ings, and not the members of the two Houses assembled in one body and voting indiscriminately.

84. Senators are elected for a term of six years, and are arranged in three classes in such a manner. that the seats of one class become vacant, and one third of the Senate must be regularly chosen, every two years; corresponding with the expiration of the term for which the House of Representatives is chosen.

85. From the superior weight and delicacy of the trusts confided to the Senate, the Constitution declares that " no person shall be a Senator that shall not have attained the age of thirty years, and have been-nine years a citizen of the United States; and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of the State for which he shall be chosen."

86. No Senator or Representative can, during the time for which he is elected, be appointed to any civil office under the authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or of which the emoluments shall have been increased, during that time ; and no person holding any office under the United States, can be a member of either House during his continuance in office. But it is sufficient if he resign the same previously to taking his seat in Congress.

87. The next subject of consideration, in regard to the Legislative power, is,

II. The privileges and powers of the two Houses of Congress, both aggregately and separately.

88. In order to preserve a pure and genuine representation, and to control the evils of irregular and tumultuous elections, each House is made the sole

judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members.

89. As each House acts in cases where this power is exercised, in a judicial capacity, its decisions are regulated by known principles of Law; and they should be strictly adhered to as precedents, for the sake of uniformity and certainty.

90. A majority of each House constitutes a quorum for the transaction of business; but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the attendance of absent members, in such manner, and under such penalties, as each House may provide.

91. Each House is bound to keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish such parts of them as do not require secrecy; and to enter the yeas and nays on its journal on any question, if demanded by one fifth of the members present.

92. The members of both Houses are entitled to receive a compensation for their services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States. And they are in all cases, except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same.

93. In order to preserve inviolate the freedom of deliberation, no member of either House can be questioned in any other place, for any speech or debate therein.

94. Although no express power is given to either House to punish for contempts, unless when commit

ted by its own members; yet a power, extending beyond their own precincts, and affecting other persons, is exercised by both Houses, as incident to the nature of every Legislative body.

95. As the People are entitled to the utmost purity and independence in the conduct of their representatives, and as each House is, in this respect, the guardian of the interests of the People, as well as of its own character, it is its duty to make immediate inquiry into any attempt on the freedom or integrity of any of its members.

96. From the duty to inquire, arises the right to punish in such cases, as well as in cases of immedi. ate insult or disturbance, preventing the exercise of ts ordinary functions; the existence and the exercise of the right in both cases, being equally founded in the necessity of self-preservation.

97. But the power to punish in either case, extends only to imprisonment, which can continue no longer than the duration of the authority that awards it; and which necessarily terminates (if no shorter period be limited) with the adjournment or dissolution of the Congress.

98. Attempts to bribe or intimidate members of the Legislature, are, moreover, offences against the Public, and subject the offender to the usual course of prosecution in a court of law. But this liability does not exclude the jurisdiction of the Legislative body, nor does the interference of the latter, in vindication of its character and safety, preclude the Judicial power from taking cognizance of the same act, as a violation of the general Law.

99. The Legislative powers of the two Houses of

Congress extend to all subjects of a national character, and will be particularly enumerated and considered in examining the powers vested in the general Government at large. There are, however, some constitutional powers which are peculiar to each branch of the national Legislature.

100. The House of Representatives possesses the sole power of impeachment, or of presenting accusations to the Senate against the public officers of the United States, for misconduct in their offices: and it has also the exclusive right of originating all bills for raising revenue; but the Senate may propose amendments as to other bills.

101. Every bill which may indirectly or consequentially raise or increase revenue, or every moneybill, in the sense of the English law, is not considered a revenue-bill, within the meaning of the Federal Constitution; and in the practical construction of this power, it has accordingly been confined to bills for levying taxes, in the strict sense of the term, and has not been extended to bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenues.

102. The Senate has the sole power of trying impeachments; and in its exclusive connexion with the Executive power, it possesses a negative voice in the appointment of all officers, whose appointments are not otherwise provided for in the Constitution.

103. The advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senators present are requisite to the ratification of treaties, which must be submitted to the exclusive consideration of the Senate.

104. Treaties with foreign powers, if made abroad, are negotiated on the part of the United States, by

ministers accredited to those powers, under the instructions of the President; and if made in the United States, they are negotiated between the Secretary of State, under the like instructions, and ministers accredited from foreign Governments.

105. The Senate is not consulted in the first instance, but when the terms of the treaty are agreed upon by the agents or plenipotentiaries employed for that purpose, the President (unless he altogether disapprove it), submits it to the Senate, in whose deliberations he does not participate, but renders them from time to time such information relative to it as they may require.

106. The Senate may wholly reject a treaty, or they may ratify it in part, or recommend additiona or explanatory articles; which, if the President approve, become the subject of further negotiation with the foreign power; and when the whole is agreed to, on the other part, and receives the sanction of the Senate, the ratifications are exchanged between the respective Governments, and the treaty becomes obligatory upon both nations.

107. From the reason and exigency of the case, the proceedings of the Senate, on these occasions, are always conducted with closed doors; and the contents of the treaty, and all information connected with it, are, from motives of delicacy and policy, kept secret until the termination of the business renders such reserve no longer necessary.

108. The subjects remaining for consideration under the present general head, are,

III. The method of enacting Laws by the two Houses of Congress; and the times and modes of their assembling and adjourning.