THE EFFECT IN THE UNITED STATES.

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CHAP. III.] stood arrayed against each other in our own country; the one as a ruthless enemy, conceding to American "rebels" not even the harsh mercies of ordinary warfare; the other as a generous ally and deliverer. During those intervening years, the continued enmity of the former, and the continued friendship of the latter, had been manifested on every practicable occasion. Great Britain, in defiance of treaties, still held forcible occupation of important portions of our territory. There was scarcely a man in the nation who did not believe that the long train of our bloody wars with the Indian tribes had been directly fomented by her, and that she furnished the savages with supplies. Her holding the American posts undeniably sheltered them from effectual chastisement or restraint. Independently, then, of all considerations growing out of the fact that the struggle between France and her enemies was virtually one between republicanism and monarchy-considerations which could not fail to enlist the eager sympathies of the advocates of those respective forms of government throughout Christendom-it would not be wonderful that the current of American feeling immediately set strongly in favor of France. And putting both of these causes together, that current became so strong that it swept along all but that comparative handful of Federal leaders whom Hamilton was wont to term the "strong-minded politicians

and Jefferson to term "monarchists."

The President was at Mount Vernon when the preceding intelligence reached the United States. A minister from France was soon expected. It was necessary to settle the line of policy our Government meant to pursue on the various questions which the occasion presented-particularly as the President knew that his Cabinet would stand divided in regard to some of the most imporant of them. He therefore hastened to Philadelphia, and

1 Even Judge Marshall says:

"A great majority of the American people deemed it criminal to remain unconcerned spectators of a conflict between their ancient enemy and republican France. The feeling on this occasion was almost universal. Men of all parties partook of it. * * * The few who did not embrace these opinions, and they were certainly very few, were held up as objects of detestation; and were calumniated as the tools of Britain, and the satellites of despotism."-Marshall's Washington, vol. ii. p. 256.

2 Mr. Jefferson says in his Ana (March 30th, 1793), that at a Cabinet meeting on the 25th of February, Hamilton remarked that "when Mr. Genet arrives, whether we shall receive him or not, would then be a question for discussion." On the 20th of March, therefore, as the President was about setting out for Mount Vernon, Mr. Jefferson observed to him that Genet might arrive in his absence, and he wished to know beforehand how he should treat him. The President said that he could see no ground to doub. that he ought to be received. On the 24th of March the President consulted the Attorney-General, informing him that he had spoken with Colonel Hamilton, "who went

122

QUESTION OF RECEIVING FRENCH MINISTER. [CHAP. III.

submitted the following, among other questions, to his Cabinet: Whether a proclamation should issue to prevent citizens of the United States from interfering in the war between France and Great Britain, and whether it should contain a declaration of neutrality; whether the French Minister should be received; whether he should be received absolutely or with qualifications; whether the United States were required to consider their treaties with France binding, and whether they could renounce or suspend them till the government of France should be established; whether, if they had the right, it would be expedient to do one or the other; whether it would be a breach of neutrality to consider the treaties still in operation, etc.

The series of questions entire is long and abounds with subtle distinctions. For this reason, and because he thought they tended towards a declaration that our treaties with France were void, Mr. Jefferson conjectured that they were prepared by Hamilton; and he believed that the "doubts" were "his alone." The Cabinet met at the President's on the 19th of April, and what transpired is thus recorded in the Ana:

