CHAP. VI.] JEFFERSON'S MOTIVES. 321 Presidency by bringing in Mr. Pinckney over his head.' Mr. Adams knew the course that he and some other chiefs of the ultra Federal school had pursued in the election. He ought to have known that as President he would be compelled to submit to the dictation of these men, or encounter their deadly opposition-the more deadly as they could fire upon him within his own party camp. Again, Jefferson had an abiding faith in Mr. Adams's personal integrity under all circumstances. But while he believed Hamilton was "disinterested, honest and honorable in all private transactions," he considered him "so bewitched and perverted by the British example as to be under thorough conviction that corruption was essential to the government of a nation." How far the disclosures made by Hamilton's now published Works would have modified Jefferson's conclusions in either of the particulars here expressed, we will not undertake to say. Lastly, there is no doubt that Jefferson dreaded Hamilton's ambition and his designs. He not unfrequently mentioned the impression-the chill-that came over him on hearing Hamilton extravagantly praise the character of Julius Cæsar, and pronounce him the greatest man that ever lived. If we were unable to conjecture the reasons why these remarks should have produced so strong an effect, perhaps we should find a clue to it in a declaration of Cicero's,' that Cæsar had frequently in his mouth a verse of Euripides "which expressed the image of his soul," that "if right and justice were ever to be violated, they were to be violated for the sake of reigning," or words to that effect. That Jefferson believed that Hamilton was capable of pp. 368, 400. See also Hamilton's "Public Character, etc., of John Adams," in the 7th vol. of his Works. 1 Hamilton menacingly insisted on an equal support of Adams and Pinckney in New England, to make sure, as he alleged, of defeating Jefferson, but he admitted that this "would have given Mr. Pinckney a somewhat better chance than Mr. Adams," that "an issue favorable to the former would not have been disagreeable to him," as "he declared at the time in the circles of his confidential friends." (Hamilton's Works, vol. vii. pp. 694 and 695.) In other words, Hamilton labored to the verge of political safety, to bring about a state of things which he was morally certain would procure Pinckney's elevation over Adams, the real and avowed candidate of his party. For the complicity of other parties to this scheme, see two letters from Higginson to Hamilton. Hamilton's Works, vol. v. pp. 185, 191. Also Oliver Wolcott, sen., to his son and Goodrich to Wolcott. Gibbs's Memoirs, etc., vol. i. pp. 408, 411, cum mult. al. See letter of John Adams to his wife, Dec. 12, 1796. Life of John Adams by C. F. Adams, p. 495. Ana, Randolph's edition, vol. iv. p. 451; Congress edition, vol. ix. p. 97. A statement of this general tenor appears somewhere in Mr. Jefferson's writings. We do not for the moment recollect where it is. This statement is attributed to Cicero in Dr. Middleton's Life of him. VOL. II.-21 322 JEFFERSON'S MOTIVES. [CHAP. VI. nourishing dangerous practical designs-that he suspected precisely what Governeur Morris suspected, that Hamilton contemplated in some "crisis" resorting to the sword-we shall have clear proof. The result of the Presidential election in 1796, in the face of Jay's treaty, discouraged Jefferson of the success of the Republican party unless the contest could be rendered less a geographical one. His views on this head are sufficiently given in the letter to Madison of January 1st, 1797. And he felt there could be no decisive and permanent advantage secured by merely electing a Republican President, while Congress and the numerical weight of the country were against him. He believed that the only hope against greater evils lay in a union with the moderate Federalists, and that this was absolutely necessary to prevent the ultras from soon succeeding to power-probably to prevent Hamilton himself from becoming President. He doubtless felt satisfied that if Mr. Adams could be separated from the ultra-Federalists, placed in an attitude of antagonism to them, rendered dependent upon the Republican party, surrounded by its chiefs, who were men of immeasurably more ability than the chiefs of the moderate Federalists, the result would be rather an absorption of than a coalition with the latter. Possibly Jefferson felt that his own influence with Mr. Adams personally and as the Republican leader, and his convenient propinquity to him as Vice-President, would enable him to render that absorption certain and complete. Mr. Adams was certainly much nearer to the Hamiltonians than to the Republicans in certain theories. In his views of practical policy he was, until he became intoxicated with the possession of authority, nearer the latter; or, at least, with his large and warm heart and early democratic biases, he would have found it much more easy to diverge from his own line to them than to their opponents. Hamilton had no hold on the Federal masses compared with Adams, but he had made himself a dictator among a great majority of their leaders, and this even in Mr. Adams's own State. Ames, Sedgwick, Cabot, Pickering, and the whole "Essex Junto," were thorough Hamiltonians. There was no moderate Federal party in Congress beyond a mere wing, nor could there be so long as the able, energetic and managing Federal chiefs in every State where the party could CHAP. VI.] JEFFERSON'S MOTIVES. 