public Law, it is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of a private person without its own consent.

287. The extension of the Judicial Power of the United States "to controversies between two or more States," is essential to the peace and stability of the Union ;-which, before the adoption of the Constitution, had been frequently endangered, and sometimes interrupted by territorial disputes, and interfering claims of boundary between the States: and it may justly be presumed, that under the National Government, the decision of all such controversies will be impartial.

288. As "controversies between a State and the citizens of another State," might excite animosities amongst the members of the Union, the Federal Courts. are properly designated as the tribunals to decide. them; and by the first Judiciary act, Congress conferred jurisdiction on the Courts of the United States, in suits prosecuted by a citizen of another State of the Union, or by citizens or subjects of foreign States.

289. The individual States, however, were not willing to submit to be arraigned as dependants, before the Federal Courts, at the instance of private persons; and it was subsequently declared by an amendment of the Constitution, that "the Judicial Power should not be construed to extend to any suit of Law or Equity commenced or prosecuted against any one of the United States, by citizens of another State, or foreign citizens or subjects."

290. Although the necessity of vesting jurisdiction in the Federal Courts in "controversies between citi. zens of different States," may not stand upon ground equally as strong as some of the preceding instances;

it may, nevertheless, be vindicated by high motives of public justice and policy; and there are many cases in which such a power may be highly expedient, if not indispensable, to carry into effect some of the privileges and immunities conferred by the Union; and some of the prohibitions upon the States.

291. The clause relative to "controversies between citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of different States," is the only instance in which the Constitution directly provides for the cognizance of disputes between citizens of the same State in the Federal Courts; but it is not the only one in which it contemplates their being incidentally and ultimately subject to the national jurisdiction; as all the citizens of the United States are equally entitled to the benefit of that jurisdiction, in all cases arising under the Constitution, Laws, and Treaties of the Union.

292. The direct jurisdiction, in this particular instance, is founded on the reasonableness and propriety of giving the National Courts cognizance of all cases in which the State tribunals cannot be supposed to be impartial; and it attaches, not only to grants made by different States which were never united, but also to grants made by different States which were originally comprehended within the same jurisdiction and government, if made after the separation, even though the origin. of the title may be traced back to an antecedent period.

293. The jurisdiction of "controversies between a State, or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens, or subjects," is founded on the responsibility of the Union for the conduct of its members; and on the necessity that this national responsibility for injury, should be accompanied by the faculty of preventing it.

294. As the perversion or denial of justice to foreigners, is with reason classed amongst the just causes of war, and as a great proportion of the controversies to which they are parties, involve national questions, it is not less essential to the preservation of the public faith, than of the public tranquillity, that all causes in which aliens are concerned should be referred to the National tribunals.

295. In order to ascertain,

III. The manner in which the jurisdiction vested in the Judicial Power of the Union has been diffused and distributed,

either by the Constitution, or by the Laws passed by Congress for giving it effect, it will be necessary to review the powers vested in the several Courts of the United States, established by the Constitution or created by law.

296. The first of these is a high and peculiar jurisdiction, not otherwise mentioned in the Constitution than by way of exception to the ordinary modes of trial; and which is denominated "the Court for the trial of impeachments ;"—a tribunal which seems rather, to have been necessarily called into existence by the mere formation of the Constitution, than to be expressly created by it.

297. Impeachment is introduced into the Constitution as a known term of definite signification, to ascertain which we must have recourse to the English Common Law, from which it is derived.

298. The practice of impeachments arose from the experience, that persons entrusted with the administration of public affairs, would often infringe upon the rights of the People, and commit such crimes as

the ordinary Courts and Magistrates did not dare, or had no power, to punish.

299. Of such offences, the Representatives of the People in the Legislature, would not be proper judges, because they and their constituents are in such cases the parties injured; and are therefore properly the

accusers.

300. As the ordinary Courts of Justice would naturally be swayed by the authority of such powerful accusers, the charge is brought for trial before the other branch of the Legislature; the members of which are supposed not to have the same interests and passions with the popular Assembly.

301. In accordance with this theory, the Constitution of the United States declares that "the House of Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment," and that "the Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments."

302. The power of originating the inquiry, and of preferring and conducting the prosecution, is thus lodged with that branch of the Legislature which immediately represents the People; and the reasons which establish the propriety of this arrangement, indicate the necessity of admitting the other branch of the Legislative body, to its appropriate share in the investigation.

303. As the members of the Senate are by one degree further removed from the People, and are elected upon a different principle of representation; as they are chosen for a longer period, are more independent of popular favour, and are presumed to be more secure from party influence; they are more fit to sit as Judges, than the members of the House of Representatives.

304. Besides, as the Senators are chosen with the knowledge that they may, whilst in office, be called upon to exercise this high jurisdiction, they bring with them the confidence of their constituents as to their qualifications for this special duty; and an implied compact on their own parts, that it will be faithfully and honestly discharged.

305. The objects of this jurisdiction are all acts which involve, or proceed from, the abuse or violation of a public trust, and are with propriety denomi nated political offences, or " high crimes and misdemeanors," as their effects and consequences are immediately injurious to the body politic itself.

306. The causes of impeachment have reference only to public character and official duty, though the terms of the Constitution comprehend "treason," as well as "bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors." But the treason contemplated, is treason against the Government of the United States.

307. With the exception of treason, offences of every description, not immediately connected with the exercise of a public trust, are left to the ordinary course of Judicial proceedings; and neither branch of the Legislature can regularly inquire into them, except in relation to their own members, and with the view of expelling them if guilty. But the ordinary tribunals are not precluded, either before, or after an impeachment, from taking cognizance of public and official delinquency.

308. The only subjects, therefore, or persons liable to impeachment, are those who hold or have held a public office under the United States; and all Executive and Judicial officers of the United States, of every rank and description, are included.