ural and the supernatural that the one ministered to the other, the sign in the heavens creating wonder and expectation, and inciting to the journey.

Our author brings forward proof that such an event did actually occur about the time of the birth of Christ. As an attempt to interpret in a scientific way the Bible story, it is as hard to manage as the new star theory; nevertheless, truth never conflicts with truth, and so we cite the facts. In October, 1572, a star was discovered by Tycho Brahe in the constellation Cassiopeia. Its light was white, and for several months its luster increased. Then it grew yellow, and began to decline. As its light lessened it became red, and finally ashen gray, and so, at the end of about eighteen monthis, it disappeared. In October, 1604, Johann Kepler, a German astronomer, discovered another temporary star of the same kind, which went through successive stages like its predecessor, in about the same time, and then disappeared. Astronomy, in that day, had not yet escaped from its entanglement with superstition. In December, 1603, there had been a conjunction of the planets Jupiter and Saturn, which had attracted attention. In March, 1604, Jupiter, Saturn, and Mars were in conjunction-a still greater astrological wonder. In October, in the very quarter of the heavens where two of these planets were still in conjunction, appeared the new star. It occurred to the mind of Kepler that thus, perhaps, the Star of the Nativity appeared, and that thus its appearing might have been heralded by other celestial phenomena. Tracing back the orbits of Jupiter and Saturn, he found that, in the year of Rome 747, they were in conjunction; and the next year the two were in conjunction with Mars, an event which occurs only at intervals of about eight hundred years. Thus it appears that a very remarkable conjunction of planets, which must have been watched with profound interest by the learned of that day, and which must have attracted the attention of all nations, did occur about the time of Christ's birth. The calculations of Kepler have been repeated, and the same result reached, by an eminent English astronomer of our own times, the Rev. Charles Pritchard, Honorable Secretary of the Royal Astronomical Society.

Still, this astronomical discovery leaves us as far as ever from

a scientific interpretation of the account given by Matthew. The plain, direct statement of the Scripture is, that "the star which they saw in the East went before" the Wise Men "till it came and stood over where the young child was." This description of the celestial guide accords as ill with the conjunction of planets, as with the new star for which our author argues, and we are compelled to return to the old interpretation of the narrative. The author's objection, that to suppose the star to be any thing less than one of the permanent lights of the firmament is to degrade it to the level of a "Will-o'-thewisp," is hardly valid. The guiding pillar of fire and cloud in the wilderness of Arabia was but a temporary light, yet there was nothing puerile or despicable about it.

But while we hesitate to accept the hypothesis about which much of the material of the two volumes centers, we do not undervalue the work itself. We regard it as one of the most beautiful and valuable publications of the modern press. Our hesitation in regard to a leading idea in no wise militates against the value of the abundant learning, the patient research, the devout spirit, the grand sweep of thought which characterize the whole. The geode crystallizes about vacancy, and yet is full of jewels. We can hardly go as far as the author would fain lead us, yet under his guidance we go farther than ever we went before, feeling that our feet are upon the rock at every step. The Magi were indeed strangers-heathen, as the Jews accounted them-and yet God was revealing to them his highest mysteries. The mission of Christ was not only to save man, but to reveal God to the universe of mind; and the glory of the Cross is destined to illumine the depths of space, and shine on through the eternal ages.

Professor Upham writes from the depths of his heart. He delights in his theme, and yet his enthusiasm in regard to it is not so much scientific or literary as it is religious, the outflow of a mightier passion, even love for Him for whom all worlds were made. This makes the whole work a lofty psalm of praise, a liturgy of holiest worship, in which Christ is all in all. The author is a believer in the full inspiration of the Scriptures, and studies them con amore. He sets many passages of holy writ in new light, and traverses the page of revelation as the well-taught searcher for diamonds trav

erses his field, finding gems where less skillful eyes see only pebbles.

The style is worthy of note. It is clear, strong, beautiful, in itself a proof that grandest themes need nothing better than the simple utterances of our noble English tongue.

ART. VI. THE PHILOSOPHY OF HERBERT SPENCER. The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer; being an Examination of the First Principles of his System. By B. P. BowNE. A.B. New York: Nelson & Phillips. Cincinnati: Hitchcock & Walden. 1874.

IN resuming our criticism of Herbert Spencer, as brought before us in Mr. Bowne's book, we cannot doubt that the great importance of Mr. Spencer's cherished doctrine that the Infinite is unknowable, and the prominent names by which it is to a greater or less extent supported, will be a sufficient excuse for prolonging our discussion so far as to glance at both the development and the application of that idea in the scheme which we are examining. It may aid our conception of the standing of this doctrine if we look for a moment into the genesis of it, as a part of Mr. Spencer's system.

