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the British Government or its agents in the distribution of the fund awarded under the treaty, and that the record did not show that the fund in controversy had ever been "voluntarily paid into court by the agent of that Government."

As to the adjudication of conflicting claims to an award, see Comegys v. Vasse, 1 Peters, 123; Clark v. Clark, 17 Howard, 315; Judson v. Corcoran, 17 Howard, 612.

The act of June 23, 1874, by which a court was erected for the distribution of the Geneva award, proceeded upon the theory of distributing the money, so far as practicable, among the classes of persons on whose claims the award appeared to be based, and the jurisdiction of the court was restricted to claims directly resulting from damage caused by the inculpated cruisers. The judgments of the court amounted to $9,315,735. Claims were subsequently presented to Congress for the distribution of the remainder of the award fund, together with increments arising from interest on the securities in which the fund had been invested as well as from other sources. These claims proceeded chiefly from insurers, who claimed a right of subrogation, from persons who had paid war premiums, and from persons who had suffered damage by the acts of the exculpated cruisers. In support of these claims (except those of the insurers) it was argued that the claims at Geneva and the wrongs on which they were based were national; that all who had suffered loss by reason of the presence of the Confederate cruisers on the sea were entitled to compensation; and that in any event the fund belonged to the United States and might be distributed among such beneficiaries as that Government should designate. By an act of June 5, 1882, a new court was erected for the distribution of the unappropriated moneys. It designated as the beneficiaries of the existing fund (1) claimants on account of damage done by the exculpated cruisers, and (2) claimants who sought reimbursement for the payment of premiums for war risks. The act thus proceeded on the theory of the national ownership of the fund.

Moore, Int. Arbitrations, V. 4657-4661.

In support of the view embodied in the act of 1882, see report of Mr. Reid from the Committee on the Judiciary, Feb. 8, 1882, H. Rept. 207, 47 Cong. 1 sess.; United States v. Weld, 127 U. S. 51; Williams v. Heard, 140 U. S. 529; Rustomjee v. Queen, L. R. 1 Q. B. D. (1876), 487; L. R. 2 Q. B. D. (1876–77), 69.

(12) BARRING OF UNPRESENTED CLAIMS.

§ 1080.

It is usual in general claims conventions to insert a stipulation expressly barring all claims, falling within the jurisdiction of the tribunal, which were not presented to it.

"While the claim of Mrs. Stevens presents analogies of treatment with the other cases to which you refer, it stands on a distinct footing of its own, being one of a class heretofore declared to be proper for adjudication on the merits by a specially provided tribunal of arbitration. If the Mexican Government should set up the late claims convention, and the failure to submit the claim to the commission organized thereunder, as a bar, it has the right to do so. We, however, have no right to debar the claimant from the possible benefits of an appeal for a hearing on the merits, for the Mexican Government has full liberty of waiver in respect of such bar, and may, at its own pleasure, consent and agree to permit the claimant's case to be stated and heard. All that we ask is that the Mexican Government avail itself of the opportunity to manifest its sense of magnanimity and justice in this regard, if its dispassionate examination of the appeal shall warrant it in doing so. If the result be to set up the treaty as a bar, we would not hesitate to concede its effectiveness, as we should expect Mexico to concede our position were the case reversed and our answer made in those terms. But Señor Mariscalcan not be unmindful of the fact that this very treaty bar has only recently been the subject of consideration between the two Governments, by reason of the Mexican appeal in the Weil and La Abra cases, and that the United States have met Mexico halfway in an earnest effort to secure the ends of equity and justice, by providing a resort not contemplated when the treaty was framed, and, indeed, barred by its express terms."

Mr. Bayard, Sec. of State, to Mr. Jackson, min. to Mexico, Jan. 26, 1886,
MS. Inst. Mex. XXI. 427.

The view expressed in this paper is not that on which the Government of
the United States has generally acted. On the contrary, it has been
held, with practical uniformity, that where a treaty provides a tri-
bunal for the settlement of claims, and stipulates that all claims not
presented to it shall be finally barred, this part of the treaty is no
less obligatory than the rest, and that it precludes the two Govern-
ments from renewing the claims thus barred, instead of merely giving
them an option to decline to pay them.

“It might, indeed, be argued that the adoption and execution of the agreement of 1871, and the final disposition and satisfaction of all claims allowed under it, preclude the presentation by this Department of a claim against Spain for losses suffered by Mr. Morrell between 1870 and 1875. But the agreement contains no provision barring as against Spain all existing claims not presented to the arbitrators, and the present claim does not appear to be so far barred by the agreement or by the proceedings under it as to preclude its presentation to the Spanish Government. Should the minister of state be indisposed to make a present adjustment of this claim, you will endeavor to have

it embraced in any general settlement of pending claims which it may be found convenient in the future to bring about by a convention between the two Governments or otherwise."

Mr. Porter, Act. Sec. of State, to Mr. Curry, Jan. 2, 1886, MS. Inst.
Spain, XX. 136.

"This decision of the commission [under the agreement between the United States and Spain of February 11-12, 1871, dismissing a claim for want of jurisdiction], does not prevent this claim from being a proper subject for diplomatic treatment."

Mr. Bayard, Sec. of State, to Mr. Curry, min. to Spain, April 9, 1886,
MS. Inst. Spain, XX. 183.

