CHAPTER IX.

1798-1799.

Impolicy of the French Measures-Viows of the American Parties-The President receives the French Overtures to Pacification-His Opinions of them-Questions to his Cabinet Their Action thereon-The President's Conviction that France did not meditate War-Hamilton apprised of all the Facts-He urges on War Preparations however-Why this Change in his Views since 1797?-Don Francisco de Miranda— His Proposals to England and the United States to revolutionize Mexico and South America-British Cabinet accede to his Plans-Hamilton consulted through KingMiranda's Letter to Hamilton of April 6th, 1798-Hamilton engages in the Scheme, and asks the Command of the Land Forces-His Letters to King and Miranda-He engaged in this before hearing Result of the new French Mission he had urged-He knew the Miranda Scheme involved a War with France-British Cabinet accede to Hamilton's Proposals-King's Letters to Pickering-The British part of the Expedition ready-Miranda's Letter to the President-Offensive War against France meditated— Necessary as an Excuse to attack Spain-Views of the Republicans in the Summer of 1798-Their Apprehensions in regard to the Army-Their Suspicions of Hamilton-Jefferson to Taylor, of Caroline, on dissolving the Union-His Letter to Mason-The Nicholases at Monticello-The Kentucky Resolutions as drafted by Jefferson-Mr. Madison's View of their Import-Modified, and passed by Kentucky Legislature-Reasons for supposing Jefferson assented to or made the Modifications-Letter to Taylor, of Caroline-Passage of the Virginia Resolutions-Third Session of Fifth Congress-The President's Speech-An Error of Jefferson-The Senate "hint Logan" to Mr. Adams— His unfortunate Reply-Hamilton's Programme for Congress-It contemplated a subversion of the existing Government-Hamilton hints the Miranda Scheme to his Instruments in Congress-Proposes Preparations to carry out that Scheme-Letters to Gunn and Otis on the Subject-Origin of the "Logan Law"-Harper's Misstatements and Logan's Corrections-Passage and Character of this Law-Jefferson to Gerry-Objects of the Letter-Jefferson to Pendleton-Pendleton's Patriarchal Address-The Union of the Patriotic Extremes of the Revolution-What it proved and what it foreshadowed -Great War Preparations in Congress-Debts to be incurred in proportion Jefferson urges the Republicans to avoid every Act and Threet against the Peace of the UnionBills to continue Non-Intercourse with France, and to augment the Navy, passed Jef ferson raises Money to print Political Documents-Letters to Monroe and StewartCapture of the Retaliation-British impress Seamen from the United States Sloop of War Baltimore-Jefferson complains of the President's withholding the French Overtures-President nominates Murray Minister Plenipotentiary to France-The Federal leaders "Gravelled "-Sedgwick and Pickering to Hamilton on the Subject-Senate drive President to substitute a Commission-Ellsworth, Henry and Murray nominated and approved-Jefferson to Kosciusko-To Madison-A scandalous Scene in the House of Representatives-Means sought to be employed by the Federal and Republican Chiefs to prepare for the decisive Contest Jefferson's Letters to his Daughters.

FRANCE had made a new, or continued an old, absurd error in her treatment of the American Envoys. It is always absurd for

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PARTY VIEWS OF FRENCH OVERTURES. [CHAP. IX.

nations or individuals to resort to menaces where inclination or interest stands in the way of their execution, if they call out defiance instead of submission. And threatening is never the best method of calling back a friend to a real or supposed duty. Her "humiliations," as Mr. Liston characterized them, were therefore a meed due to her folly.

The American parties took different views of the subject. The Republicans thought insults from France thus apologized for, were not better causes of war, than insults from other quarters unapologized for; and had all the pacific efforts and assurances from France, recorded in the last chapter, been allowed to come directly before the American people, it is probably safe to say that nine-tenths of them, out of high political and army circles, would have concurred with the Republicans.

