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opinion I did not take up hastily-for with regard to the tariff, I, in common with everybody else in the State, once thought it within the competency of Congress. But more mature inquiry has resulted in a change of my opinion upon that subject, and although I dare not express myself so confidently in respect to it as it is the habit of the times to do, I must be permitted to say that I am more and more strengthened in that conviction by every day's experience and reflection. Sir, if I had any doubt about the matter, the proceedings of this day would be sufficient to dispel it. It is melancholy to think of the change which has been made in the feelings and opinions of some of the best and ablest men among us, by this pernicious system-to reflect that alienation and distrust, nay, in some instances, perhaps, that wrath and hostility now possess those bosoms which were but a few years ago warmed with the loftiest and the holiest enthusiasm for the government of their own and their fathers' choice. The authors of this policy are indirectly responsible for this deplorable state of things, and for all the consequences that may grow out of it. They have been guilty of an inexpiable offence against their country. They found us a united, they have made us a distracted people. They found the Union of these States an object of fervent love and religious veneration; they have made even its utility a subject of controversy among very enlightened men. They have brought us not peace, but a sword. It is owing to this policy that the government has to bear the blame of whatever evils befall the people, from natural or accidental causes-that whether our misfortunes spring from the barrenness of the earth, or the inclemency of the seasons, or the revolutions of commerce, or a defective system of domestic and rural economy-or, in short, from any other source, they are all indiscriminately imputed to the tariff. The decay and desolation which are invading many parts of the lower country-the fall in the price of our great staple commodity-the comparative unproductiveness of slave labor-are confidently declared to be the effects of this odious and tyrannical monopoly. Sir, firmly convinced as I am that there is no sort of connection (or an exceedingly slight one) between these unquestionable facts and the operation of the tariff law, yet I do not wonder at the indignation which the imposition of such a burthen of taxation has excited in our people in the present unprosperous state of their affairs. I have sympathized and do sympathize with them too deeply to rebuke them for their feelings, however improper I deem it to be to act upon such feelings, as recklessly as some of their leaders would have them do.

Sir, it is not only as a Southern man that I protest against the tariff law. The doctrine of free trade is a great fundamental doctrine of civilization. The world must come to it at last if the visions of improvement in which we love to indulge are ever to be realized. It has been justly remarked that most of the wars which have, for the last two cen

turies, desolated Europe, and stained the land and sea with blood, originated in the lust of colonial empire or commercial monopoly. Great nations cannot be held together under a united government by any thing short of despotic power; if any one part of a country is to be arrayed against another in a perpetual scramble for privilege and protection, under any system of protection, they must fall to pieces, and if the same blind selfishness and rapacity animate the fragments which had occasioned the disunion of the whole, there will be no end to the strife of conflicting interests. When you add to the calamities of public wars and civil dissensions, the crimes created by tyrannical revenue laws, and the bloody penalties necessary to enforce them, the injustice done to many branches of industry, to promote the success of others, the pauperism, the misery, the discontent, the despair, and the thousand social disorders which such a violation of the laws of nature never fails to engender, you will admit, I think, that the cause of free trade is the great cause of human improvement. Sir, I can never sufficiently deplore the infatuation which has brought such a scourge upon this favored land-which has entailed, so to speak, the curse of an original sin upon a new world, and upon the continually multiplying millions that are to inhabit it. Most heartily shall I co-operate in any measure, not revolutionary, to do away with the system which has already become a fountain of bitter waters to us-which threatens to become to another generation a source of blood and tears-and I heartily rejoice at the dawn of hope which has opened upon us in the proposed convention at Philadelphia. Not that I am sanguine as to the immediate results of such a meeting; but if it be filled, as it ought to be, with leading and enlightened men from all parts of the country, which think as we do upon this great subject, it will awaken the attention of the people, it will lead to general discussion, it will give scope, if I may so express it, for the operation of those momentous truths on which we rely, and I cannot, and will not despair of the Republic, as it came down to us from the most venerable band of sages and heroes that ever laid the foundation of a great empire, until I become satisfied by much better evidence than any I have yet seen, that it is in vain to appeal to the good sense and kindly feelings of the American people. Meanwhile, to the measure which is now under consideration, and which, by whatever name it may be called, is, in my opinion, essentially revolutionary, I am, as I ever have been, decidedly opposed. I regarded it, when it was first mentioned in 1828, as an ill-omened and disastrous project-calculated to divide us among ourselves, to alienate from us the minds of our natural allies in such a struggle, the agricultural States in our neighborhood, and to involve us in difficulties from which we should not be able to retreat without dishonor, and in which we could not persevere without inevitable and irretrievable ruin-I might have been wrong, but I

acted upon deep and solemn conviction, and I thank God, from the bottom of my heart, for being permitted to indulge in the consoling persuasion, that my humble labors on that memorable occasion did contribute in some degree to avert these calamities.

Sir, this is no occasion for going into a detailed analysis of the doctrine of nullification, a doctrine which, as taught in The Exposition, I undertake to say, involves just as many paradoxes and contradictions as there are topies relied on to maintain it—but I cannot refrain from presenting a single view of it, which is of itself entirely conclusive. You will observe, Mr. President, that the difference between us and the advocates of this doctrine, is not as to the question how far a State is bound to acquiesce in an unconstitutional act of Congress; or (which is the same thing) how far it has a right "to interpose to arrest the progress" of such legislation. We admit this right in the most unqualified manner; for if the law be unconstitutional, it is no law at all. So far there is no difference and can be no difference between us. The question is not as to the right, nor even as to the remedy, but as to what shall ensue upon the exercise of the right, or the application of the remedy. The advocates of nullification insist upon it, that the interference of the States in such a case would be a peaceful act-we say it would be, even upon their own showing, an act of war-a revolutionary measure-a remedy derived from a source above all law, and an authority which bows to no arbiter but the sword-and this is susceptible of as rigorous demonstration as any point within the whole compass of public law.

