subsequently made for the insurance, on the ground that the insured was guilty of no laches and that at the close of the war the policy revived. The court held that the agency was revoked by the war, since its continuance would have involved an active and continuous business of such a nature that it could not be carried on during the war, where the principal and the agent resided in different belligerent countries. The general subject of contracts and business between the citizens of States at war was examined with great care in Kershaw e. Kelsey, 100 Massachusetts, 561, by Mr. Justice Gray, who held that, while the law of nations prohibited all contracts involving intercourse between citizens of the two belligerents, the prohibition would not be carried further, and that the court was not disposed to declare unlawful contracts such as had not previously been adjudged to be inconsistent with a state of war. The Supreme Court thought that the power of attorney in the present case was not revoked by the war, and that, as it was manifestly the interest of the principal that the agency constituted before the war should continue, his assent to its continuance would be presumed. And the act of the agent was ratified by the receipt by the principal of the money obtained by the sale. Williams v. Paine (1897), 169 U. S. 55; opinion by Mr. Justice Peckham. During the war, a sale of land within the Union lines was made under a deed of trust given before the war to secure the payment of a debt. The grantor, at the time of the sale, was a resident within the Confederate lines. Held, that the sale was valid. Mitchell v. Nodaway County, 80 Mo. 257. With regard to life insurance contracts, it was held that, as the companies elected to insist upon the conditions of time as to the payment of premiums, the payment of which had been prevented by the existence of war, the policies must be considered as extinguished by nonpayment of the premiums, but that the insured were entitled ex æquo et bono to recover the equitable value of the policies, with interest from the close of the war. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Statham (1876), 93 U. S. 24. See Semmes v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1871), 13 Wall. 158; New York Life (3) CESSATION OF INTEREST. § 1138. Interest did not run during war on a mortgage debt due by an inhabitant of the United States to a British subject. The reporter in a note states that this had been the uniform holding in the courts of Pennsylvania. Hoare v. Allen, Supreme Court of Pa., 1789, 2 Dall. 102. This principle was affirmed in the case of Foxeraft and Galloway r. Nagle, Supreme Court of Pa., 1791, 2 Dall. 132. See, to the same effect, Brown . Hiatts, 15 Wall. 177. See Moore, Int. Arbitrations, IV. 4313. There should be no abatement of interest on a judgment during the war, the counties in which the plaintiff and defendant respectively lived being judicially known not to be in territories which were hostile to one another. Kent, Paine & Co. v. Chapman, 18 W. Va. 485. 3. JUDICIAL REMEDIES. (1) SUSPENSION AND REVIVAL. § 1139. An alien enemy is not permitted to sue. Wilcox v. Henry, 1 Dall. 69; Matthews v. McStea, 91 U. S. 7; Sanderson v. Morgan, 39 N. Y. 231; Perkins r. Rogers, 35 Ind. 124; Rice v. Shook, 27 Ark. 137; Grinnan v. Edwads, 21 W. Va. 347; Haymond r. Camden, 22 W. Va. 180; Sturm v. Flemming, 22 W. Va. 404; Stephens v. Brown, 24 W. Va. 234. This rule obviously does not operate as to alien enemies who are by treaty permitted to continue their residence and business, on condition of observing the laws. The existence of war does not prevent the citizens of one belligerent power from taking proceedings for the protection of their own property, in their own courts, against the citizens of the other, whenever the latter can be reached by process; and where an alien enemy is thus sued, he may defend himself in the action. MeVeigh v. United States, 11 Wall. 259; United States r. Shares of The right to sue revives after peace. Hanger r. Abbott, 6 Wall. 532; Stiles r. Eastley, 51 Ill. 275. See, also, Citizens of the loyal States were not prevented from suing citizens of the Confederate States in the Federal courts in those States as soon as such courts were opened. Before any official proclamation of the end of the civil war was made courts of the United States were held in the several States which had been engaged in rebellion, and their jurisdiction to hear and determine the cases brought before them as well before as after such proclamation is not open to controversy. Masterson v. Howard, 18 Wall. 99. As to the time when the civil war ceased in different places, see infra, § 1163. The fact that a defendant in a suit, during the war, left the State and joined the United States Army, affords no ground for maintaining a bill to reverse the proceedings had in the suit during his absence. Rodgers and Smith v. Dibrell, 6 Lea (Tenn.), 69. (2) SUSPENSION OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. § 1140. The treaty of peace with Great Britain prevents the operation of the statute of limitations of Virginia on British debts which were incurred before the treaty. Hopkirk v. Bell, 3 Cranch, 454. Where a citizen of a State adhering during the war of the rebellion to the national cause brought suit, after the war, against a citizen residing during the war within the limits of an insurrectionary State, it was held that the period during which the plaintiff was prevented from suing by the state of hostilities should be deducted from the time necessary to bar the action under the statute of limitations. Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wall. 532. See, also, The Protector, 12 Wall. 700; Semmes v. Hartford Ins. Co., 13 Wall. 150; Brown v. Hiatts, 15 Wall. 177; University v. Finch, 18 Wall. 106. 