The Federal leaders on the other hand, discovered that these concessions sprung only from abject fear, and that therefore they afforded no reason for our withholding our chastising arm.' Yet we rarely find this boast uttered without being coupled with the wholly contrary hypothesis, that France was only seeking to gain time, and put us off our guard, preparatory to an attempt to conquer a portion or the whole of our country. Intimidated as France was, the "invasion" which we were raising armies, and preparing fortificatins to withstand, was but a little way off! It is probable that there were persons who firmly believed both theories. Of the sincerity of the leaders of the war party we shall be better enabled to judge after we look, presently, into their confidential correspondences.

What were the effects of the pacific French news on the mind of an inconsistent, impulsive, but honest and patriotic President? It distinctly appears from his own subsequent

To show the spirit which animated a portion of the Federalists at this period, let two or three facts suffice. So enraged were they, because Gerry remained for a brief period in France for the purpose of averting, as he believed, an immediate declaration of war, and consented to confer in a private capacity with its Government, that their presses represented his conduct as on a par with that of Benedict Arnold. The Secretary of State fiercely wrote the President that he "verily believed" Gerry guilty not only of "duplicity," but of "treachery;" and that "if he should not be impeached, not his innocence but political expediency alone should prevent it!" (Adams's Works, vol. viii. p. 616.) Austin, in his Life of Gerry, shows how the neighbors of the latter-the usually peaceful and orderly citizens of Massachusetts-demeaned themselves towards his family in his absence:

"Letters, anonymous or feigned, were sent to Mrs. Gerry [who resided at Cambridge], imputing his continuance in France to causes most distressing to a wife and mother. Yells were uttered and bonfires were kindled at night about his house, and on one occa sion a guillotine was erected under the window, smeared with blood, and bearing the effigy of a headless man."

CHAP. IX.]

PRESIDENT'S OPINION OF THEM.

431

avowals, that they wrought an undoubting conviction in his mind, that France was sincere in her proffers of a pacific and fair accommodation-that "if ever there was a regular diplomatic communication," M. Pichon's "to Murray" was one-that there were not "any words either in the French or English language, which could have expressed in a more solemn, a more explicit, or a more decided manner, assurances of all he [the President] had demanded as conditions of negotiation," that " if, with all this information, he had refused to institute a [new] negotiation," "he should have been degraded in his own estimation as a man of honor, he should have disgraced the nation he represented, in their own opinion, and in the judgment of Europe.'

Mr. Adams received Murray's two first letters on the 9th of October, 1798, and Talleyrand's inclosed first one to Pichon (returned from the State Department, where Mr. Adams had sent it to be deciphered) on the 18th of the same month. These contained the opening French overtures for pacific negotiation. with the United States, which we have seen the President so energetically characterizing.

A letter of Gerry at this period, says Mr. Adams, "confirmed these assurances beyond all doubt in my mind, and his conversations with me at my own house in Quincy, if anything further had been wanting, would have corroborated the whole." The letter of Gerry thus mentioned, was dated at Nantasket Road, October 1st, 1798. Mr. Adams's family biographer asserts that the "conversations" referred to, "must have been in the first week of October," the same year.

On the 20th of October, Mr. Adams addressed questions to his Cabinet through Mr. Pickering, in regard to some "things which deserved to be maturely considered before the meeting of Congress." The first was whether it was expedient to recommend a declaration of war against France. The second was, "whether any further proposals of negotiation could be made. with safety; and whether there would be any use or advantage, in Europe or America, by uniting minds more in our favor, by

1 These declarations, and others as strong, will be found in Mr. Adams's Works, vol. ix. pp. 245, 246. See also p. 241, and the twenty or thirty succeeding pages.

The dates of their reception are particularly mentioned by Mr. Adams's filial biographer and annotator. Adams's Works, vol. viii. p. 676-note.

See them in ib. pp. 680-684.

Life of Adams, p. 533-note.

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CABINET ACTION-THE MESSAGE, ETC.