For the sake of argument, I concede all that the most extravagant writers in our newspapers have ever assumed, and a great deal more than the most able of them can prove-I will grant that the government of the United States is no government at all—that it is not only a compact between independent States, but that it is a compact of no peculiar solemnity or efficacy-conveying no powers not usually granted by international treaties, establishing no intimate relations between the different parts of the country, not subjecting the citizen, in the least, to the jurisdiction of the federal courts, not binding upon his conscience, not imposing upon him the obligations of allegiance, not making him liable in any case to the penalties of treason. I will put the case as strongly as possible for the advocates of the doctrine. I will suppose that this constitution, of which we have been boasting so much for near half a century, is found out to be a league between foreign powers, and that every question that can arise under it, is in the strictest sense of the word, a merely political question. What then, sir? Did you ever hear of one party to a league having a right-not to judge for himself of its meaning, mark the distinction; but to bind the other party by his judgment? I admit that there is no common arbiter-that each of

the parties is to judge for himself-does that mean that he shall judge for the others, too? A compact between States is as binding as a compact between individuals-it creates what is called by text writers "a perfect obligation "-there is no doubt but that a sovereignty is obliged before God and man scrupulously to fulfil the conditions of its agreements. But sovereignties with regard to each other are in a state of nature-they have no common superior to enforce compliance with their covenants; and if any difference arise as to their rights and liabilities under them, what says the law of nature and nations? Why what can it say, but that each shall do as he pleases-or that force shall decide the controversy? Is there any imaginable alternative between the law and the sword, between the judgment of some regularly constituted umpire, chosen beforehand by the common consent of the contracting parties, and the ultima ratio regum? Sir, we have been told that State sovereignty is and ought to be governed by nothing but its own "feelings of honorable justice"-it comes up in the declamation of the day, to the description of that irrascible, imperious and reckless hero, whose wrath and the woes it brought upon his country are an admirable theme for an epic or a tragic song, but would not, I suppose, be recommended as the very highest of all possible examples in morality. Impiger, iracundus, inexorabilis, acer

Jura negat sibi nata, nihil non arrogat armis.

Yet strange to say, the very men who paint to us the sovereignty of the States in such colors, and would cavil about the ninth part of a hair where their own rights and interests are concerned, forget entirely that there are any other parties to the compact but South Carolina, or that those parties have any rights to exercise, or any interests to maintain! "We have a right to judge for ourselves," say they, "how far we are bound by the Constitution, or how far we shall comply with it." Grant it. But what of the other twenty-three parties? Are they bound by our decision? Shall they not think for themselves, because we say that an act, which they have all declared (or the great majority of them) to be within the meaning of the treaty and binding upon us, is not so? If our opinion is just we are not bound. Admit it. But if their's is just we are bound. Now the whole fallacy of the argument on the other side consists in coolly taking for granted the very matter in dispute-in blotting out this if-in denying to others the very right of judging which we claim for ourselves-and in expecting them, exacting it of them, to act upon our convictions instead of their own.

Sir, it may be that they will do so. Instances upon instances have been laboriously compiled of late by a writer in one of the leading journals of the country, to show how often the government has been forced, right or wrong, to yield to the resistance of the States. I shall

say nothing of these examples-except that some of them have never been mentioned until recently but with scorn and indignation. But I maintain that not one of them-no, not one-goes to show that the other parties to the compact might not, if they had been so minded, have rightfully insisted upon enforcing their construction of the contract. I will only remark as to Georgia and the Cherokees, that as that State was clearly right in her pretensions from first to last, so she maintained her rights by open force, and made no scruple about professing to do so.

Mr. President, the argument which I now advance is too clear for controversy. It addresses itself to the common sense of mankind, and the bare stating of it is sufficient to show how incongruous and absurd the doctrine of the veto is, so far as it rests upon general reasonings and the law of nature-the only law acknowledged by sovereigns. But if any authority be wanted to confirm it, then is abundance of it at hand. Look into the writings of publicists-they are all full of it. By the established law of nations, each party construes a treaty for itself; but then it allows the other to do the same, and if the difference between them be deemed important enough that other has the option either of rescinding the whole treaty (in the case before us, putting the State out of the Union,) or making war to enforce it. "If one of the allies fails in his engagements (says Vattel), the other may constrain him to fulfil them; this is the right derived from a perfect promise. But if he has no other way but that of arms to constrain an ally to keep his word, it is sometimes more expedient to disengage himself from his promises and break the treaty. He has undoubtedly a right to do this; having promised only on condition that his ally shall accomplish on his side every thing he is obliged to perform. The ally offended or injured in what relates to the treaty, may then choose either to oblige the perfidious ally to fulfil his engagements or declare the treaty broken by the violation."Vatt. Sec. 200. This civilian then proceeds to lay down the rule that the violation of one article of the treaty is a violation of the whole. He admits that it ought not to be rashly done, and says that the sovereign deeming himself aggrieved "is permitted to threaten the other to renounce the entire treaty-a menace that may be lawfully put into execution if it be despised. Such is, doubtless, the conduct which prudence, moderation, the love of peace and charity would commonly prescribe to nations. Who will deny this, and madly advance that sovereigns are allowed suddenly to have recourse to arms or only to break every treaty of alliance for the least subject of complaint? But the case here is about a right, and not about the steps that ought to be taken besides the principle upon which such a [contrary] decision is founded, is absolutely unsupportable," &c., and he goes on to demonstrate this more at large. He quotes Grotius to show that the clause is sometimes inserted,

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