not, I believe, contended for by the abettors of this scheme. But if they deny to the inhabitants of hell freedom of the will, or, which is the same thing, natural ability to obey God, they must admit, or be grossly inconsistent, that there is no sin in hell, either in men or devils. But is this admission agreea ble either to reason or revelation? I know that the abettors of this scheme maintain that God may justly hold both men, from whom a gracious ability is withdrawn, and devils, responsible for their conduct, because and upon the ground that they have destroyed their own ability. But suppose this were true that they had rendered themselves idiots, lunatics, or necessary as opposed to free agents, could God, justly, could enlightened reason still regard them as moral agents, and as morally responsible for their conduct? No, indeed. God and reason may justly blame and render them miserable for annihilating their freedom or their moral agency, but to hold them still responsible for present obedience were absurd.

7. We have seen that the ability of all men of sane mind to obey God, is necessarily assumed by all men as a first truth of reason, and that this assumption is, from the very laws of mind, the indispensable condition of the affirmation, or even the conception that they are subjects of moral obligation; that but for this assumption men could not so much as conceive the possibility of moral responsibility, and of praise and blame worthiness. If the laws of mind remain unaltered, this is and always will be so. In the eternal world, and in hell, men and devils must necessarily assume their own freedom or ability to obey God, as the condition of their obligation to do so, and consequently to their being capable of sin or holiness. Since revelation informs us that men and devils continue to sin in hell, we know that there also it must be assumed as a first-truth of reason, that they are free agents, or that they have natural ability to obey God.

8. But that a gracious ability to do duty or to obey God' is an absurdity, will farther appear if we consider that it is a first-truth of reason that moral obligation implies moral agency, and that moral agency implies freedom of will; or in other words, it implies a natural ability to comply with obli gation. This ability is necessarily regarded by the intelligence as the sine qua non of moral obligation, on the ground of natural and immutable justice. A just command always implies an ability to obey it. A command to perform a natural impossibility would not and could not impose obligation. Suppose God should command human beings to fly without

giving them power, could such a command impose moral obligation? No, indeed. But suppose he should give them power or promise them power upon the performance of a condition within their reach, then he might in justice require them to fly, and a command to do so would be obligatory. But relatively to the requirement, the bestowment would not be grace, but justice. Relatively to the results or the pleasure of flying, the bestowment of power might be gracious. That is, it might be grace in God to give me power to fly that I might have the pleasure and profit of flying, so that relatively to the results of flying the giving of power might be regarded as an act of grace. But, if God requires me to fly as a matter of duty, he must in justice supply the power or ability to fly. This would in justice be a necessary condition of the commands, imposing moral obligation.

Nor would it at all vary the case if I had ever possessed wings, and by the abuse of them, had lost the power to fly. In this case, considered relatively to the pleasure and profit and results of flying, the restoring of the power to fly might and would be an act of grace. But if God would still command me to fly, he must as a condition of my obligation restore the power. It is vain and absurd to say, as has been said, that in such a case, although I might lose the power of obedience, this can not alter the right of God to claim obedience. This assertion proceeds upon the absurd assumption that the will of God makes or creates law instead of merely declaring and enforcing the law of nature. We have seen in former lectures that the only law or rule of action that is or can be obligatory on a moral agent, is the law of nature, or just that course of willing and acting, which is for the time being, suitable to his nature and relations. We have seen that God's will never makes or creates law, that it only declares and enforces it. If, therefore, by any means whatever, the nature of a moral agent should be so chagned that his will is no longer free to act in conformity with or in opposition to the law of nature, if God would hold him still obligated to obey, he must in justice relatively to his requirement, restore his liberty or ability. Suppose one had by the abuse of his intellect lost the use of it, and become a perfect idiot, could he by any possibility be still required to understand and obey God? Certainly not. So neither could he be required to perform any thing else that had become naturally impossible to him. Viewed relatively to the pleasure and results of obedience his restoring power would be an act

of grace. But viewed relatively to his duty or to God's command, the restoring of power to obey is an act of justice and not of grace. To call this grace were to abuse language and confound terms. But this brings me to the consideration of the next question to be discussed at present, namely, III. IN WHAT SENSE A GRACIOUS ABILITY IS POSSIBLE.

1. Not, as we have just seen, in the sense that the bestowment of power to render obedience to a command possible can be properly a gift of grace. Grace is undeserved favor, something not demanded by justice, that which under the circumstances, might be withholden without injustice. It never can be just in any being to require that which under the circumstances is impossible. As has been said, relatively to the requirement and as a condition of its justice, the bestowment of power adequate to the performance of that which is commanded, is an unalterable condition of the justice of the command. This I say is a first-truth of reason, a truth every where by all men necessarily assumed and known. A gracious ability to obey a command, is an absurdity and an impossibility.