1

"The Erst question, whether we should receive the French minister, Genet, was proposed, and we agreed unanimously that he should be received; Hamilton, at the same time, expressing his great regret that any incident had happened, which should oblige us to recognize the Government. The next question was, whether he should be received absolutely, or with qualifications. Here Hamilton took up the whole subject, and went through it in the order in which the questions sketch it." See the chain of his reasoning in my opinion of April the 28th. Knox subscribed at once to Hamilton's opinion that we ought to declare the treaty void, acknowledging, at the same time, like a fool as he is, that he knew nothing about it. I was clear it remained valid. Randolph declared himself of the same opinion, but on Hamilton's undertaking to present to him the authority in Vattel (which we had not present) and to prove to him, that if the authority was admitted, the treaty

into lengthy considerations of doubt and difficulty, and viewed it as a very unfortunate thing that the President should have the decision of so critical a point forced on him; but in conclusion, said he did not see but the President must receive Mr. Genet." Randolph told the President he was clear he should be received, and the President said he had never had any doubt on the subject in his mind. On the same day the President spoke to Mr. Jefferson again on the subject, and said, "Mr. Genet should be unquestionably received, but he thought not with too much warmth or cordiality, so only as to be satisfactory to him." "I wondered," says Jefferson, "at first at this restriction; but when Randolph afterwards communicated to me his conversation of the 24th, I became satisfied it was a small sacrifice to the opinion of Hamilton."

For the questions entire, see Sparks's Washington, vol. x. p. 533.

2 Hamilton seems to have privately entertained considerable more doubt than Jefferson was aware of on the subject of receiving Genet at all. See his letter to John Jay of April 9, 1793, in Life and Writings of John Jay, vol. i. r. 298. (This is not given in Hamilton's Works.) Jay replied, "I would not receive any minister from a regent until he was regent de facto."-lb. vol. i. p. 300.

CHAP. III.] SO CALLED PROCLAMATION OF NEUTRALITY.

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might be declared void, Randolph agreed to take further time to consider. It was adjourned. We determined, unanimously, the last question, that Congress should not be called. There having been an intimation by Randolph, that in so great a question, he should choose to give a written opinion, and this being approved by the President, I gave in mine April the 28th. Hamilton gave in his. I believe Knox's was never thought worth offering or asking for. Randolph gave his May the 6th, concurring with mine. The President told me, the same day, he had never had a doubt about the validity of the treaty; but that since a question had been suggested, he thought it ought to be considered: that this being done, I might now issue passports to sea vessels in the form prescribed by the French treaty. I had, for a week past only issued the Dutch form; to have issued the French, would have been presupposing the treaty to be in existence. The President suggested, that he thought it would be as well that nothing should be said of such a question having been under consideration.

"Written May the 6th."

It was agreed unanimously "that a proclamation should issue forbidding our citizens to take part in any hostilities on the seas, with or against any of the belligerent powers; and warning them against carrying to any such powers any of those articles deemed contraband, according to the modern usage of nations; and enjoining them from all acts and proceedings inconsistent with the duties of a friendly nation towards those at war." The proclamation, as first proposed, was a declaration of neutrality. Jefferson opposed this successfully, on two grounds-that such a declaration would amount to one that the United States would take no part in the war, to determine which the Executive was not competent-that it would be better to hold back such a declaration, if it was to be made at all, to secure a "price" for it, namely, "the broadest privileges of neutral nations." Randolph drew the paper and exhibited the draft to Jefferson to show him "there was no such word as neutrality in it." The latter considered the omission of any terms which would allow the affection of America for France to be discovered, a piece of "pusillanimity" characteristic of the writer, and productive of evil, because the people, "seeing the Government does not express their mind, perhaps rather leans the other way, are coming forward to express it themselves."◄

Sparks's Washington, vol. x. p. 534.

Jefferson to Madison, June 23d, 1793; to Monroe, July 14.

Jefferson to Monroe, July 14, 1793. Some of the leading Federalists saw the same difficulty in a declaration of neutrality. (See Jay to Hamilton, Hamilton's Works, vol. v. p. 552; Sedgwick to Hamilton, ib. vol. v. p. 581.) Others complained of the omission of the word. (See King to Hamilton, ib. vol. v. p. 553.)

4 This was written after Genet's arrival.

124

THE PRESIDENT'S ATTITUDE.

[CHAP. III. Hamilton delivered an elaborate written opinion on the third question of the President (in regard to receiving a minister), before the close of the month; and on the remaining ones on the 2d of May. In the latter paper he asserted that "the war is plainly an offensive war on the part of France," and therefore that the guaranty in the treaty of alliance between her and the United States "cannot take place, though her West India Islands should be attacked." The hostility evinced towards the present Government of France, throughout the paper was extreme. Jefferson's opinion was dated April 28th, and he answered at considerable length the verbal arguments offered by Hamilton in the Cabinet meeting of the 19th, in favor of our right to renounce the treaty; and he arrived at a precisely opposite conclusion.

It has been seen that the President had really prejudged the question of receiving Genet. There is, in fact, every reason to believe that at this period his views as to the proper and politic course to be pursued as between France and England, much more nearly coincided with those of the Republicans than with those of the Federalists. That he looked with the distrust inseparable from a conservative and singularly cautious mind, on that brilliant but portentous meteor of republicanism which was now glaring luridly over the falling thrones and fanes of Europe, is certain; but, living himself in a republican country, and professing to be a republican, he could not plunge into the enormous inconsistency of denying to the French people (or any other people), a right to establish a similiar government, or of desiring to disown them from among nations for exercising that right. Nay, he had sanctioned, or permitted Jefferson to sanction, exactly the opposite doctrine in instructions to our ministers in both France and England. And he had no partialities, personal or political, for England, which induced him to seek that friendship and alliance with it, which it had so long contemptuously refused, and particularly to seek them at the expense of an early and constant ally. But his extreme disinclination to do anything to commit the United States unnecessarily in any direction, as well as his unquestionable dissent from the doctrines of the ultra-Republicans the democratical Republicans—is

1 The first will be found in his Works, vol. iv. p. 362, and the second, ib. p. 382. The last deserves an attentive perusal from those who would understand Hamilton's politics.

CHAP. III.]

PRESIDENT'S ATTITUDE-FRENEAU.

125

clearly enough shown in a conversation which took place with Jefferson on the 23d of May. The latter had sent to the President, the day before, drafts of letters to be addressed to M. Ternant on the occasion of his recall. Jefferson says:'

"He had underscored the words our republic. He said that certainly ours was a republican government, but yet we had not used that style in this way: that if anybody wanted to change its form into a monarchy, he was sure it was only a few individuals, and that no man in the United States would set his face against it more than himself: but that this was not what he was afraid of; his fears were from another quarter; that there was more danger of anarchy being introduced."

Then immediately follow, in the same connection, certain remarks which have given much pain to some of the warmest friends of Mr. Jefferson:

"He [the President] adverted to a piece in Freneau's paper of yesterday; he said he despised all their attacks on him personally, but that there never had been an act of the Government, not meaning in the Executive line only, but in any line, which that paper had not abused. He had also marked the word republic thus ✅, where it was applied to the French republic. (See the original paper.) He was evidently sore and warm, and I took his intention to be, that I should interpose in some way with Freneau, perhaps withdraw his appointment of trans. lating clerk to my office. But I will not do it. His paper has saved our Constitution, which was galloping fast into monarchy, and has been checked by no one means so powerfully as by that paper. It is well and universally known, that it has been that paper which has checked the career of the monocrats; and the President, not sensible of the designs of the party, has not with his usual good sense and sang froid, looked on the efforts and effects of this free press, and seen that, though some bad things have passed through it to the public, yet the good have preponderated immensely."

The circumstances have already been adverted to which induced Jefferson to retain Freneau in his office. The words, "I will not do it," above, at first certainly grate harshly on the ear, when applied by the writer to an expressed or implied wish of General Washington; but a little further consideration, we think, will show that they mean no more than would the expression, "I cannot consistently do it," in the mouth of a man more accustomed to wrap up his thoughts in velvety phraseology. They meant no more, in truth, than did the naked fact that he kept Freneau in office. His reasons for that were distinctly known to the President-and knowing them the President again and again solicited him to remain in his Cabinet. That there

1Ana, May 23d.