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604

BURR'S CONDUCT.

[CHAP. XI.

they may thank themselves for it; and let the consequences be what they may, the guilt will lie at their own doors as being the aggressors, and bringing forward the lex talionis of the Federalists."

We have seen in Jefferson's letter to Monroe, February 15th, that the Republicans in Congress had "declared openly and firmly one and all " to their opponents that the day" an act was passed for putting the government into the hands of an officer, "the middle States would arm, and that no such usurpation, even for a single day, should be submitted to." He said but for this, they would have prevented an election." We soon shall bring some very authoritative testimony from the other side to confirm the last statement.

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Jefferson wrote Governor McKean, March 9th, that he would have cheerfully taken the place of Vice-President, had Burr been elected; "because, however, it might have been variant from the intentions of the voters, yet it would have been agreeable to the Constitution." "But," he added, " in the event of a usurpation, he was decidedly of those who were determined not to permit it; because that precedent once set, would be artificially reproduced and end soon in a dictator. Virginia was bristling up he believed. He should know the particulars from Governor Monroe." If we had the letter of McKean to which this is an answer, we suspect we should find in it some particulars of the "bristling up" of Pennsylvania.

Burr's conduct during the long struggle in the House was characteristic. His tools wrote wheedling letters, and he remained at Albany shrouded in mystery.' When he found the Federalists were preparing to disregard his letter to General Smith (and we suspect he well knew why they disregarded it), it was his duty equally to his party, to himself, and to his country, to repair at once to the seat of Government, or take other equally effectual means to assure friend and foe that he deprecated the meditated attempt to make him President, and would under no circumstances avail himself of an election thus secured." This would have nipped the scheme in the bud.

He has only the merit of not having promised to embrace Federal doctrines in the event of his election, and of not having

Hammond's Political History of New York, vol. i. p. 142.

His immediate resignation or refusal to qualify, in case of an election, would have devolved the Presidency on the Vice-President, who would, necessarily, have been Jefferson.

CHAP. XI.]

BURR'S CONDUuct.

605

directly interfered, so far as is known, to induce Republicans to abandon the support of Jefferson and vote for him. The first merit could not be a great one, so long as the Federalists supported him, to the pitch of desperation, without any such promises. There was but one State (Maryland) in which the change of a single vote would secure him another State, and where anybody pretended he could obtain such vote. He lacked three States of a majority.' There is no real reason for believing that his most desperate personal attempts, his most profuse promises, could have secured him the election. Others, at least, were free enough to promise for him. It would have been a very serious thing for any Republican to have changed his vote in that terrible struggle. Great would have been the reward sufficient to tempt even a corrupt man, unless he had nerves of steel, to make himself a by-word of infamy and be hissed and hooted at wherever he exhibited his dishonored head.

There is no proof (even the extent of their own allegations) that Burr did not secretly try every joint of the moral armor of such Republicans as he dared to approach. We, at least, know that his most confidential agent commenced to tamper with some of them. Had the prospect of success looked inviting, all the analogies of his corrupt career lead to the inference, he would have followed it up. It would be a fanciful hypothesis that a man ever found so ready to perpetrate baseness on slight temptation, would have shrunk from it with so high a prize in view as the Presidency. If he left others to act for him, we may presume he considered that degree of precaution necessary for his safety. We allude not to physical safety. But without any efficient minority to sustain him-with a Senate to reject the nominations, and a House to treat with scorn the recommendations of the detected briber-with the open contumely of a Congress and nation poured upon him personally and officially, the Presidency would have been too dear a bargain for even Aaron Burr.

No one familiar with the history of men or parties at the time, will believe that Burr could have procured the single vote cast for Jefferson in either Vermont, Georgia or Tennessee. Two members changing their votes in New York, two in New Jersey, and one in Maryland, would have given him those States, and it has been assumed that he could have procured them by corrupt appliances in some cases and deceit in others; but as already said, there is no proof whatever of that fact, and all the real probabilities are the other way.

CHAPTER XII.

1801.

Inside View of Federal Camp during closing Election Scenes-Bayard to HamiltonProof that the Federalists contemplated desperate Measures-Jefferson's Statements in Ana in regard to Bayard-Clayton's Interrogatories to Smith and Livingston in the Senate on the Subject-Their Replies and Remarks of Hayne and others-The fair Conclusion derivable from the Facts-Burr's Libel Suit against Cheetham-Bayard's Affidavit-The Wager Suit between Gillespie and Smith-Bayard's and Smith's Affidavits-Burr's Agency in obtaining these while visiting and holding out Menaces to Jefferson-He attempts surreptitiously to alter Smith's Affidavit-Jefferson's Comments on Bayard's Affidavit in Ana-General Smith's Letter explanatory of his Affidavit-Its valuable Explanations in other particulars-Later Disquisitions and Madison's ReplyThe real Attitude of Jefferson and his Opponents towards each other at the close of the Election in 1801-Bayard's later Letters and Speeches illustrative of this-Closing Acts of Adams's Administration-French Treaty ratified with an Exception-The Judiciary Bill-Wolcott appointed one of the Judges-His and the President's CorrespondenceWolcott's Conduct characterized-Marshall's anomalous Official Position-Expiration of Sedition Law-Its Decease contemporaneous with that of the National Federal Party-How the News of Jefferson's Election was publicly Received-His Feelings towards the Body of the Federalists-His Farewell to the Senate and its answering Address His Reputation as a Presiding Officer-Inaugural Ceremonies-His Inaugural Address Its Character as a Literary and Political Production-President's Letter to John Dickinson-Explanatory Letter to Governor Monroe-The Cabinet Appointments -Mr. Madison-Sketch of Colonel Dearborn-Sketch of Mr. Lincoln-Character of Gallatin-Samuel and Robert Smith-Mr. Granger-Dawson dispatched to France with Treaty-President's Letter to Thomas Paine-Permits him to Return to United States in a Public Vessel-Comments of the Federal Press and Clergy thereon-Justice of their Strictures considered-Paine's Visit to Monticello-Jefferson to Priestley-His Letter to Robinson-He was not understood in New England, and did not understand the New England Character-Least of all did he understand its Clergy-Character of the Virginia Clergy-Different Circumstances of New England Clergy-Religious Character of New England Emigrations-The Religious Principle paramount in the Social Organization-The Government essentially Hierocratic-The Clergy extended their Supervision to all Moral Subjects-The System towards the close of the Eighteenth Century-Character of the Clergy at that period-Sources of their Hostility to Jefferson-The Mistake of both sides.