2. But a gracious ability considered relatively to the advantages to result from obedience is possible.

Suppose, for example, that a servant who supports himself and his family by his wages, should by his own fault render himself unable to labor and to earn his wages. His master may justly dismiss him and let him go with his family to the poor-house. But in this disabled state his master cannot justly exact labor of him. Nor could he do so if he absolutely owned the servant. Now suppose the master to be able to restore to the servant his former strength. If he would require service of him, as a condition of the justice of this requirement, he must restore his strength so far at least as to render obedience possible. This would be mere justice. But suppose he restored the ability of the servant to gain support for himself and his family by labor. This, viewed relatively to the good of the servant-to the results of the restoration of his ability to himself and to his family, is a matter of grace. Relatively to the good or rights of the master in requiring the labor of the servant, the restoration of ability to obey is an act of justice. But relatively to the good of the servant, and the benefits that result to him from this restoration of ability and making it once more possible for him

to support himself and his family, the giving of ability is properly an act of grace.

Let this be applied to the case under consideration. Suppose the race of Adam to have lost their free agency by the first sin of Adam and thus to have come into a state in which holiness and consequent salvation were impossible. Now if God would still require obedience of them, he must in justice restore their ability. And viewed relatively to his right to command, and their duty to obey, this restoration is properly a matter of justice. But suppose he would again place them in circumstances to render holiness and consequent salvation possible to them:-viewed relatively to their good and profit, this restoration of ability is properly a matter of grace. A gracious ability to obey, viewed relatively to the command to be obeyed, is impossible and absurd.

But a gracious ability to be saved, viewed relatively to salvation, is possible.

There is no proof that mankind ever lost their ability to obey, either by the first sin of Adam, or by their own sin. For this would imply, as we have seen, that they had ceased to be free, and had become necessary agents. But if they had, and God had restored their ability to obey, all that can be justly said in this case, is, that so far as his right to command is concerned, the restoration of their ability was an act of justice. But so far as the rendering of salvation possible to them is concerned, it was an act of grace.

3. But it is asserted or rather assumed by the defenders of this dogma that the Bible teaches the doctrine of a natural inability and of a gracious ability in man to obey the commands of God. I admit indeed that if we interpret Scripture without regard to any just rules of interpretation, this assumption may find countenance in the word of God, just as almost any absurdity whatever may and has done. But a moderate share of attention to one of the simplest and most universal and most important rules of interpreting language whether in or out of the Bible, will strip this absurd dogma of the least appearance of support from the word of God. The rule to which I refer is this, "that language is always to be interpreted in accordance with the subject-matter of discourse."

When used of acts of will, the term "can not" interpreted by this rule, can not be understood to mean a proper impossibility. If I say, I can not take five dollars for my watch, when it is offered to me, every one knows that I do not and

can not mean to affirm a proper impossibility. So when God said to Lot," Haste thee, for I can do nothing until thou be come thither," who ever understood God as affirming a natural or any proper impossibility? All that he could have meant was, that he was not willing to do any thing until Lot was in a place of safety. Just so when the Bible speaks of our inability to comply with the commands of God, all that can be intended is that we are so unwilling that without divine persuasion, we as a matter of fact shall not and will not obey. This certainly is the sense in which such language is used in common life. And in common parlance, we never think of such language, when used of acts of will, as meanin any thing more than an unwillingness, a state in which the will is strongly committed in an opposite direction.

When Joshua said to the children of Israel, “Ye can not serve the Lord, for he is a holy God," the whole context, as well as the nature of the case, shows that he did not mean to affirm a natural, nor indeed any kind of impossibility. In the same connection, he requires them to serve the Lord and leads them to solemnly pledge themselves to serve Him. He undoubtedly intended to say that with wicked hearts they could not render Him an acceptable service, and therefore insisted on their putting away the wickedness of their hearts by immediately and voluntarily consecrating themselves to the service of the Lord. So it must be in all cases where the terms can not and such like expressions (which, when applied to muscular action, would imply a proper impossibiliity,) are used, in reference to acts of will; they can not, when thus used be understood as implying a proper impossibility without doing violence to every sober rule of interpreting language. What would be thought of a judge or an advocate at the bar of an earthly tribunal who should interpret the language of a witness without any regard to the rule," that language is to be understood according to the subject-matter of discourse." Should an advocate in his argument to the court or jury, attempt to interpret the language of a witness in a manner that made can not, when spoken of an act of will mean a proper impossibility, the judge would soon rebuke his stupidity and remind him that he must not talk nonsense in a court of justice; and might possibly add, that such nonsensical assertions were allowable only in the pulpit. I say again, that it is an utter abuse and perversion of the laws of language so to interpret the language of the Bible as to make it teach a proper inability in man to will as: