or by the joint resolution approved the 9th day of February, 1870, "to authorize the secretary of war to provide for taking meteorological observations at the military stations and other points of the interior of the continent, and for giving notice on the northern lakes and seaboard of the approach and force of storms," such telegraphic company shall forfeit and pay to the United States not less than one hundred and not exceeding one thousand dollars for each refusal or neglect aforesaid, to be recovered by an action or actions at law, in any district court of the United States.-Sec. 1, June 10, 1872, chap.

TRUSSES.

977. Every soldier of the Union army who was ruptured while in the line of duty, during the late war for the suppression of the rebellion, shall be entitled to receive a single or double truss of such style as may be designated by the surgeon-general of the United States army as the best suited for such disability.-Sec. 1, May 28, 1872, chap. 228.

978. Application for such truss shall be made by the ruptured soldier to an examining surgeon for pensions, whose duty it shall be to examine such applicant, and for every such applicant, found to have a rupture or hernia, shall prepare and forward to the surgeon-general an application for such truss, without charge to the soldier. Sec. 2, ibid.

979. The surgeon-general of the United States army is hereby authorized and directed to purchase and procure the number of trusses which may be required for distribution to such disabled soldiers, at a price not greater than the same are sold to the trade at wholesale; and the cost of the same shall be paid, upon the requisition of the surgeon-general, out of any moneys in the treasury not otherwise appropriated.-Sec. 3, ibid.

APPENDIX.

DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

STEPHEN V. R. ABLEMAN, Plaintiff in Error, v. SHERMAN M. BOOTH; and The United STATES, Plaintiff in Error, v. SHERMAN M. BOOTH.

1001. The process of a State court or judge has no authority beyond the limits of the sovereignty which confers the judicial power.

A habeas corpus, issued by a State judge or court, has no authority within the limits of the sovereignty assigned by the Constitution to the United States. The sovereignty of the United States and of a State are distinct and independent of each other within their respective spheres of action, although both exist and exercise their powers within the same territorial limits. When a writ of habeas corpus is served on a marshal or other person having a prisoner in custody under the authority of the United States, it is his duty, by a proper return, to make known to the State judge or court the authority by which he holds him. But, at the same time, it is his duty not to obey the process of the State authority, but to obey and execute the process of the United States.

This court has appellate power in all cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, with such exceptions and regulations as Congress may make, whether the cases arise in a State court or an inferior court of the United States. And, under the act of Congress of 1789, when the decision of the State court is against the right claimed under the Constitution or laws of the United States, a writ of error will lie to bring the judgment of the State court before this court for re-examination and revision.

THESE two cases were brought up from the supreme court of the State of Wisconsin by a writ of error issued under the 25th sec. of the judiciary act. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.1

They were argued by Mr. Black (attorney-general) for the plaintiffs in error, no counsel appearing for the defendant.

1 The narrative of these cases omitted as unimportant in view of the distinct enunciation by the court of the general principles involved. These cases are reported in 21 Howard, and a synopsis of the facts may be found in ¶¶ 1032, 1033.

*

Mr. Chief Justice TANEY delivered the Opinion of the Court.

1002. It will be seen, from the foregoing statement of facts, that a judge of the supreme court of the State of Wisconsin in the first of these cases claimed and exercised the right to supervise and annul the proceedings of a commissioner of the United States, and to discharge a prisoner, who had been committed by the commissioner for an offense against the laws of this government, and that this exercise of power by the judge was afterwards sanctioned and affirmed by the supreme court of the State.

1003. In the second case, the State court has gone a step further, and claimed and exercised jurisdiction over the proceedings and judgment of a district court of the United States, and upon a summary and collateral proceeding, by habeas corpus, has set aside and annulled its judgment, and discharged a prisoner who had been tried and found guilty of an offense against the laws of the United States, and sentenced to imprisonment by the district court.

