Legislative acts void, on the ground of their unconstitutionality, has sometimes been doubted or denied, either from a misconception of the principle on which it rests, or from an apprehension that the doctrine would establish a superiority of the Judicial, over the Legislative Power.

267. But no position is founded on clearer principles, than that every act of delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it is exercised, must be void; and no Legislative act contrary to the Constitution, which is the commission from which every department of the Government derives its authority, can therefore be valid.

268. Without an express provision to that effect, it is not to be presumed that the Constitution intended to enable the representatives of the People, in the Legislature, to substitute their will in the place of the will of their constituents; and to render a construction by the Legislature of their own powers conclusive upon the other departments.

269. It is more reasonable to conclude, that the Courts of Justice were intended, not only to represent the sovereign authority of the People in a separate and co-ordinate department; but were designed in that capacity, to act as an intermediate body be. tween the People and the Legislature, in order, amongst other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to its authority,

270. The interpretation of the Laws is the peculiar province of Courts of Justice; and as the Consti tution is in fact, a fundamental Law, and the Courts are bound to regard it as such, it is as much their duty to ascertain its meaning, as to ascertain the meaning of any act proceeding from the Legislative body,

271. If in any case there should be found an irreconcileable variance between a Law and the Constitution, that which has the superior obligation and validity ought of course to be preferred; the Constitution should prevail over the statute, and the intention of the People themselves be carried into effect, instead of the intention of their agents.

272. This conclusion by no means supposes a superiority of the Judicial, over the Legislative Power: it merely supposes that the People are superior to both; and where the will of the Legislature declared in the Law, stands opposed to the will of the People declared in the Constitution, the Judges are to be governed by the latter rather than by the former; and Courts are bound to regulate their decisions by that fundamental Law over which the Legislature has no control, rather than by those which it may at any time alter or repeal, and which derive their validity and effect from the Constitution.

273. There is no weight in the objection, that Courts of Justice, on the pretence of a repugnancy between a Law and the Constitution, may substitute their own pleasure in the place of the constitutional intentions of the Legislature; because this might as well happen in the case of two contradictory statutes, or in every adjudication upon any single Legislative Act.

274. The Courts are bound to declare the meaning of the Law; and if they should be disposed to exercise will, instead of judgment, the consequence in all cases equally, would be the substitution of their own pleasure, to that of the Legislature; and therefore, if the objection proved any thing, it would prove that there ought to be no Courts or Judges distinct from the Legislative body.

275. But the separation of the Judicial from the Legislative Power, was designed not only to create a distinct and independent body to expound and execute the Law; but to create a bulwark to protect a Constitution conferring limited powers, from Legislative encroachments and Executive usurpation; whilst this restraining power was itself confined within its proper limits, by corresponding checks, in the hands of the other departments, or arising from its own constitution.

276. A further object of the separation of the Judicial Power from the other departments in the Constitution of the United States, and of the precautions for maintaining its independence from their control, was to afford security to the General Government, in the exercise of its limited powers, against the inroads and influence of the several States.

277. All the reasons that support the right and duty of the Courts, in the ordinary exercise of their power, to declare void those Acts of Congess which in their judgment, are repugnant to the Constitution, apply with equal force to establish a similar control and authority in the Judiciary of the Union, over the acts and proceedings of the State Governments.

278. The People of the several States, by their adoption of the Constitution of the United States, in many instances superseded and modified in effect their State Constitutions, which the People of each State respectively alone could alter; and in those instances they were competent to do so, and to acknowledge and declare, not only the Federal Constitution itself, but the Laws and Treaties made in pursuance of its authority, to be the Supreme Law of the land, and of paramount obligation to either the Constitution or the Laws of any of the States.

279. By declaring that the Judicial Power of the United States should extend to all cases arising under the Constitution, the People vested in that department of the Government authority to determine the construction of that instrument, in every case in which such a question should arise judicially, whether directly between the parties to the suit, or collaterally between the parties to the national compact.

280. This authority of the Judiciary of the Union, necessarily results from the operation of the Laws of the United States upon the individual citizens of the several States; and if this distinct, independent, and appropriate department, were not expressly created as an intermediate body between the National and State Governments, it is, at all events, that in which, from its nature and constitution, this high and indispensable power necessarily resides, and could be most safely deposited.

281. But the Judiciary of the United States has no authority to declare void acts of a State Legislature, on the ground of their repugnancy to the State Constitution, unless in administering the local law of the State; in which case the Courts of the United States act exactly as the State tribunals are bound to

act.

282. The propriety of extending the Judicial Pow, er of the Union" to all cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers, and Consuls," will appear from the consideration, that all diplomatic officers, like the two former descriptions of these public agents, are the immediate representatives of their sovereigns, and, as such, owe no subjection to any Laws but those of their own country and the Law of Nations; and that the acts of the latter description of officers are not in all cases subject to the private law of the country in which they are appointed to reside; and where they

H

are liable to its jurisdiction, the reasons applicable to all foreigners render it proper that they should be amenable only to the National tribunals.

283. Public ministers, in order to perform their duty to their own sovereign, should be independent of any other authority; their powers, duties, and privileges, are therefore determined, not by any municipal regulations or enactments, but by the Law of Nations, which is equally obligatory upon all sovereigns; and every question in which their rights or the rights of Consuls are involved, is so intimately connected with the peace of the nation, that it would be unsafe to submit them to any other than the national judicature,

284. The clause extending the Judicial Power "to all cases of Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction," is supported by the same considerations relative to the public peace, as respect public Ministers and Consuls; as Maritime causes generally depend on the Law of Nations, and commonly affect the rights of aliens,

285. Unless jurisdiction had been given to the na tional Courts of "cases to which the United States are a party," all the rights, powers, contracts, and privileges, which they possess in their sovereign capacity, would be at the mercy and control of the several States; and it would, besides, be a novelty in jurisprudence to prevent a sovereign power from suing in its own Courts,

286. But the terms in which this jurisdiction is conferred, does not vest in the Federal Courts jurisdiction in all controversies to which the United States shall be a party-so as to justify a suit to be brought against the United States without the consent of Congress; and according to an established maxim of