his Constitutional power, sooner convene it, on some extraordinary occasion.

138. Congress, by a concurrent resolution, to which the assent of the President is not required, fixes the times of its own adjournments within the period of its dissolution; but during a session, neither House can adjourn for more than three days without the assent of the other; nor can they agree to adjourn to any other place than that in which they shall be sitting. And in cases of disagreement between the two Houses, as to the time of their adjournment, the President may adjourn them to such time as he may think proper.

139. But as the term for which the House of Representatives and one third of the Senate are elected, expires at the end of every second year, Congress must of necessity adjourn at the expiration of that period; as the Congress, for the time being, is in fact dissolved by the operation of the Constitution and Laws, on the third day of March in every alternate year.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE EXECUTIVE POWER.

140. The object of this department is the execution of the Laws; and good policy requires that it should be organized in the mode best calculated to effect that end with fidelity and precision.

141. No discretion is vested in the Executive Magistrate in regard to the wisdom and expediency of the Laws after they are duly made and promulgated.

It is his duty then to execute them, whatever may be his opinion as to their justice or policy.

142. What has once been declared under the forms prescribed by the Constitution to be the meaning and intention of the Legislature, must be carried into prompt execution, and due effect continued to be given to it by the Executive department, until repealed by the Legislature, or pronounced by the Judicial department to be repugnant to the "Constitution,

143. Every individual is bound to obey a Constitutional Law, however objectional in other respects it may appear to him; and whosoever refuses obedience to a Law on the ground of its unconstitutionality, does so at his peril, and is liable to the legal consequence of disobedience, if the Law be judicially declared to be warranted by the Constitution.

144. The legal presumption is always in favour of an act passed by the Legislature according to the forms of the Constitution; and where the Chief Executive Magistrate possesses a negative upon those acts, the presumption is stronger against him than against an inferior officer, or a private person.

145: As the Executive power is not only bound to obey, but to execute, the Law, the essential qualities required in this department are promptness, vigour, and responsibility.

146. A prompt submission to the Law, and a prompt preparation to enforce it, are requisite both in respect to the authority from which it emanates, and in order to give it due operation and effect, which should be immediate and decisive..

147. The Executive power must also be endowed

with energy in other respects; for feebleness in this department implies feebleness in the Government; and the vigour of action imparted to the Executive power, must be duly proportioned to the exigencies which may arise under the system. .

148. The power vested in this department should, however, be proportioned as exactly as possible to the occasions which may be expected to require its exercise; for if it fall short of them, the public sense of the protection and control of the Government will be weakened, and violations of the Law. escape with impunity; and if the quantum of power exceed the exigency of the case, the liberties of the People will be in jeopardy.

149. In a written Constitution, it is difficult to adopt general expressions precisely descriptive of the proper extent and limitation of this power; but to guard against its abuse, as well as to insure the faithful execution of the general trusts confided.to this department, the Chief Executive Magistrate should be held responsible to the People for official misconduct.

150. These three qualities of promptness, vigour, and responsibility, are most likely to exist in union with each other where the chief Executive authority is limited to a single person.

151. Unity is conducive to energy, which includes both promptness and vigour, as well as decision, activity, secrecy, and despatch; all of which will generally characterise the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of a greater number; and in proportion as the number is increased, those qualities will be diminished.

152. This unity in the Executive department may

be destroyed, either by vesting the power in two or more Magistrates of equal dignity; or by vesting it. - ostensibly in one, subject, in whole or in part, to the control and advice of a council; both of which me thods are liable to similar, if not to equal, objections.

153. History and experience confirm the theoretical reasoning which renders it obvious that a division of the Executive power in any form, between two or more persons, must always tend to produce dissentions and fluctuating measures, and diminish the respectability, as well as the authority and efficiency of the Government.

154. The division of the Executive power has also a direct tendency to destroy, responsibility; for there will always be much less temptation to depart from duty, and much greater solicitude for character, where there are no partners to share the odium of bad measures, or to communicate by their example, confidence in the perpetration of abuses, from the greater probability of escaping punishment..

155. Plurality in the Executive department, besides depriving the People of these great securities for the faithful exercise of delegated power, tends to depress the character of the nation abroad; whilst unity in that branch of the Government not only affords greater security at home, but increases that efficacy which is requisite to command the respect of foreign nations.

156. In accordance with these principles, the Executive power is vested by the Constitution in a single Chief Magistrate, under the name of "THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES;" and, in the examination of the functions of this high officer,

I. The qualifications required by the Constitu

tion for the office of President, the mode and duration of his appointment, and the provision for his support, are first to be con- · sidered.

157. No person is eligible to the office of President, except a natural-born citizen, or a citizen of the United States at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, and who shall not have attained the age of thirty-five years, and been fourteen years resident within the United States.

158. To avoid the dangers and difficulties to be apprehended, under the most favourable circumstances, from the popular election of a Supreme Executive Magistrate for a whole nation, the Constitution does not refer the election of the President directly to the People; but confides the power to a small body of electors, representing for that purpose the People at large, and appointed in each State under the direction of the Legislature...

159. Each State appoints, in such manner as its Legislature may direct, a number of electors, equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives, which it may be entitled to send to Congress.

160. To prevent the person in office at the time of the election from having an improper influence in procuring his re-election; it is provided that no Senator or Representative in Congress, nor any person holding an office of trust or profit under the United States, shall be an elector. But in no other respect does the Constitution define the qualifications of the electors.

161. In some few of the States the electors are appointed by the Legislature itself, in a mode pre