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to Porto Rico, and that until Congress otherwise constitutionally directed, such merchandise was entitled to free entry.

"An unlimited power on the part of the Commander-in Chief to exact duties upon imports from the States might have placed Porto Rico in a most embarrassing situation. The ratification of the treaty and the cession of the island to us severed her connection with Spain, of which the island was no longer a colony, and with respect to which she had become a foreign country. The wall of the Spanish tariff was raised against her exports, the wall of military tariff against her imports, from the mother country. She received no compensation from her new relations with the United States. If her exports, upon arriving there, were still subject to the same duties. as merchandise arriving from other foreign countries, while her imports from the United States were subjected to duties prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief, she would be placed in a position of practical isolation, which could not fail to be disastrous to the business and finances of an island. It had no manufactures or markets of its own, and was dependent upon the markets of other countries for the sale of her productions of coffee, sugar and tobacco. In our opinion the authority of the President as. Commander-in-Chief to exact duties upon imports from the United States ceased with the ratification of the treaty of peace, and her right to the free entry of goods from the ports of the United States continued until Congress should constitutionally legislate upon the subject.

"The judgment of the circuit court is therefore reversed and the case remanded to that court for further proceedings in consonance with this opinion.”

Mr. Justice Brown, delivering the opinion of the court, Dooley v. United
States (1901), 182 U. S. 222, 234-236.

With reference to restrictions placed by the American military authorities on commerce with the Sulu Islands, the Government of the United States took the ground that, as the islands were then subject to military occupation, it was the right of the commander of the occupying forces to regulate or prohibit trade with the territory so occupied. The fact was also pointed out that the military forces of the United States were engaged in suppressing an insurrection in a part of the Philippine Archipelago accessible from the Sulu Islands, and that the military authorities conducting the operations against the insurrection were at one time of opinion that a military necessity existed for prohibiting commercial intercourse between the Sulu Islands and the outside world. To that end Admiral Dewey, in June, 1899, issued an order prohibiting all trade with the Philippines, except with the ports of Manila, Iloilo, Cebu, and Bakalota. Subsequently this order was modified and new orders were substituted, under which such restrictions on trade with the Sulu Islands

were enforced as were deemed essential to meet the military necessity occasioned by the insurrection. These restrictions were emergency measures, and were not intended as an evidence of what the permanent policy of the United States would be when peace was restored in the Philippines.

Mr. Adee, Act. Sec. of State, to Count Quadt, German chargé, No. 481,
Oct. 19, 1900, MS. Notes to German Leg. XII. 500.

The right of the military occupant to regulate, as an incident of military government, trade with the inhabitants of the territory subject to his jurisdiction is well established by the laws and usages of nations.

Mr. Magoon, law officer, Division of Insular Affairs, War Department,
Oct. 24, 1899, Magoon's Reports, 302, citing Birkhimer on Military
Government and Martial Law, 204; Fleming . Page, 9 How. 615.
See, also, report of Oct. 8, 1900, Magoon's Reports, 316, 325.

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4. TREATMENT OF THE INHABITANTS.

§ 1146.

Though a subject can not divest himself of the obligation of a citizen, and wantonly make a compact with the enemy of his country, stipulating a neutrality of conduct," yet, where his country is no longer able to give him protection, he may be warranted in making the best terms he can; e. g., he may be warranted in pledging himself to neutrality of conduct for the purpose of protecting his property in a place surrendered by his government to the enemy.

Case of The Resolution, Federal Court of Appeals, 1781, 2 Dall. 1, 10.

June 4, 1846, Marcy sent to General Taylor a proclamation in Spanish to be signed by Taylor and circulated in Mexico. Taylor was instructed to use his "utmost endeavors to have pledges and promises therein contained carried out to the fullest extent." In this proclamation the causes of the war are recited, and it is declared: “This war ... will be prosecuted with vigor and energy against your army and rulers; but those of the Mexican people who remain neutral will not be molested. We come to obtain reparation for repeated wrongs and injuries; we come to obtain indemnity for the past and security for the future; we come to overthrow the tyrants who have destroyed your liberties; but we come to make no war upon the people of Mexico, nor upon any form of free government they may choose to select for themselves. Your religion, your

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altars and churches, the property of your churches and citizens, the emblems of your faith and its ministers, shall be protected and remain

inviolate. Hundreds of our army, and hundreds of thousands of our people, are members of the Catholic Church. We come among the people of Mexico as friends and republican brethren, and all who receive us as such shall be protected, whilst all who are seduced into the army of your dictator shall be treated as enemies. We shall want from you nothing but food for our army, and for this you shall always be paid in cash the full value."

H. Ex. Doc. 119, 29 Cong. 2 sess. 14-17.

"33. It is no longer considered lawful-on the contrary, it is held to be a serious breach of the law of war-to force the subjects of the enemy into the service of the victorious government, except the latter should proclaim, after a fair and complete conquest of the hostile country or district, that it is resolved to keep the country, district, or place permanently as its own and make it a portion of its own country."

Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the
Field, General Orders, No. 100, April 24, 1863, War of the Rebellion,
Official Records, series 3, III. 152.

"32. A victorious army, by the martial power inherent in the same, may suspend, change, or abolish, as far as the martial power extends, the relations which arise from the services due, according to the existing laws of the invaded country, from one citizen, subject, or native of the same to another.

"The commander of the Army must leave it to the ultimate treaty of peace to settle the permanency of this change."

Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the
Field, General Orders, No. 100, April 24, 1863, ibid.

"37. The United States acknowledge and protect, in hostile countries occupied by them, religion and morality; strictly private prop erty; the persons of the inhabitants, especially those of women; and the sacredness of domestic relations. Offenses to the contrary shall be rigorously punished.

"This rule does not interfere with the right of the victorious invader to tax the people or their property, to levy forced loans, to billet soldiers, or to appropriate property, especially houses, lands, boats or ships, and the churches, for temporary and military uses."

Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the
Field, General Orders, No. 100, April 24, 1863, ibid.

"ARTICLE XLIV. Any compulsion of the population of occupied territory to take part in military operations against its own country is prohibited."

Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague,
July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. II. 1821.

"ARTICLE XLV. Any pressure on the population of occupied territory to take the oath to the hostile Power is prohibited.”

Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague,
July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. II. 1822.

“ARTICLE XLVI. Family honours and rights, individuai lives and private property, as well as religious convictions and liberty, must be respected.

"Private property can not be confiscated.

"ARTICLE XLVII. Pillage is formally prohibited."

Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague,
July 29, 1899, ibid.

"ARTICLE L. No general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, can be inflicted on the population on account of the acts of individuals for which it can not be regarded as collectively responsible.”

Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague,
July 29, 1899, ibid.

Martial law—Military jurisdiction.

5. MARTIAL LAW.

§ 1147.

"1. A place, district, or country occupied by an enemy stands, in consequence of the occupation, under the martial law of the invading or occupying army, whether any proclamation declaring martial law, or any public warning to the inhabitants, has been issued or not. Martial law is the immediate and direct effect and consequence of occupation or conquest.

The presence of a hostile army proclaims its martial law.

2. Martial law does not cease during the hostile occupation, except by special proclamation, ordered by the commander-in-chief, or by special mention in the treaty of peace concluding the war, when the occupation of a place or territory continues beyond the conclusion of peace as one of the conditions of the same.

3. Martial law in a hostile country consists in the suspension by the occupying military authority of the criminal and civil law, and of the domestic administration and government in the occupied place or territory, and in the substitution of military rule and force for the same, as well as in the dictation of general laws, as far as military necessity requires this suspension, substitution, or dictation.

The commander of the forces may proclaim that the administration of all civil and penal law shall continue either wholly or in part, a in times of peace, unless otherwise ordered by the military authority.

"4. Martial law is simply military authority exercised in accordance with the laws and usages of war. Military oppression is not martial law; it is the abuse of the power which that law confers. As martial law is executed by military force, it is incumbent upon those who administer it to be strictly guided by the principles of justice, honor, and humanity-virtues adorning a soldier even more than other men, for the very reason that he possesses the power of his arms against the unarmed.

"5. Martial law should be less stringent in places and countries fully occupied and fairly conquered. Much greater severity may be exercised in places or regions where actual hostilities exist or are expected and must be prepared for. Its most complete sway is allowed—even in the commander's own country-when face to face with the enemy, because of the absolute necessities of the case, and of the paramount duty to defend the country against invasion.

"To save the country is paramount to all other considerations. "All civil and penal law shall continue to take its usual course in the enemy's places and territories under martial law unless interrupted or stopped by order of the occupying military power; but all the functions of the hostile government-legislative, executive, or administrative—whether of a general, provincial, or local character. cease under martial law, or continue only with the sanction, or, if deemed necessary, the participation of the occupier or invader.

"7. Martial law extends to property, and to persons, whether they are subjects of the enemy or aliens to that government.

"10. Martial law affects chiefly the police and collection of public revenue and taxes, whether imposed by the expelled government or by the invader, and refers mainly to the support and efficiency of the Army, its safety, and the safety of its operations.

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"12. Whenever feasible martial law is carried out in cases of individual offenders by military courts; but sentences of death shall be executed only with the approval of the Chief Executive, provided the urgency of the case does not require a speedier execution, and then only with the approval of the chief commander.

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13. Military jurisdiction is of two kinds: First, that which is conferred and defined by statute; second, that which is derived from the common law of war. Military offenses under the statute law must be tried in the manner therein directed; but military offenses which do not come within the statute must be tried and punished under the common law of war. The character of the courts which exercise these jurisdictions depends upon the local laws of each particular country.

"In the armies of the United States the first is exercised by courtsmartial; while cases which do not come within the Rules and Articles

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