AN ATTEMPT TO RECONCILE METAPHYSICS AND PHRENOLOGY, IN A REVIEW OF DR BROWN'S PHYSIO

LOGY OF THE MIND.

“General terms enable us, by the exactness of our verbal definitions, to hold communion with other minds on the finest and most shadowy relations that have been felt by us, as readily as on the individual objects that affect our external sense, and thus to profit by the

results of the reasonings of all mankind, as we add our own small and almost imperceptible contribution to the magnificent and ever increasing store of the wisdom of every age."

ONE of the objects of this article is, if not to reconcile Metaphysics and Phrenology, to moderate the feelings of dislike, or perhaps contempt, with which the most strenuous advocates on either side have been accustomed to look upon each other. The latest writer on phrenology, we allow, is distinguished for candour; and yet expressions are to be found, even in his work, which may rather tend to widen than to close the breach that is between them. On the whole, however, the metaphysicians are perhaps most to blame; inasmuch as the sneers of real or supposed elevation are more provocative, and less justifiable, than the self-satisfaction of those whose individual faith is beyond their means of giving reasons for it to others. The metaphysician moves on a sort of sanctified ground, which is too often, perhaps, obscured so as to be placed out of the reach of common observation; while the phrenologist professes to rest every thing on observations which may be made by all, but which few will be at the trouble of making with sufficient accuracy. And hence the

empirical aspect of this new science, which may also have been injured by the empirical manner of one or both of its founders; but, as nothing can be true, which is not true universally to all men, and in all sciences, truth in phrenology cannot be inconsistent with truth in metaphysics. The evidence of what is true in the latter science is consciousness; the evidence of truth in the latter is said to be observation; but, in our opinion, the evidence in both cases is the same, since ob servation is only a name for a certain species of facts of which we are conscious. When we observe that one head exhibits a certain conformation, and that with this special developement or form, there is always conjoined a certain propensity or capacity, we must be conscious of the reality of our observations, otherwise we shall not believe in them. The fact that the brain exhibits a peculiar and definite form is a matter of consciousness, just as much as the fact that grass is green, or the sky blue; so also is the fact, that a peculiar propensity is conjoined with the special form in any particular case; but as the propensity may, for any thing previously known, arise from many va rious causes, the inference, that the shape and size of the brain, at a given point, is the cause of the propensity, will depend on circumstances of which we shall take notice hereafter. Our object at present was merely to shew that all truth rests upon consciousness. And this brings us to Dr Brown's theory.

The MIND, according to the physiology of this eminently comprehensive and acute writer, is simple and indivisible; the whole of its varied feelings being the mind only in various successive states; and its feeling at each moment being its state at each moment. These states, in so far as they are known to us at all, are revealed to us by consciousness, which is no power, however, but a name only for FEELING; since to be conscious is to feel, and not to feel is not to be conscious. That of which we are not conscious, is neither felt nor known; but of all that we feel we are conscious, and, for the time at least, have knowledge; and this principle is applicable to all the varied and varying states of the mind, simple or complex, and whether they consist of Sensations, Thoughts, or Emotions, taken singly, or compounded together. The only benefit, therefore, of the phrase, "state of the mind," is its generality. It applies equally to every species of feeling; and enables us to keep the unity of the mind more readily and constantly in view.

These states of the mind, considered separately, are called feelings; when considered in reference to the prior circumstances which have in duced them, they are called Affections of the mind; and these again are di vided into,

1. Affections from External causes. 2. Affections from Internal causes. This division is convenient, certain ly, though we doubt much whether it rests upon any solid foundations. All causes which affect our minds are strictly speaking external; since the laws or conditions imposed on the human mind, for its good, and by which it feels in this or that manner, are just as much beyond its own reach, and from the same origin, indeed, as the laws by which it perceives, or be lieves in the existence of, external na ture. The movements of mind are regulated by laws, and the mechanism imposed upon it, is just as much beyond its own control as that of the material world. It can just as little prevent itself from feeling pain or pleasure, or a desire to get rid of the one, and obtain the other, as it can alter the tendency of the water of a river to the ocean, or of a stone to the centre of the earth; but as the laws of mind and matter

have been wisely framed to bestow uniformity of operation on both, and as the mind has been benevolently endowed with a capacity for acquiring knowledge, it can indirectly do almost every thing, while directly, and by its mere volition, it can do nothing. But this is hurrying rather prematurely into the depths of metaphysics; and those who would fully understand this total want of direct power in the human mind, and see it reconciled with religion and morals, must peruse not only Dr Brown's Physiology, but his earlier work on the Relation of Cause and Effect; and still more especially the Essays on Miracles and a Particular Providence. These, which are written in a sufficiently popular style, have probably never been looked at, from their appearing in the shape of notes to a discussion of a most abstract and difficult nature; but, notwithstanding the unobtrusive manner in which they have been laid before the public, they are infinitely superior to those of Hume or Campbell, or any other published essays on the same subject.

Dr Brown classifies the resulting feelings from external causes according to the organs of sense that are primarily affected; and to Taste, Smell, Hearing, Sight, and Touch, he adds, as a sixth sense, MUSCULAR CONTRACTION, by which alone, he is of opinion, we become acquainted with external nature. The speculation and discussion which he enters upon un➡ der this head are more than ingenious

they display talent of the highest order; but we had always considered the sense of Touch to embrace all sensation, whether through the nerves or the muscles; and, it is of little moment, in a metaphysical point of view, whether this has been the general opinion or not, since every sensation, by which we mean every primary feeling, which does not arise consciously from some desire or emotion in the mind, is necessarily and intuitively accompanied with a belief of something out of and besides our own minds. Such sensations, from whatever sense they may arise, have three things common to them all, namely,

1. The presence of an external
body;
2. An organic change consequent on
its presence;