323 elect Congressmen were Hamiltonians. Mr. Adams could not therefore possibly sustain his administration without the support of either the ultra-Federalists or the Republicans. He would be forced to concede a good deal to secure either. From quarters from which we should not have expected it, namely from Mr. Adams's friends and apologists, we have seen the idea held out that there was something specially designing, and intended to wheedle, in Jefferson's advance to Mr. Adams on this occasion. The facts do not furnish any color for the hypothesis that Mr. Jefferson thought so poorly of the President as to believe that he could be seduced away from a party to which he was united by principle and affection, merely by the promise of what this same hypothesis would presume he would not be compelled to look for from any new friends. If Mr. Adams entertained the same views with a great proportion of the Federal Members of Congress-if there were no concealed differences of opinion, or disaffection between him and the chiefs of that victorious party who ostensibly stood around him -what kind of a lure would it be if he was supposed in his senses, and the offerer was in his senses, to offer him the support of a minority in exchange for that of a majority? But neither Mr. Adams himself, nor the Hamiltonians believed there was such political and personal harmony between them. Mr. Adams wrote his wife, December 12th, 1796: "If Colonel Hamilton's personal dislike of Jefferson does not obtain too much influence with Massachusetts electors, neither Jefferson will be President, nor Pinckney Vice-President. "I am not enough of an Englishman, nor little enough of a Frenchman, for some people. These would be willing that Pinckney should come in chief. But they will be disappointed. * * * "Giles says, 'the point is settled The V. P. will be President. He is undoubtedly chosen. The old man will make a good President too.' (There's for you.) But we shall have to check him a little now and then. That will be all.' Thus Mr. Giles. * * "The Southern gentlemen with whom I have conversed, have expressed more affection for me than they ever did before, since 1774. They certainly wish Mr. Adams elected rather than Mr. Pinckney. Perhaps it is because Hamilton and Jay are said to be for Pinckney. * "There have been manoeuvres and combinations in this election that would surprise you. I may one day or other develop them to you. "There is an active spirit in the Union who will fill it with his politics wherever he is. He must be attended to, and not suffered to do too much."1 1 Life of John Adams, p. 495. But strangely enough (or what would appear strangely enough in any other man), in answer to a letter of Gerry, of February 3d, (See Adams's 324 JEFFERSON'S MOTIVES. [CHAP. VI. While Mr. Adams thus dreaded "the active spirit" of Hamilton, it is certain, if we may trust his own assertions, that he entertained no corresponding suspicions of Jefferson, and was not aware that they differed very materially in their views of the United States Constitution. Giving (in 1809) a published account of a transaction which took place immediately after his inauguration in the Presidency, he said: "I sought and obtained an interview with Mr. Jefferson. With this gentleman I had lived on terms of intimate friendship for five-and-twenty years, had acted with him in dangerous times and arduous conflicts, and always found him assiduous, laborious, and, as far as I could judge, upright and faithful. Though by this time I differed with him in opinion by the whole horizon concerning the practicability and success of the French Revolution and some other points, I had no reason to think that he differed materially from me with regard to our national Constitution. I did not think that the rumbling noise of party calumny ought to discourage me from consulting men whom I knew to be attached to the interest of the nation, and whose experience, genius, learning, and travels had eminently qualified them to give advice. I asked Mr. Jefferson what he thought of another trip to Paris, and whether he thought the Constitution and the people would be willing to spare him for a short time. 'Are you determined to send to France?' 'Yes.' That is right,' said Mr. Jefferson; but without considering whether the Constitution will allow it or not, I am so sick of residing in Europe, that I believe I shall never go there again!' I replied, 'I own I have strong doubts whether it would be legal to appoint you; but I believe no man could do the business so well. What do you think of sending Mr. Madison? Do you think he would accept an appointment?' 'I do not know,' said Mr. Jefferson. 