As a thinker, Mr. Spencer stands distinguished for his achievements alike in physical science and in the profounder walks of philosophy. In the former, it is claimed for him by his friends; that, far more than Darwin, or Wallace, or any of the eminent naturalists who have maintained the doctrine of development, he is the author of that whole scheme of thought. The philosophy of evolution is pre-eminently his. It was announced by him, as a comprehensive principle, before Darwin had published a word on the subject; and the research has been carried on with the utmost consistency of aim in all his subsequent works. From time to time he has extended the scope of the doctrine, and by discovery after discovery he has mastered its laws. He has shown that it proceeds by methods, first, of dif ferentiation; next, of integration; and finally, of equilibration. He has defined these laws, and brought them into relations with one another; and has thus given the only complete account of the comprehensive process which he was the first to proclaim.

To all this we have nothing to object. The reality of these 'aws, the universality of their application, and the value to be attached to them in human thinking, it will be for succeeding observers and reasoners to estimate. It cannot be questioned that Mr. Spencer's acquaintance with physical philosophy is real and great; nor that he is a marvel of industry and attainment. From these high claims some abatement must perhaps be made on the ground of an occasional inaccuracy in his statement of the infinite detail which the extended science of our day involves, and of consequent erroneous conclusions thence deduced; but any criticism of this part of his works would be a matter of mere detail, and we do not propose to enter upon it.

Without disputing any claims to eminence which Mr. Spencer's friends may set up for him on the ground of the consistent and progressive character of his opinions in physical science, and in regard to the rationale of evolution, it must be observed that no similar allegation can be made in regard to his philosophical speculations. These have been neither original nor consistent. Indeed, there are few examples of speculation so totally destitute of harmonious development as that which has now issued in the philosophy of the unknowable. This point we must take the time to illustrate.

The first work which brought Mr. Spencer's name prominently before the public as an independent thinker was his "Social Statics; or, The Conditions of Human Happiness Specified," etc., published in 1850. In this work he endeavored to establish a system of society and of inorals; and, after discussing and rejecting all other grounds as insufficient, he deliberately laid the foundation of his doctrine of human liberty and human rights in the fact that God has given to all men faculties, and that this implies the right and liberty of using them. His language, in enunciating his fundamental principle, we quote as follows:-

From this conclusion there seems no possibility of escape. Let us repeat the steps by which we arrive at it. God wills man's happiness. Man's happiness can only be produced by the exercise of his faculties. Then God wills that he should exercise his facul-. ties. But to exercise his faculties he must have liberty to do all that his faculties naturally impel him to do. Then God intends that he should have that liberty. Therefore, he has a right to that liberty.-Part II, chap. iv, § 2.

This, then, was the original form of all Mr. Spencer's speculations upon the liberty and the rights of men, and this his basis of the social system-the will of God. It is almost needless "to say how distinctly it recognizes God as knowable and thinkable not only, but as thinkable with a distinctness which makes this knowledge the foundation of all social philosophy. Not only do we know God, but we know him as an intelligent and designing mind, having purposes and intentions respecting the beings of whom he is the author; and these purposes and designs we know so definitely that our knowledge becomes the foundation of all that is sacred in rights, and all that is precious in liberty. Now, however, Mr. Spencer avows a very different philosophy of society. God, he now tells us, is incapable of being known, or thought, by the human mind; we cannot say that he has any designs or intentions whatever; we do not know that he is a personal being with a will, or even that he has any glimmer of intelligence or rationality. The very foundation. principle and the only one that Mr. Spencer, in his first work, consented to recognize-is formally abandoned. Social philosophy is to rest henceforth on a new basis; and Mr. Spencer has organized a system of inquiries which is to give us all the detail of social facts, with a view to the future discovery of the. laws of sociology.

Here, then, we have no such consistent and progressive development as marks the construction of his scientific works. In place of an orderly progress, we have a radical and destructive subversion of opinions. The philosophical portion of the scheme can boast no such harmony as is claimed for the scientific part of it. The end is in utter conflict with the beginning. Instead of evolution we have revolution.

The radical change which has subverted the very foundations of Mr. Spencer's philosophy is largely due to those writings in which Sir William Hamilton taught that the infinite is not a positive in knowledge, inasmuch as by its very nature the concept has to be negatively formed and expressed. It is the correlate of the finite; and every finite object that we know, carries with it a conception of the infinite, from which it has to be distinguished. But this infinite, known thus as the notfinite, cannot, Hamilton said, become the subject of logical reasoning, because this process has for its sphere the relation of FOURTH SERIES, VOL. XXVII.-29