revelation and appropriation of Christ in all the fulness of his official relations.

It is not intended, as has been said, that Christ must previously be known in all these relations before a soul can be sanctified at all; but that when tried from time to time, a new revelation of Christ to the soul, corresponding to the temptation, or as the help of the soul in such circumstances, is a condition of its remaining steadfast. This gracious aid or revelation is abundantly promised in the bible, and will be made in time, so that by laying hold on Christ in the present revealed relation, the soul may be preserved blameless, though the furnace of temptation be heated seven times hotter than it is wont to be.

In my estimation the church as a body, I mean the nominal church, have entirely mistaken the nature and means or conditions of sanctification. They have not regarded it as consisting in a state of entire consecration, nor understood that continual entire consecration was entire sanctification. They have regarded sanctification as consisting in the annihilation of the constitutional propensities instead of the controlling of them. They have erred equally in regard to the means or conditions of entire sanctification. They seem to have regarded sanctification as brought about by a physical cleansing in which man was passive; or to have gone over to the opposite extreme, and regarded sanctification as consisting in the formation of habits of obedience. The Old School have seemed to be waiting for a physical sanctification in which they are to be in a great measure passive, and which they have not expected to take place in this life. Holding, as they do, that the constitution of both soul and body is defiled or sinful in every power and faculty, they of course can not hold to entire sanctification in this life. If the constitutional appetites, passions, and propensities are in fact, as they hold, sinful in themselves, why, then the question is settled that entire sanctification can not take place in this world nor in the next, except as the constitution is radically changed, and that of course by the creative power of God. The New School rejecting the doctrine of constitutional moral depravity and physical regeneration and sanctification, and losing sight of Christ as our sanctification, have fallen into a self-righteous view of sanctification, and have held that sanctification is effected by works or by forming holy habits, &c. Both the Old and the New School have fallen into egregious errors upon this fundamentally important subject.

The truth is, beyond all question, that sanctification is by faith as opposed to works. That is, faith receives Christ in all his offices and in all the fulness of his relations to the soul; and Christ when received, works in the soul to will and to do of all his good pleasure, not by a physical, but by a moral or persuasive working. Observe, he influences the will. This must be by a moral influence, if its actings are intelligent and free, as they must be to be holy. That is, if he influences the will to obey God, it must be by a Divine moral suasion. The soul never in any instance obeys in a spiritual and true sense, except it be thus influenced by the indwelling Spirit of Christ. But whenever Christ is apprehended and received in any relation, in that relation he is full and perfect; so that we are complete in him. For it hath pleased the Father that in him should all fullness dwell; and that we might all receive of his fullness until we have grown up into him in all things, "Until we all come in the unity of the faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ."

LECTURE LXV.

SANCTIFICATION.

VII. OBJECTIONS ANSWERED.

To the doctrine we have been advocating it is objected that the real practical question is not,

1. Whether this state is attainable on the ground of natural ability; for this is admitted.

2. It is not whether it is rational to hope to make this attainment, provided we set our hearts upon making it, and persevere in aiming to attain it; for this is admitted.

3. It is not whether this state is a rational object of pursuit, provided any are disposed to pursue it. But,

4. Is it rational for christians to hope that they shall pursue it, and shall perseveringly set their hearts upon it? Is it rational for christians to hope that they shall so endeavor to attain it as to fulfil the conditions of the promises wherein it is pledged?

To this I reply,

(1.) That it makes a new issue. It yields the formerly contested ground and proposes an entirely new question. Hitherto the question has been, is this state an object of rational pursuit, provided any are disposed to pursue it? May christians aim at this attainment with the rational hope of making it? This point is now yielded, if I understand the objection, and one entirely distinct is substituted, namely: Is it rational for christians to hope that they shall pursue after this attainment? or that they shall aim at and set themselves to make this attainment? This, I say, is quite another question than the one heretofore argued.

It is, however, an important one, and I am quite willing to discuss it, but with this distinct understanding that it is not the question upon which issue has been heretofore taken. This question, as we shall see, calls up a distinct enquiry. In this discussion I shall pursue the following outline:

1. What constitutes hope?

2. What is implied in a rational hope?

3. The grounds of rational hope may vary indefinitely in dogree.

4. Wrong views may inspire an irrational hope.

5. Wrong views may prevent a rational hope.

6. Hope is a condition of the attainment in question. 7. What the objection under consideration admits.

8. What I understand it to deny.

9. What it amounts to.

10. What it must assume in reference to the provisions of grace. 11. What these provisions are not.

12. What they are.

13. What real grounds of hope there are in respect to the question under consideration.

14. Consider the tendency of denying that there are valid grounds of hope in this case.

1. I am to show what hope is.

Hope in common parlance, and as I shall use the term in this discussion, is not a phenomenon of will, or it is not a voluntary state of mind. It includes a phenomenon both of the intellect and the sensibility. It is a state of mind compounded of desire and expectation. Desire alone is not hope. A man may desire an event ever so strongly yet if he has no degree of expectation that the desired event will occur he can not justly be said to hope for it.

Expectation is not hope, for one may expect an event ever so confidently, yet if he does not at all desire it, he can not be truly said to hope for it. Hope comprehends both desire and expectation. There must be some degree of both of these to compose hope.

2. What is implied in a rational hope?

(1.) The desire must be reasonable; that is, in accordance with reason. The thing desired must be such as reason sanctions or approves. If the desire is an unreasonable one the fact that there is good ground for expecting the desired end will not make the hope rational. The expectation might in this case be rational in the sense that there is valid reason for the expectation. But expectation alone is not hope. A rational hope must include a rational desire or a desire in accordance with reason, and a rational expectation, that is, an expectation in accordance with reason.

(2.) The expectation to be rational must have for its foundation at least some degree of evidence. Hope may be, and often is, indulged barely on the ground that the desired event

is possible in the absence of all evidence that it is likely to occur. Thus we say of one who is at the point of death, and whose life is despaired of by all but his nearest friends, "where there is life there is hope." When events are so greatly desired men are wont to indulge the hope that the event will occur, even in the absence of all evidence that it will occur, and in the face of the highest evidence that it will not occur. But such hope can hardly be said to be rational. Hope to be rational must have for its support, not a bare possibility that the desired event may occur, but at least some degree of evidence that it will occur. This is true of hope in general. When an event is conditioned upon the exercise of our own agency and upon an agency which we are able either in our own strength or through grace to exert, it may be more or less rational to expect the occurrence of the event in proportion as we more or less desire it. Hope includes desire; there can be no hope without desire. There may be a good ground of hope when there is in fact no hope. There may be a reason and a good reason for desire where there is no desire. There may be and is good reason for sinners to desire to be christians when they have no such desire. Again, there may be good reason for both desire and expectation when in fact there is neither. The thing which it is reasonable to desire may not be desired, and there may be good reason for expecting that an event will occur, when no such expectation is indulged. For example, a child may neither desire nor expect to comply with the wishes of a parent in a given instance. Yet it may be very reasonable for him to desire to comply in this instance with parental authority, and the circumstances may be such as to afford evidence that he will be brought to compliance, and yet there may be in this case no hope exercised by the child that he shall comply. There may be then a rational ground for hope when there is no hope. A thing may be strongly desired and yet the evidence that it will occur may not be apprehended, and therefore, although such evidence may exist, it may not be perceived by the mind, or the mind may be so occupied with contemplating opposing evidence or with looking at discouraging circumstances as not to apprehend the evidence upon which a rational hope may be or might be grounded.

Again, when the event in question consists in the action of the will in conformity with the law of the reason, the probability that it will thus act depends upon the states of the sensibility or upon the desires. It may therefore be