184. But if the President pro tempore of the Senate should die, during a casual vacancy in the offices of President and Vice President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives then extinct, would probably be deemed the person upon whom the office was intended to devolve.

185. If the Vice President succeed to the office of President, he continues in it until the expiration of the term for which the President was elected, unless a temporary disability of the President be sooner removed; and if both offices be vacant, it is by law made the duty of the Secretary of State to take measures for the election of a President. But, from a defect in the amendment, a Vice President, as the Constitution now stands, cannot be elected until the regular period.

186. The term of four years, for which the President and Vice President are elected, was intended to be long enough to render the Executive Magistrate firm and independent in the discharge of his trust, and to give stability to his system of administration; and short enough to retain him under a due sense of his dependence on public approbation.

187. A practice which has prevailed from the commencement of the Government, for the President to decline a second re-election, seems now to be permanently established, and to have acquired the force of a legal precedent; and it has, in effect, limited the period of service to eight years, subject to an intermediate re-election.

188. The support of the President is secured by a provision of the Constitution, which declares that he shall at stated times receive for his services a compensation, which shall neither be increased nor

diminished during the period for which he shall have been elected.

189. This provision was obviously intended to strengthen and preserve the proper independence and energy of the Executive department; but the President cannot receive any other emolument from the United States, or from any of the States.

190. In pursuing the examination of the Executive department,

II. The powers and duties of the President, are next to be considered.

191. The first power vested in the President, connects him with the Legislature in the exercise, to a certain extent, of Legislative powers, as a security for his own independence, and a check upon that most powerful branch of the Government; and it consists in the qualified negative he possesses upon the acts of Congress.

192. Every act, order, resolution, or vote, to which the concurrence of the two houses of Congress is necessary, (except on the question of their adjournment,) must be presented to the President, and must be approved by him before it can take effect, unless, after being disapproved by him; it be again passed by two thirds of both Houses.

193. Without this power the Executive department would be unable to sustain itself against the propensity of the Legislature to encroach upon the rights, and absorb the powers, of the weaker branches of the Government.

194. The President might gradually be stripped of his authority by successive concurrent resolutions

of the Senate and House of Representatives, or so weakened as to be ultimately annihilated by a single vote of the more popular branch of the Legislature, unless he possessed this check, as a means of preventing the Legislative and Executive powers, from being united in the same hands.

195. This power, not only serves as a defence to the Executive authority, but furnishes an additional safeguard against the enactment of improper Laws, and secures the community against the effects of precipitancy, or of any impulse or excitement hostile to the public welfare, that may happen temporarily to influence a majority of the Congress.

196. The President is constituted Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual service of the Union.

197. The command and disposal of the public force to execute the Laws, maintain domestic tranquillity, and resist foreign oppression, are powers obviously of an Executive nature; and particularly require the exercise of the qualities characteristic of this department; and they have uniformly been appropriated to it, in every well organized Government.

198. The President has the sole power of granting reprieves and pardons for offences against the United States, except in cases of impeachment; the necessity of which authority in every Government, arises from the infirmities incident to the administration of human justice.

199. But were that administration perfect, policy would sometimes require the remission of a punishment strictly due, for a crime clearly ascertained;

and both humanity and policy dictate that this power should be as unrestricted as possible; and hence the expediency of vesting it in the President alone.

200. The President has power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.

201. As Treaties are declared by the Constitution to be a part of the supreme Law of the land, as by their means new relations are formed, and obligations contracted with foreign powers, it would seem most consonant with the principles of a Republican Government, that the right of making Treaties should be vested in the Legislative department.

202. But the preliminary negotiations which are required, and the secrecy and despatch proper to take due advantage of a sudden and favourable turn in public affairs, render it more expedient that this power should be confided to the Executive.

203. Although the power of making treaties partakes more of the Legislative than of the Executive character, yet it does not fall strictly within the definition of either. It relates neither to the enacting of new Laws, nor to. the execution of those which exist. Its objects are contracts, which have, indeed, the force of Law, but derive that force from the obligations of good faith amongst nations.

204. Treaties are not rules of action prescribed by the Supreme Legislative power, to the citizens of the State; but agreements between sovereign and independent States.

205. The power in question accordingly constitutes a distinct department in the Government of the

United States; formed from the association of one branch of the Legislature with the Executive power, and for this purpose, the Constitution invests the Senate with the attributes of an Executive Council.

206. The qualities requisite in the management of national intercourse, indicate the President as the most fit organ of communication with foreign powers, and the efficient agent in the conclusion of treaties; whilst the importance of the trust, and the operation of Treaties as Laws, strongly recommend that they should be made under the advice and control of a portion of the Legislative power.

207. The Senate was selected for this purpose, not only because the deposit of the power in that body, imparts additional weight and security to it as the weaker branch of the Legislature, but because, from its smaller number, it may be more easily assembled, and from its greater permanence, it is presumed to be governed by steadier and more systematic views of public policy, than the House of Representatives; whilst these causes combined, would enable it to act with promptitude and vigour.

208. The President is further invested with the power to nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate to appoint, Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, the Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States whose appointments are not otherwise provided for, and which may be established by Law. But Congress may vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they may think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the heads of departments.

209. The exercise of such a power by the People