The Constitution As Political StructureOxford University Press, 1995年1月5日 - 240 頁 Over the last forty years modern constitutional scholarship has concentrated on an analysis of rights, while principles of constitutional law concerning the structure of government have been largely downplayed. The irony of this interpretive emphasis is that the body of the Constitution contains relatively little dealing directly with rights. Rather, it is primarily a blueprint for the establishment of a complex form of federal-democratic structure. This work emphasizes the central role served by the structural portions of the Constitution. Redish argues that these structural values were designed to provide the framework in which our rights-based system may flourish, and that judicial abandonment of these structural values threatens the very foundations of American political theory. |
內容
| 3 | |
2 Federalism the Constitution and American Political Theory | 23 |
3 The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism | 63 |
4 Pragmatic Formalism and Separation of Powers | 99 |
5 Legislative Delegation Pragmatic Formalism and the Values of Democracy | 135 |
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常見字詞
action American political theory analysis argued argument Article Articles of Confederation authority basis Choper commerce power common law concept Congress congressional Constitution's text constitutional text decision democratic discussion in chapter discussion infra discussion supra dormant Commerce Clause dual federalism effectively enact enforcement enumerated powers exclusive executive branch executive power exercise federal courts federal government federal power federal system Federalist footnote omitted Framers function goals governmental Herbert Wechsler imposed inherent interpretation invalidation issues judicial review judiciary jurisdiction Justice Korematsu League of Cities legislative power limited Madison majoritarian Martin H ment Montesquieu National League Necessary-and-Proper Clause nondelegation doctrine normative originalist policy choices political commitment principle power to regulate pragmatic formalism president Privileges-and-Immunities Clause Professor prohibition protection reason Redish regulate interstate commerce rejected representative require role separation of powers separation-of-powers statute substantial supra note Supreme Court t]he Tenth Amendment tion tional tive tutional U.S. Const undermines United voters Wickard