"The second article of the claims convention of January 15, 1880, with France provides as follows:

"The said commission thus constituted, shall be competent and obliged to examine and decide upon all claims of the aforesaid character, presented to them by the citizens of either country, except such as have been already diplomatically, judicially or otherwise by competent authorities heretofore disposed of by either Government.'

"Under the interpretation put upon the treaty by both Governments, all cases that had been passed upon by prize tribunals were excepted from the jurisdiction of the commission. (Ex. Doc. 235, 48th Cong., 2d sess., p. 235.)

"It is held by this Government that the action of the commission in declaring that it had no jurisdiction of the claim in question in no way bars its presentation to the French Government for payment. I have therefore to request you to recall this claim, including indemnity for the detention of the schooner and the breaking up of the voyage, to the attention of the French foreign office, as one which is believed by this Government to be just and fair, and to urge its early settlement."

Mr. Bayard, Sec. of State, to Mr. McLane, July 29, 1885, MS. Inst.
France, XXI. 231.

The claims convention between the United States and Great Britain of 1853 settled (Art. V.) "every claim arising out of any transaction of a date prior to the exchange of ratifications, whether or not the same may have been presented to the commission." Hence a claim not presented for property confiscated during the war of 1812 was barred.

Mr. Rives, Assist. Sec. of State, to Mr. Gregg, May 12, 1888, 168 MS. Dom.
Let. 359.

4. FINALITY OF AWARDS.

(1) RULE OF RES JUDICATA.

§ 1081. .

The decision of an international tribunal over matters as to which it is made the supreme arbiter is final, and is not the subject of revision, except by the consent of the contesting sovereigns.

Comegys r. Vasse, 1 Pet. 193, 212.

An award of arbitrators, under a treaty between the United States and another nation, by which the contracting parties agree that the decision of the arbitrators shall constitute a final settlement of all questions submitted, becomes the supreme law of the land and is as binding on the courts as an act of Congress.

La Ninfa (1896), 75 Fed. Rep. 513, 21 C. C. A. 434, reversing 49 Fed.
Rep. 575.

An award was made in favor of R. W. Gibbes, a citizen of the United States, by Mr. Upham, the umpire of the mixed commission under the convention between the United States and New Granada of September 10, 1857, for the sum of $2,500, with interest from July 26, 1826, at the rate of five per cent per annum. The Colombian commissioner declined to sign the award, on the ground that the case was submitted to the umpire only on the question as to whether a valid claim existed, and that the question of the amount to be paid was not submitted. On February 10, 1864, a convention was concluded between the United States and Colombia for the adjudication of claims which were left undecided by the previous commission. Counsel for Gibbes declined to prosecute the case before the new commission, and it was submitted to the board by counsel for Colombia. The commissioners, on May 18, 1866, made the following order: "Stricken from the calendar and docket, protest being made against the action of the board, and case not prosecuted." After the adjournment of the commission, Gibbes demanded payment from the Treasury. His demand was referred to Attorney-General Hoar, who held that the case was decided by the umpire of the first commission, and that neither the United States nor the second board was able to divest his rights under that decision against his will and without his consent. The Attorney-General, however, expressed a doubt as to whether Gibbes was entitled to payment from the Treasury, since he did not possess a certificate from the commissioners; but Gibbes obtained payment in full, and the amount so paid him was included in the account of the United States against Colombia, and

H. Doc. 551-vol 7-5

the entire amount was afterwards repaid to the United States by the Colombian Government.

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Moore, Int. Arbitrations, II. 1398, 1400, 1401, 1410-1411; Hoar, At. Gen., (1869), 13 Op. 19.

The principle [of arbitration] is one that has been followed on many occasions by this Government in settling disputed claims between its citizens and foreign powers. It has been the custom in these cases to conclude a formal convention with the interested power by which a claims commission is to be formed, to be composed in general of two arbitrators, one to be chosen by the Secretary of State, and one by the minister of the other power, and an umpire, to be likewise agreed upon by the Secretary of State and the minister, whose decisions shall be regarded as final. .

“I may add that an agreement so entered into has all the solemnity and finality of a treaty between the powers who are parties to it, and is in no sense an informal reference of a matter of contention between two powers to the decision of the minister of a third party."

Mr. Frelinghuysen, Sec. of State, to Mr. Rosecrans, Oct. 17, 1883, 148 MS.
Doh. Let. 405.

"The general rule is that when an arbitrator or a referee makes a decision and adjourns without expressly deciding a motion for a rehearing, the decision is left in full force. The motion does not ipso facto reopen the case; and the adjournment without specific action on the motion by implication denies it.

"With respect to the objection to the decision of the arbitrators, that it is not altogether sound in law, it is to be noticed that by the convention under which the United States and Spanish Claims Commission was organized, the two Governments expressly agreed that they would accept the awards made in the several cases submitted to the proposed arbitration as final and conclusive. This provision was adopted by the contracting parties as an essential part of the arrangement for the settlement and disposition of claims, and with the understanding that it was to be kept as faithfully as any other provision of the treaty.”

Mr. Bayard, Sec. of State, to Mr. Rodriguez, Mar. 22, 1886, 159 MS. Dom.
Let. 388.

"I have received your letter of the 27th instant, in relation to the claims of M. C. Rodriguez & Co. against Spain, which were rejected by the United States and Spanish Claims Commission.

"I have failed to discover in your letter any reason for changing the opinion expressed in my letter of the 22d instant, that it would be improper, upon the grounds which you allege, for this Government to

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