1004. And it further appears that the State court have not only claimed and exercised this jurisdiction, but have also determined that their decision is final and conclusive upon all the courts of the United States, and ordered their clerk to disregard and refuse obedience to the writ of error issued by this court, pursuant to the act of Congress of 1789, to bring here for examination and revision the judgment of the State court.

1005. These propositions are new in the jurisprudence of the United States, as well as of the States; and the supremacy of the State courts over the courts of the United States, in cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, is now for the first time asserted and acted upon in the supreme court of a State.

1006. The supremacy is not, indeed, set forth distinctly and broadly, in so many words, in the printed opinions of the judges. It is intermixed with elaborate discussions of different provisions in the fugitive slave law, and of the privileges and power of the writ of habeas corpus. But the paramount power of the State court lies at the foundation of these decisions; for their commentaries upon the provisions of that law, and upon the privileges and power of the writ of habeas corpus, were out of place, and their judicial action upon them without authority of law, unless they had the power to revise and control the proceedings in the criminal case of which they were speaking; and their judgments, releasing the prisoner, and disregarding the writ of error from this court, can rest upon no other foundation. 1007. If the judicial power exercised in this instance has been reserved to the States, no offense against the laws of the United States can be punished by their own courts, without the permission and according to the judgment of the courts of the State in which the party happens to be imprisoned; for if the supreme court of Wisconsin possessed the power it has exercised in relation to offenses against the act of Congress in question, it necessarily follows that they must have the same judicial authority in relation to any other law of the United States; and, consequently, their supervising and

controlling power would embrace the whole criminal code of the United States, and extend to offenses against our revenue laws, or any other law intended to guard the different departments of the general government from fraud or violence. And it would embrace all crimes, from the highest to the lowest; including felonies, which are punished with death, as well as misdemeanors, which are punished by imprisonment. And, moreover, if the power is possessed by the supreme court of the State of Wisconsin, it must belong equally to every other State in the Union, when the prisoner is within its territorial limits; and it is very certain that the State courts would not always agree in opinion; and it would often happen, that an act which was admitted to be an offense, and justly punished, in one State, would be regarded as innocent, and indeed as praiseworthy, in another.

1008. It would seem to be hardly necessary to do more than state the result to which these decisions of the State courts must inevitably lead. It is, of itself, a sufficient and conclusive answer; for no one will suppose that a government which has now lasted nearly seventy years, enforcing its laws by its own tribunals, and preserving the union of the States, could have lasted a single year, or fulfilled the high trusts committed to it, if offenses against its laws could not have been punished without the consent of the State in which the culprit was found.

1009. The judges of the supreme court of Wisconsin do not distinctly state from what source they suppose they have derived this judicial power. There can be no such thing as judicial authority, unless it is conferred by a government or sovereignty; and if the judges and courts of Wisconsin possess the jurisdiction they claim, they must derive it either from the United States or the State. It certainly has not been conferred on them by the United States; and it is equally clear it was not in the power of the State to confer it, even if it had attempted to do so; for no State can authorize one of its judges or courts to exercise judicial power, by habeas corpus or otherwise, within the jurisdiction of another and independent government. And although the State of Wisconsin is sovereign within its territorial limits to a certain extent, yet that sovereignty is limited and restricted by the Constitution of the United States. And the powers of the general government, and of the State, although both exist and are exercised within the same territorial limits, are yet separate and distinct sovereignties, acting separately and independently of each other, within their respective spheres. And the sphere of action appropriated to the United States is as far beyond the reach of the judicial process issued by a State judge or a State court, as if the line of division was traced by landmarks and monuments visible to the eye. And the State of Wisconsin had no more power to authorize these proceedings of its judges and courts, than it would have had if the prisoner had been confined in Michigan, or in any other State of the Union, for an offense against the laws of the State in which he was imprisoned.

1010. It is, however, due to the State to say, that we do not find this claim of paramount jurisdiction in the State courts over the courts of the United States asserted or countenanced by the constitution or laws of the