4. LICENSES. § 1141. Licenses are sometimes granted by a belligerent State to its own citizens, to those of the enemy, or to neutrals, to carry on a trade which is interdicted by the laws of war. Such documents must be respected by the officers and tribunals of the State under whose authority they are issued, though they may be considered by the adverse belligerent as a ground of capture and confiscation. They are to be construed fairly but strictly. Licenses are general and special. A general license relaxes the exercise of the rights of war, generally or partially, in relation to any community or individuals liable to be affected by their operation. A special license is one given to individuals for a particular voyage for the importation or exportation of particular goods. Licenses to trade must, as a general rule, emanate from the supreme authority of the State. But there are exceptions to this rule, growing out of the particular circumstances of the war in particular places. Thus, the governor of a province, the general of an army, or the admiral of a fleet, may grant licenses to trade within the limits of their own commands. But such licenses afford no protec tion beyond the limits of the authority of those who issue them. Halleck, Int. Law (3d ed., by Baker), II. 343 et seq. See, as to licenses to trade, The Sea Lion, 5 Wall. 630; Coppell v. Hall, 7 Wall. 542; Hamilton . Dillin, 21 Wall. 73; United States v. One Hundred Barrels of Cement, 27 Fed. Cases, 292. "I have to acknowledge the receipt or your letter of the 9th instant, in which you state that you desire, as counsel for the Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, to obtain from this Government authority for your company to apply to the Spanish Government for a license that will enable it to protect its real estate and other assets in Spain. "In this relation, the Department desires to refer to Article XIII. of the treaty between the United States and Spain, concluded at San Lorenzo el Real, October 22, 1795. "The provisions of the article are as follows: "For the better promoting of commerce on both sides, it is agreed, that if a war shall break out between the said two nations one year after the proclamation of the war shall be allowed to the merchants in the cities and towns where they shall live, for collecting and transporting their goods and merchandises; and if anything be taken from them or any injury be done them within that term, by either party, or the people or subjects of either. full satisfaction shall be made for the same by the Government.' "If the obligations of this article, which expressly refer to a state of war, were recognized by the Spanish Government, it is probable that they would be so construed as to accomplish, for the present, the object which you desire to attain, so far at least as the protection of any personal property is concerned. The Department, however, is advised that the Spanish Government has, as its public proclamations imply, declared all the treaty stipulations between the two countries, even though such stipulations expressly refer to a state of war, to be annulled by the existing hostilities. "In this position the Government of the United States does not acquiesce; and while it considers the action of the Spanish Government as releasing it from any obligation to observe the stipulations in question, it is unwilling to lend any countenance to that Government's contention. With this reservation, however, it is not disposed, in such a case as is now presented, to stand in the way of its citizens obtaining, by special license of the Spanish Government, the protection which the treaty was designed to secure to them. The Department therefore grants the request of the Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States for permission to obtain from the Spanish Government a license which will enable the company to protect its assets in Spain. It is, however, to be understood that this permission is granted upon the condition that the company will perform its duties as a citizen of the United States and confine itself in its action in Spain to the protection of its legitimate interests, and that the permission is revocable at the will of this Government." Mr. Moore, Assist. Sec. of State, to Messrs. Alexander and Green, May 19, 1898, 228 MS. Dom. Let. 586. 5. INTERFERENCE WITH MEANS OF COMMUNICATION. § 1142. In the summer of 1893, in view of political disturbances, the Government of Brazil prohibited the use of cipher words in commercial messages sent to that country. The minister of the United States at Rio was instructed to try to have the restriction removed altogether, but, if this was impossible, as a last resort to suggest the expedient of lodging the cipher codes with the Government. The interdiction was subsequently removed. After the revolt of the squadron under Admiral Mello, telegraphic communication for commercial purposes was altogether prohibited, but the restriction was almost immediately modified so as to allow messages to be sent in plain language, with the visé of the minister of the treasury. For. Rel. 1893, 38-39, 41-43, 49-50, 62, 145. During the war between the United States and Spain, a censorship was established, under General A. W. Greely, Chief Signal Officer, of cable messages sent from the United States. No cipher messages were permitted to pass without special authority in each case; but such authority was given for the messages of diplomatic representatives officially addressed and signed. In this relation, however, it was observed that, "should the exigencies of war require, this Department could oppose no objection to the complete prohibition of all cipher messages, whether of foreign representatives or others." Mr. Adee, Act. Sec. of State, to Sec. of War, April 27, 1898, 228 MS. See, also, Mr. Adee, Act. Sec. of State, to Sec. of War, April 27, 1898. |