; 3 Cal. L. R., 311. An order that when a condition should be performed, a decree should pass in due order An order merely directing an in a suit-Coverji vs. Morarji, I. L. R., 9 Bom., 183. award should be filed-Ramadhin vs. Mahesh, I. L. R., 2 Alla., 471; or refusing to file it-Daya Nand vs. Singh, I. L. R., 5 Alla., 333; Bhola vs. Gobind Dayal, I. L. R.,

« 上一頁繼續 »