THE best inside view of the closing scenes in the Federal camp preceding the late election, is derived from a letter from Bayard to Hamilton, which we present entire. It is entitled

CHAP. XII.] BAYARD'S ACCOUNT OF THE ELECTION.

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to calm and close scrutiny in its several parts, and as a whole :

DEAR SIR:

WASHINGTON, 8th March, 1801.

I left Washington on the 5th and arrived here last evening. The letter which you did me the honor to write the 22d ultimo, reached me on the 4th, when I was occupied in arrangements for leaving the seat of Government.

I remained in Washington on the 4th through necessity, though not without some curiosity to see the inauguration and to hear the speech. The scene was the same as exhibited upon former occasions, and the speech, in political substance, better than we expected; and not answerable to the expectations of the partisans of the other side.

After the inaugural ceremonies, most of the Federal gentlemen paid their respects to the President and the Vice, and were received with very decent respect.

Mr. Adams did not attend. He has been sufficiently humbled to be allowed to be absent. Your views in relation to the election differed very little from my own, but I was obliged to yield to a torrent which I perceived might be diverted, but could not be opposed.

In one case I was willing to take Burr, but I never considered it as a case likely to happen. If by his conduct he had completely forfeited the confidence and friendship of his party, and left himself no resort but the support of the Federalists, there are many considerations which would have induced me to prefer him to Jefferson. But I was enabled soon to discover that he was determined not to shackle himself with Federal principles; and it became evident that if he got in without being absolutely committed in relation to his own party, that he would be disposed and obliged to play the game of McKean upon an improved plan and enlarged scale.

In the origin of the business I had contrived to lay hold of all the doubtful votes in the House, which enabled me according to views which presented themselves, to protract or terminate the controversy.

This arrangement was easily made, from the opinion readily adopted from the consideration, that representing a small State without resources which could supply the means of self-protection, I should not dare to proceed to any length which would jeopardize the Constitution or the safety of any State. When the experiment was fully made, and acknowledged upon all hands to have completely ascertained that Burr was resolved not to commit himself, and that nothing remained but to appoint a President by law, or leave the Government without one, I came out with the most explicit and determined declaration of voting for Jefferson. You cannot well imagine the clamor and vehement invective to which I was subjected for some days. We had several caucuses. All acknowledged that nothing but desperate mea sures remained, which several were disposed to adopt, and but few were willing openly to disapprove. We broke up each time in confusion and discord, and the manner of the last ballot was arranged but a few minutes before the ballot was given. Our former harmony, however, has since been restored.

The public declarations of my intention to vote for Jefferson, to which I have alluded, were made without a general consultation, knowing that it would be an easier task to close the breach which I foresaw, when it was the result of an act done without concurrence, than if it had proceeded from one against a decision of the party. Had it not been for a single gentleman from Connecticut, the eastern States would finally have voted in blank, in the same manner as done by South

608

DESPERATE DESIGNS PROVEN.

[CHAP. XII.

Carolina and Delaware; but because he refused, the rest of the delegation refused, and because Connecticut insisted on continuing the ballot for Burr, New Hamp shire, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island, refused to depart from their former vote.

The means existed of electing Burr; but this required his cooperation. By deceiving one man (a great blockhead), and tempting two (not incorruptible), he might have secured a majority of the States. He will never have another chance of being President of the United States; and the little use he has made of the one which has occurred, gives me but an humble opinion of the talents of an unprincipled man.'

It will be observed that Mr. Bayard asserts that at the last caucus of the Federalists, it was admitted that Burr could not be elected that nothing but "desperate measures" remained to defeat Jefferson-that several were disposed to adopt, and that "few were willing openly to disapprove" of them. Mr. Bayard, some years after, declared in an affidavit that: "In the morning of the day (on which the last ballot was taken) there was a general meeting of the party, where it was generally admitted that Mr. Burr could not be elected; but some thought it better to persist in our vote, and to go without a President rather than to elect Mr. Jefferson."

The preceding letter to Hamilton clearly conveys the inference that Bayard ultimately acted against the wishes of a decided majority of his own party, and that they received his determination with continued "clamor and invective."

His testimony concurs with Morris's, in proving that "desperate measures" were contemplated to defeat Jefferson. Morris declares what the desperate measure was. Adams's letter to Gerry, already quoted,' leaves no doubt that he too was informed of its nature.

Professor Tucker, in his Life of Jefferson, says: "General Lee, of Virginia, it is said, was earnest in advising this desperate measure." This specific statement has been before the public twenty years, and we are not aware that it has been contradicted."

Yet when an imputation against the Federalists of such designs appeared in Jefferson's contemporaneous correspondence, published after his death, they were fiercely denied and pronounced, as usual, wicked fabrications. Certificate makers,

1 For this letter, see Hamilton's Works, vol. vi. p. 522. The word Washington, in the date, is an obvious misprint. 2 See ante, p. 588. It is possible that a public contradiction has escaped our notice.

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