[CHAP. IX.

any such measure." "If any measure of this kind should be thought admissible who should be the man?" He suggested the names of Mr. Henry, Judge Patterson, Senator Ross, and Senator Stockton, "because while they were staunch Americans, they had not been marked or obnoxious to the French." He also named several other individuals, and among them Mr. Murray. Mr. Adams's biographer states, that instead of the Cabinet "sending any answer, or entering into a discussion of the questions involved, a consultation was had, denominated by Mr. Jefferson, 'a military conclave,' from the presence of some of the general officers then assembled in Philadelphia, and especially of Mr. Hamilton, at which a draft of a message was prepared, obviously designed to preclude the President's action upon the suggestions therein contained," and that "this draft was probably made by Mr. Wolcott, under the direction of Mr. Hamilton."

The President adopted the body of the draft, but introduced an essential modification of the clauses in respect to France (as will hereafter appear), to keep open the door for adjustment. Hamilton afterwards said of his conduct on this occasion:

"In vain was this extension of the sentiment opposed by all of his ministers, as being equally incompatible with good policy, and with the dignity of the nation-he obstinately persisted, and the pernicious declaration was introduced."2

Mr. Adams's clear and decisive conviction at the period he thus consulted his Cabinet, that there was no danger of a war with France; that the cry of "invasion," kept up by a portion of the Federal party, was destitute of a color of foundation; and that he in his heart was thoroughly sick of the military preparations going on, appears in a letter to the Secretary of War, of October 22d.

"There has been no national plan, that I have seen, as yet formed for the maintenance of the army. One thing I know, that regiments are costly articles everywhere, and more so in this country than in any other under the sun. If this nation sees a great army to maintain, without an enemy to fight, there may arise an enthu siasm that seems to be little foreseen. At present there is no more prospect of seeing a French army here, than there is in Heaven."

We have already alluded to the change in General Hamil

1 Adams's Works, vol. viii. p. 610-note.

Adams's Works, vol. viii. p. 613.

"Hamilton's Works, vol. vii. p. 705.

CHAP. IX.] HAMILTON'S SUDDEN CHANGE OF VIEWS.

433

ton's feelings in respect to a war with France since 1797. During the recent excitement on this subject, he was foremost in advocating extensive preparations for war. He appears to have approved all the measures in that direction during the Congressional session of 1797-98. His hand now clutched the baton of command. He ranked next to Washington, and all understood the latter had accepted the position of Commanderin-Chief only for an exigency, and would be likely to soon retire.

General Washington did not anticipate an "invasion." Mr. Adams had no expectation of a war. The Cabinet were apprised of the French overtures through our Minister at the Hague, and three of the secretaries had no secrets with Hamilton. They communicated with him quite as freely as with the President, and far more confidentially. After reading Pickering's, Wolcott's and McHenry's letters to him throughout the year, it would be absurd to conjecture that any Cabinet secrets or intelligence were withheld from him; and the "military conclave" at Philadelphia had afforded every facility for orally communicating them. King wrote him from London, September 23d, "You will have no war."1

With all this information, and with more of the same tenor constantly accumulating, we have seen that Hamilton subsequently bitterly reproached the President for leaving open a loop-hole for accommodation with France in his speech to the succeeding Congress. We shall find him urging on that Congress vastly more extensive warlike preparations than any yet made. We shall find the ghost of a French invasion raised to serve as an excuse and cover for these preparations-but confidential associates apprised of an utterly different and most stupendous design. We shall find a determined-literally, a dogged-effort on the part of Hamilton and his followers, in the Cabinet and in Congress, to prevent the reopening of negotiations with France. We shall find this faction filled with mortification and rage when that negotiation was reopened, which, with so little difficulty or delay, led to an honorable and advantageous pacification. Whence this almost incredible change in Hamilton's views from those entertained in 1797? The answer

1 For the letter entire, see Hamilton's Works, vol. vi. p. 359. VOL. II.-28