similar at least to some one observation, which we ourselves have made. For example, that there are such people on the earth as negroes, could not, on that hypothesis, be rendered credible to one who had never seen a negro, not even by the most numerous and the most unexceptionable attestations. Against the admission of such testimony; however strong, the whole force of the author's argument evidently operates. But that innumerable absurdities would flow from this principle, I might easily evince, did I not think the task superfluous.

The author himself is aware of the consequences; and therefore, in whatever sense he uses the term experience in proposing his argument; in prosecuting it, he, with great dexterity, shifts the sense, and, ere the reader is apprised, insinuates another. 'It is a miracle,' says he, that a dead man should come to life, because that has never been observed

• in

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any age or country. There must therefore be an uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation* Here the phrase an uniform experience against an event, in the latter clause, is implicitly defined in the former, not what has never been observed BY US, but (mark his words) what has never been observed IN ANY AGE OR COUN TRY. Now, what has been observed, and what has not been observed, in all ages and countries, pray

* Page 181.

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how can you, Sir, or I, or any man, come to the knowledge of? Only I suppose by testimony, oral or written. The personal experience of every individual is limited to but a part of one age, and commonly to a narrow spot of one country. If there be any other way of being made acquainted with facts, it is to me, I own, an impenetrable secret; I have no apprehension of it. If there be not any, What shall we make of that cardinal point, on which your argument turns? It is, in plain language, Testimony is not entitled to the least degree of faith, but as far as it is supported by such an ex'tensive experience, as if we had not had a previous and independent faith in testimony, we • could never have acquired.'

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How natural is the transition from one sophism to another! You will soon be convinced of this, if you attend but a little to the strain of the arguA miracle,' says he, is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience hath established these laws, the proof against a miracle is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined *? Again, As an uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of

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any miracle +.' I must once more ask the author,

What is the precise meaning of the words firm, unalterable, uniform? An experience that admits no exception, is surely the only experience, which can, with propriety, be termed uniform, firm, unalterable. Now, since, as was remarked above, the far greater part of this experience, which comprises every age and every country, must be derived to us from testimony; that the experience may be firm, uniform, unalterable, there must be no contrary testimony whatever. Yet, by the author's own hypothesis, the miracles he would thus confute, are supported by testimony. At the same time, to give strength to his argument, he is under a neces-, sity of supposing, that there is no exception from the testimonies against them. Thus he falls into that paralogism, which is called begging the question. What he gives with one hand, he takes with the other. He admits, in opening his design, what in his argument he implicitly denies.

But that this, if possible, may be still more manifest, let us attend a little to some expressions, which one would imagine he had inadvertently dropt. 'So long,' says he, as the world endures, · I presume, will the accounts of miracles and

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digies be found in all profane history * Why does he presume so? presume so? A man so much attached to

* Page 174. In the edition of the Essays 1767, mentioned in the Preface, his words are, In all history, sacred

and profane.'

experience, can hardly be suspected to have any other reason than this; because such accounts have hitherto been found in all the histories, profane as well as sacred, of times past. But we need not recur to an inference to obtain this acknowledgment. It is often to be met with in the essay. In one place, we learn that the witnesses for miracles are an infinite number *; in another, that all religious records of whatever kind abound with them †. I leave it, therefore, to the author to explain, with what consistency he can assert, that the laws of nature are established by an uniform experience, (which experience is chiefly the result of testimony), and at the same time allow, that almost all human histories are full of the relations of miracles and prodigies, which are violations of those laws. Here is, by his own confession, testimony against testimony, and very ample on both sides. How then can one side claim a firm, uniform, and unalterable support from testimony?

It will be in vain to object, that the testimony in support of the laws of nature greatly exceeds the testimony for the violations of these laws; and that if we are to be determined by the greater number of observations, we shall reject all miracles whatever. I ask, Why are the testimonies much more numerous in the one case than in the other? The answer is obvious: Natural occurrences are much

more frequent than such as are preternatural. But are all the accounts we have of the pestilence to be rejected as incredible, because, in this country, we hear not so often of that disease, as of the fever? Or, because the number of natural births is infinitely greater than that of monsters, shall the evidence of the former be regarded as a confutation of all that can be advanced in proof of the latter? Such an objector needs to be reminded of what was proved in the foregoing section; that the opposite testimonies relate to different facts, and are, therefore, not contradictory; that the conclusion founded on them, possesses not the evidence of the facts on which it is founded, but only such a presumptive evidence, as may be surmounted by the slightest positive proof. A general conclusion from experience is, in comparison, but presumptive and indirect; sufficient testimony for a particular fact is direct and positive evidence.

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I shall remark one other fallacy in this author's reasoning, before I conclude this section. "The Indian prince,' says he, who refused to believe ⚫ the first relations concerning the effects of frost, reasoned justly; and it naturally required very strong testimony to engage his assent to facts, which arose from a state of nature, with which he

was unacquainted, and bore so little analogy to those events, of which he had had constant and uniform experience. Though they were not contrary to his experience, they were not conformable