X.

1777.

even the well affected were unwilling to part with their CHAPTER property upon so feeble a security as the certificates given on the authority of Congress. With his usual delicacy and caution, Washington was reluctant to exercise the powers with which he was intrusted to obtain supplies from the people by forcible means. The soundest policy forbade this practice, as long as it could possibly be avoided. It alienated friends, and added a new motive for disaffection.

"I confess," said he, in writing to the President of Congress, "I have felt myself greatly embarrassed with respect to a vigorous exercise of military power. An illplaced humanity, perhaps, and a reluctance to give distress, may have restrained me too far; but these were not all. I have been well aware of the prevalent jealousy of military power, and that this has been considered as an evil much to be apprehended, even by the best and most sensible among us. Under this idea, I have been cautious, and wished to avoid as much as possible any act that might increase it. However, Congress may be assured, that no exertions of mine, as far as circumstances will admit, shall be wanting to provide our own troops with supplies on the one hand, and to prevent the enemy from getting them on the other. At the same time they must be apprized, that many obstacles have arisen to render the former more precarious and difficult than they usually were, from the change in the commissary's department, at a very critical and interesting period. I should be happy, if the civil authority in the several States, through the recommendations of Congress, or their own mere will, seeing the necessity of supporting the army, would always adopt the most spirited measures, suited to the end. The people at large are governed much by custom. To acts of legislation or civil authority they have ever been taught to yield a willing obedience, without reasoning about their propriety; on those of military power, whether immediate or derived originally from another source, they have ever looked with a jealous or suspicious eye."

Washingcacy in the military

ton's deli

exercise of

power.

Dec. 15.

CHAPTER

X.

1777.

Coercive

measures

for procuring supplies impolitic.

Different opinions of the officers respecting winter

quarters.

And again, "It will never answer to procure supplies of clothing or provision by coercive measures. The small seizures made of the former a few days ago, in consequence of the most pressing and absolute necessity, when that, or to dissolve, was the alternative, excited the greatest alarm and uneasiness even among our best and warmest friends. Such procedures may give a momentary relief; but, if repeated, will prove of the most pernicious consequence. Besides spreading disaffection, jealousy, and fear among the people, they never fail, even in the most veteran troops under the most rigid and exact discipline, to raise in the soldiery a disposition to licentiousness, to plunder and robbery, difficult to suppress afterwards, and which has proved not only ruinous to the inhabitants, but, in many instances, to armies themselves. I regret the occasion that compelled us to the measure the other day; and shall consider it among the greatest of our misfortunes, if we should be under the necessity of practising it again."

These sentiments were not more the dictates of policy, than of wisdom and humanity. He adhered to them through the war, and in no case resorted to coercive measures for procuring supplies, till every other method had proved unavailing. And, in the deference he paid to the rights of property, he was equally scrupulous, whether it belonged to persons suspected of disaffection, or to avowed and active friends. While the former committed no positive acts of hostility, but remained quietly at their homes, he considered them amenable to the civil authorities alone for their opinions and conduct, and not within the pale of military coercion.

The officers differed widely in regard to the best mode of disposing of the army for the winter. Some advised that it should be quartered at Wilmington; others recommended the valley of Tredyfin, a few miles west of the Schuylkill, as the place of cantonment; while others preferred a line of detached posts extending from Lancaster to Reading. The matter was largely discussed in a coun

cil of war, and elaborate arguments in writing were given CHAPTER for each of these dispositions.

X.

ment at Val

Dec. 18.

The opinions of the officers were so various and con- 1777. tradictory, that the Commander was finally obliged to act Encampaccording to his own judgment, and on his own responsi- ley Forge. bility. He decided to establish a fortified encampment at Valley Forge, about twenty miles from Philadelphia. The ground was covered with woods, and bounded on one side by the Schuylkill, and on the others by ridges of hills. He examined the site in person, and designated the particular parts in which each regiment was to be quartered. The army marched to this place, and, on the 18th of December, orders were issued for building huts. Trees were felled for this purpose, and the huts were constructed with logs, the dimensions of each being sixteen feet by fourteen. One hut was assigned to twelve privates, and one to a smaller number of officers, according to their rank. A general officer was the sole tenant of a hut. These structures were arranged in parallel lines where the shape of the ground would admit, and, when the encampment was completed, it had the appearance of a town with streets and avenues. Troops from the same State inhabited the same street or quarter. The whole encampment was surrounded on the land side by intrenchments; and a bridge was thrown across the river to open a communication with the country in that direction. Here the army remained till the following June. A detachment was also stationed at Wilmington, to protect the State of Delaware from the incursions of the enemy's foraging parties.

