On Representative Government and Personal Representation: Based in Part Upon Thomas Hare's Treatise, Entitled "The Election of Representatives, Parliamentary and Municipal".J.B. Lippincott & Company, 1871 - 237 頁 |
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adopted aforesaid Antinomians appointed appropriated ascer assembly ballot borough certificate character choice citizens clause comparative majority constituency corporations corruption council declared democratic directors district divided division elec election officers electoral district Electoral Law electoral quotient entitled evils fact form of government full quota gazetted list Gerrymandering give greater number Hare Hare's House importance interests jority Kleon lative legislative body meet ment minority names nomination number of members number of votes obtained the quota opinion organization political politicians popular practical principle proportional representation proposed Provisions of Oxford proxies question quota of votes railway reform Registrars repre representative body REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT representative system Republican respective result returning officer Rigsraad Robert Von Mohl says scheme scutage seats sentation sentative serve in Parliament shareholders shares sufficient suffrage supposed system of representation third estate ticket tion voters votes polled voting papers whole number writ
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第 179 頁 - The science of constructing a commonwealth, or renovating it, or reforming it, is, like every other experimental science, not to be taught a priori.
第 29 頁 - And for holding the general council of the kingdom concerning the assessment of aids, except in the three cases aforesaid, and for the assessing of scutages, we will cause to be summoned the archbishops, bishops, abbots, earls, and greater barons of the realm, singly by our letters. And furthermore we shall cause to be summoned generally by our sheriffs and bailiffs, all others who hold of us in chief...
第 110 頁 - All persons possessing any portion of power ought to be strongly and awfully impressed with an idea that they act in trust ; and that they are to account for their conduct in that trust to the one great master, author, and founder of society.
第 154 頁 - In all elections of representatives aforesaid, each qualified voter may cast as many votes for one candidate as there are representatives to be elected, or may distribute the same, or equal parts thereof, among the candidates, as he shall see fit; and the candidates highest in votes shall be declared elected.
第 48 頁 - ... position is different, and by the united authority of the instructed. When, therefore, the instructed in general can be brought to recognise one social arrangement, or political or other institution, as good, and another as bad, one as desirable, another as condemnable, very much has been done towards giving to the one, or withdrawing from the other, that preponderance of social force which enables it to subsist.
第 174 頁 - When two persons who have a joint interest in any business, differ in opinion, does justice require that both opinions should be held of exactly equal value ? If with equal virtue, one is superior to the other in knowledge and intelligence — or if with equal intelligence, one excels the other in virtue — the opinion, the...
第 179 頁 - The science of government being therefore so practical in itself, and intended for such practical purposes, a matter which requires experience, and even more experience than any person can gain in his whole life, however sagacious and observing he may be...
第 38 頁 - It is contrary to the first intentions and genuine principles of every well-regulated government that one or more men should arrogate to themselves the exclusive power to dispose at will of the life and property of any individual...
第 43 頁 - ... apt to unite in the pursuit of it. It was incumbent on us, then, to try this remedy, and with that view to frame a republican system on such a scale and in such a form as will control all the evils which have been experienced.
第 43 頁 - The only remedy is to enlarge the sphere, and thereby divide the community into so great a number of interests and parties, that in the 1st place a majority will not be likely at the same moment to have a common interest separate from that of the whole or of the minority; and in the 2d place, that in case they sh d have such an interest, they may not be apt to unite in the pursuit of it.