'Washington wanted to appoint him some Works, vol. viii. p. 520.) Mr. Adams wrote, February 13th (two months after the letter to his wife): "Phocion, the ex-Secretary, and their connections, did not, I believe, meditate by surprise to bring in Pinckney. I believe they honestly meant to bring in me; but they were frightened into a belief that I should fail, and they, in their agony, thought it better to bring in Pinckney than Jefferson, and some, I believe, preferred bringing in Pinckney President, rather than Jefferson should be Vice-President. I believe there were no very dishonest intrigues in this business. The zeal of some was not very ardent for me, but I believe none opposed me."-Adams's Works, vol. viii. p. 524. To this Mr. Adams's editor and biographer, so ready to impute "discrepancies" of statement, "vapors of duplicity," stratagems, etc., to others besides the subject of his biography, attaches a note after the words "bring in me," as follows: "Not many days after the confident expression of this opinion, Mr. Adams received from an old friend in Albany unequivocal evidence of the secret hostility of Mr. Hamilton and his immediate friends. * Mr. Jefferson, far more keen sighted in * stratagem, had hit the truth two months earlier," etc. This gentleman has a convenient way of citing unnamed or unquoted (in the words) witnesses to supply links to his theories as we shall see on a more conspicuous occasion, where Mr. Jefferson is named. But it would seem in the above case, from his letter to his wife, that Mr. (John) Adams did not need the anonymous intimations with which we are now furnished in the supplied link of facts-but that he actually, for once, was as "keen-sighted in stratagem' as Jefferson himself! John Adams does not really need any testimony named or unnamed to explain away the most rapid transition and re-transition in his statements. On the contrary, inconsistency in his declarations is so much more habitual than consistency, that we should suspect him of a "stratagem" himself, did we find him agreeing with himself through two or three consecutive narrations of the same fact. He was only consistent in incon sistency. CHAP. VI.] JEFFERSON'S MOTIVES. 325 time ago, and kept the place open for him a long time; but he never could get him to say that he would go.' Other characters were considered, and other conversation ensued. We parted as good friends as we had always lived; but we consulted very little together afterwards. Party violence soon rendered it impracticable, or at least useless, and this party violence was excited by Hamilton more than any other man. "I will not take leave of Mr. Jefferson in this place without declaring my opinion that the accusations against him of blind devotion to France, of hostility to England, of hatred to commerce, of partiality and duplicity in his late negotiations with the belligerent powers, are without foundation." It appears from this that Mr. Adams was quite as ready for a union with the Republicans, as any of them could be with him that he made the first important actual advance-that he was willing, two months after the date of Jefferson's suppressed letter to him, to give Jefferson or Mr. Madison an office on the successful conduct of which, under the precise circumstances of the time, the whole fate of his own administration hung. We could readily accumulate proof to any amount to show that Adams entered the Presidency sufficiently conscious of his true position, to be anxious to form that union which Jefferson suggested to Madison. In Mr. Trist's Memoranda occurs the following passage, giving the substance of Madison's letter to Jefferson, on the points under examination, in a little more unvarnished form: “Yesterday, July 15th, 1827, speaking of Mr. Adams [Mr. Madison said]: 'On coming into the office of President, he brought with him a sincere disposition to conciliate the Republican party-to bring them into the administration and give them their share of it but his advisers, Hamilton, Pickering, etc., would not hear of it. He was wrought up into a frenzy almost by those around him.' 'You speak in that letter [Madison's letter to Jefferson of January 15, 1797] of H- -n's treachery to Adams-what was that? Why, sir, A. had been taken up by the Federal party as their candidate; but the ultra-Federalists, as they may be called, fearing that he would not be disposed to go as far as they might wish, took up Pinckney as their candidate." a 1 Mr. Adams's Correspondence originally published in the Boston Patriot. See his Works, vol. ix. p. 285. This postscript of the conversation of the 15th is preceded, in the Memoranda, by a report of the conversation of that day, written immediately after, which, though it contains irrelevant matter, we cannot bring ourselves to omit from the liberal apology it offers for the early Federalists, from the justice it does Mr. Adams, and from the favorable opinion it records of the manly elder Wolcott, whom it is our province to meet in these pages only in one unfortunate phase-croaking against Republican government. UNIVERSITY, July 15th, 1817.-Mr. Madison [said]: "I have reasons to believe that Mr. Adams's objections to Democracy were con siderably mitigated towards the close of his life. I have had a correspondence with him since I left public life, and on one occasion expressed a belief that our institutions would stand-his answer was such as to induce the above opinion. At the time he wrote his |