2. III. ] essity of the thing from the necessity of the ida, w s the very point in quesoon. It seems impossibe to v te ate many of his expressions, from which he never re-i the controversy to which is neitas gue re. ht › long habit of repeating in his mind the same series of asonings gave Descartes, as it will always di an mwATÉ surance of their certainty, which ould not be writeA y objection. The former argument for the benz of tas hether satisfactory or not, is to be distingas resent.* "From what is said already of the that mu gnorance we are in of the essence of ser mind, it is evident that we are not acie to know whether any mind be seessarily existent by a necessity & pour founded in its essence, as we have showed ther one, s time and space to be. Some p think that such a necessity may be de monstrated of God from the nature of sold HWY I perfection. For God being cary, in e that is, absolutely perfect, they say he must needs be necessarily existent; because, say they, necessary existence is one of the greatest of perfections. Bet 1 e take this to be one of those faise ant imaginary arguments, that are f in the abuse of certain terms; and of a.. fections are properly asserted to a some power it te nated pers logy dram atia ; st or W tes In the same page of Stewart's ation, he has been led by dislike e university of Oxford to miscon in an extraordinary manner, a age of Addison in the Guardian, ich is evidently a sportive ridicule of e Cartesian theory, and is absolutely napplicable to the Aristotelian. Vol. i. p. 147. Vol. iii. p. 64. remarked that we are never, strictly speaking, deceived by our senses, but by the inferences which we draw from them. 93. Such is nearly the substance, 'exclusive of a great variety of more or less episodical theories, of the three metaphysical works of Descartes, the history of the soul's progress from opinion to doubt, and from doubt to certainty. Few would dispute, at the present day, that he has destroyed too much of his foundations to render his superstructure stable; and to readers averse from metaphysical reflection, he must seem little else than an idle theorist, weaving cobwebs for pastime which common sense sweeps away. It is fair, however, to observe, that no one was more careful than Descartes to guard against any practical scepticism in the affairs of life. He even goes so far as to maintain, that a man having adopted any practical opinion on such grounds as seem probable should pursue it with as much steadiness as if it were founded on demonstration; observing, however, as a general rule, to choose the most moderate opinions among those which he should find current in his own country. * 94. The objections adduced against the Meditations are in a series of seven. The first are by a theologian Objections named Caterus, the second by Mersenne, the third made to his by Hobbes, the fourth by Arnauld, the fifth by Gas Meditations. sendi, the sixth by some anonymous writers, the seventh by a Jesuit of the name of Bourdin. To all of these Descartes replied with spirit and acuteness. By far the most important controversy was with Gassendi, whose objections were stated more briefly, and, I think, with less skill, by Hobbes. It was the first trumpet in the new philosophy of cient war between the sensual and ideal schools of chology. Descartes had revived, and placed in a light, the doctrine of mind, as not absolutely depen I it of its own colour, when no- not easy to revive prejudices in our imagination. In the same page of Stewart's Dissertation, he has been led by dislike of the university of Oxford to misconceive, in an extraordinary manner, a passage of Addison in the Guardian, which is evidently a sportive ridicule of the Cartesian theory, and is absolutely inapplicable to the Aristotelian. * Vol. i. p. 147. Vol. iii. p. 64. His deduc this. 91. From the idea of a perfect being Descartes immediately deduced the truth of his belief in an external world, tions from and in the inferences of his reason. For to deceive his creatures would be an imperfection in God; but God is perfect. Whatever, therefore, is clearly and distinctly apprehended by our reason must be true. We have only to be on our guard against our own precipitancy and prejudice, or surrender of our reason to the authority of others. It is not by our understanding, such as God gave it to us, that we are deceived; but the exercise of our free-will, a high prerogative of our nature, is often so incautious as to make us not discern truth from falsehood, and affirm or deny, by a voluntary act, that which we do not distinctly apprehend. The properties of quantity, founded on our ideas of extension and number, are distinctly perceived by our minds, and hence the sciences of arithmetic and geometry are certainly true. But when he turns his thoughts to the phænomena of external sensation, Descartes cannot wholly extricate himself from his original concession, the basis of his doubt, that the senses do sometimes deceive us. He endeavours to reconcile this with his own theory, which had built the certainty of all that we clearly hold certain on the perfect veracity of God. Primary and 92. It is in this inquiry that he reaches that important distinction between the primary and secondary prosecondary perties of matter, (the latter being modifications of qualities. the former, relative only to our apprehension, but not inherent in things,) which, without being wholly new, contradicted the Aristotelian theories of the schools; and he the idea of infinite perfection does not include, and consequently not prove, God to be necessarily existent. If he be so, it is on account of those attributes of his essence which we have no knowledge of." I have made this extract from a very short tract, called Contemplatio Philosophica, by Brook Taylor, which I found in an unpublished memoir of his life printed by the late Sir William Young in 1793. It bespeaks the clear and acute understanding of this celebrated philosopher, and appears to me an entire refutation of the scholastic argument of Descartes; one more fit for the Anselms and such dealers in words, from whom it came, than for himself. *See Stewart's First Dissertation on the Progress of Philosophy. This writer has justly observed, that many persons conceive colour to be inherent in the object, so that the censure of Reid on Descartes and his followers, as having pretended to discover what no one doubted, is at least unreasonable in this respect. A late writer has gone so far as to say, "Nothing at first can seem a more rational, obvious, and incontrovertible conclusion, than that the colour of a body is an inherent quality, like its weight, hardness, &c.; and that to see the object, remarked that we are never, strictly speaking, deceived by our senses, but by the inferences which we draw from them. 93. Such is nearly the substance, 'exclusive of a great variety of more or less episodical theories, of the three metaphysical works of Descartes, the history of the soul's progress from opinion to doubt, and from doubt to certainty. Few would dispute, at the present day, that he has destroyed too much of his foundations to render his superstructure stable; and to readers averse from metaphysical reflection, he must seem little else than an idle theorist, weaving cobwebs for pastime which common sense sweeps away. It is fair, however, to observe, that no one was more careful than Descartes to guard against any practical scepticism in the affairs of life. He even goes so far as to maintain, that a man having adopted any practical opinion on such grounds as seem probable should pursue it with as much steadiness as if it were founded on demonstration; observing, however, as a general rule, to choose the most moderate opinions among those which he should find current in his own country.* Meditations. 94. The objections adduced against the Meditations are in a series of seven. The first are by a theologian Objections named Caterus, the second by Mersenne, the third made to his by Hobbes, the fourth by Arnauld, the fifth by Gassendi, the sixth by some anonymous writers, the seventh by a Jesuit of the name of Bourdin. To all of these Descartes replied with spirit and acuteness. By far the most important controversy was with Gassendi, whose objections. were stated more briefly, and, I think, with less skill, by Hobbes. It was the first trumpet in the new philosophy of an ancient war between the sensual and ideal schools of of psychology. Descartes had revived, and placed in a clearer light, the doctrine of mind, as not absolutely depen I and to see it of its own colour, when nothing intervenes between our eyes and it, are one and the same thing. Yet this is only a prejudice," &c. Herschel's Discourse on Nat. Philos. p. 82. almost even suspect that the notion of sounds and smells, being secondary or merely sensible qualities, is not distinct in all men's minds. But after we are become familiar with correct ideas, it is not easy to revive prejudices in our imagination. In the same page of Stewart's Dissertation, he has been led by dislike of the university of Oxford to misconceive, in an extraordinary manner, passage of Addison in the Guardian, which is evidently a sportive ridicule of the Cartesian theory, and is absolutely inapplicable to the Aristotelian. * Vol. i. p. 147. Vol. iii. p. 64. a |