The command of the American armies, and the responsibilities attending that high office, were not the only causes of vexation, which at this time harassed the mind of Washington. Attempts were made by his public adversaries, and by secret foes wearing the mask of friendship, to destroy his influence and ruin his character.

A pamphlet was published in London, containing a series of letters, purporting to have been written by him in

X.

1777.

ters publish

ed in the

name of

CHAPTER the summer of 1776, and with his signature attached to them. It was stated in the preface, that, when Fort Lee was evacuated, General Washington's servant was left beSpurious let hind indisposed; that in his possession was a small portmanteau belonging to the General, in which, among other Washington. things of trifling value, were the drafts of several private letters to Mrs. Washington, Mr. Lund Washington, and Mr. Custis; and that these had been transmitted to England by an officer into whose hands they had fallen. This fiction was contrived to deceive the public into a belief of the genuineness of the letters, although in reality not one of General Washington's servants, nor a single article of his baggage, was taken by the enemy in the whole course of the war. But the tenor of the letters was the most insidious part of the fabrication. Washington is represented as expressing sentiments totally at variance with his conduct, and as deprecating the misguided zeal and rashness of Congress in declaring independence, and pushing the opposition to Great Britain to so perilous an extremity. The letters were reprinted in New York, and industriously circulated in various forms through the agen

Author of these letters unknown.

Conway's
Cabal.

cy of disaffected persons. The disguise was too flimsy to cover so nefarious a purpose. Whatever credit they may have gained in England, they could have no influence on his countrymen, who understood his character.

The author of these spurious epistles was never publicly known. They were written with considerable art, and by a person acquainted with many particulars of General Washington's family concerns. It is probable, also, that parts of intercepted letters actually written by him were interwoven. He never thought the subject worthy of his notice, till near the end of his presidency, when a new edition of these same forgeries was palmed upon the public to gratify the spleen of a malignant party spirit, and to effect a purpose even more infamous than the one contemplated by their original author. He then declared them, in a letter to the Secretary of State, to be spurious and false.

Whilst the enemies of his country were thus employed

X.

1777.

in the cabal.

in scattering the seeds of detraction and falsehood, the CHAPTER agents of faction were secretly at work, both in the army and in Congress, to disparage and undermine his reputation. This conspiracy has been called Conway's Cabal, from the name of the individual who acted the most conspicuous part. The other prominent leaders were General Chief actors Gates and General Mifflin. The causes and origin of the disaffection of these officers to the Commander-in-chief have not been explained. When they joined the service, at the beginning of the war, they professed to be his friends, and probably were such. It was mainly at his instance, that General Gates received his first appointment. Being an Englishman by birth, some of the members of Congress had scruples on the subject, thinking their cause would be safest in the charge of native Americans, both on account of their influence over the people, and of the ardor and sincerity of their patriotism. These scruples were waved, however, in favor of Gates and Charles Lee, and in each case at the solicitation of Washington, who had confidence in their attachment to American liberty, and believed important aid might be derived from their military skill and experience.

origin of the

The first symptoms of discontent are supposed to have supposed been manifested at Cambridge. Gates was adjutant-general cabal. of the army, with the rank of brigadier. Mifflin went there as aid-de-camp to the Commander-in-chief, by whom, under the authority of Congress, he was appointed quartermaster-general, with the rank of colonel. After the organization of the first Continental army, Gates applied for the command of a brigade, and Mifflin of a regiment. These requests were declined by Washington, on the ground, in the first place, that the duties of their offices required their whole attention, and, in the next, that such an indulgence would interfere with the just claims of other officers. This refusal is thought to have given an offence, that was not forgotten. It is certain, that, after the army marched from Cambridge, General Gates made interest with Congress to be employed at a distance from