669. The clause vesting this power previously declares that "full faith and credit shall be given in each State, to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other State;" and the Act passed by Congress in execution of this power, not only prescribes the manner of authentication, but declares that when so authenticated, they "shall have such faith and credit given to them in every Court within the United States, as they have by Law or usage in the Courts of the State from whence they are taken."

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670. The Common Law gives to the Judgments of the Courts of one State the effect of prima facie evidence, or evidence open to impeachment, explanation, or contradiction, in the Courts of every other but the Constitution contemplates, and ConState gress have executed, a further power or giving a cus clusive effect to such judgments as evidence admitting neither of impeachment, explanation, or contradiction, in the Courts of every other State, provided they have that effect in the State in which they are rendered.

CHAPTER IV.

OF THE POWERS VESTED IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, RELATIVE TO CERTAIN MISCELLANEOUS OBJECTS OF GENERAL UTILITY.

671. The Powers vested in the Federal Government, in relation to certain Specified objects of general utility, comprehend

I. A Power" to promote the progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing, for limited times, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their writings and discoveries."

672. Before the American Revolution, the right of property of authors and inventors in their inventions and discoveries, was made a question in England; and it was finally settled by a Judgment of the House of Lords, reversing an almost unanimous decision of the Court of King's Bench, that this right had no foundation in the Common Law.

673. Even those Judges in the Court below, who, reasoning upon different principles, arrived at the opposite conclusion, seem to have been perplexed with the indefinite nature of such a right, and embarrassed by the consequences of admitting it.

674. To deprive men of genius of the right to the profits of invention was, on the one hand, discouraging to the useful arts, and injurious to the progress of learning and science; whilst, on the other hand, an unlimited right to the exclusive enjoyment of the fruits of genius and discovery, although for a time it might stimulate both, would, in its consequences, levy a perpetual tax on posterity, and impede the progress of invention itself.

675. Yet, to deny to inventors the fair profits derivable from their talents and exertions, seemed to be at variance with the dictates of natural justice and liberal policy, as it was, in effect, to deny to genius its appropriate reward; and to withhold from the powers of intellect, one of the strongest stimulants to their activity.

676. The existing Statute, enacted in the reign of Queen Anne, limiting the rights of authors and inventors to a term of years, was regarded as a compromise by which their claims were acknowledged, their rights defined and protected, and their reward secured; whilst a public interest was effectually created, and its benefit transmitted to posterity.

677. With this Statute, and this decision before them, and with a full knowledge of the principles and policy on which both were founded, the several States ceded to Congress the power "to promote the progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing, for limited times, to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their writings and discoveries."

678. The English Law had limited the right to a term of years; the Power ceded by the Federal Constitution was to secure it for limited times; the former restricting the right to a definite term; the latter adopting the same principle, but leaving the quantum of interest to the discretion of Congress.

679. In execution of this power, several Acts have been passed by Congress, and are now in force, defining the times for which the exclusive rights of authors and inventors to their respective writings and discoveries, shall be enjoyed, and securing them in such enjoyment for different periods in different

cases.

680. The object, therefore, of this provision of the Constitution, and of the Laws enacted under it, was twofold; first, to secure to inventors and authors a reward for their genius, by granting them an exclusive privilege for limited times; and secondly, to secure to the public the benefit of their inventions, by bringing the property in them into the common stock, after the expiration of the exclusive grant.

681. This double object can only be effected by such a construction of the Constitution as will leave to Congress the exclusive power of legislation on the subject; although it has been held in some of the State Courts that the power is concurrent and may be exercised by the State legislatures, provided their laws do not contravene the Acts of Congress.

682. Prior to the adoption of the Federal Consti tution, legislative Acts in favour of valuable discoveries and improvements had been passed in some of the States; but their efficacy being confined to the respective limits of those States, the privileges they conferred were of little value; and it was provided in the first Act of the National legislature, in relation to the subject, that the applicant for the benefit of the national protection, should surrender his right under any State Law.

683. Hence it seems to have been supposed that Congress could not effectually.secure the exclusive rights of authors and inventors, without the exercise of an exclusive power of legislation on the subject ; and the necessity of such a power was an adequate reason for vesting it in the paramount authority of the Union.

684. The power under consideration falls under that class of cases, in which the exercise of a similar power by the States would be repugnant and contradictory to the power vested in Congress; and in relation to its particular objects, the power of Congress seems to be necessarily exclusive, both from the terms, and the nature, of the grant.

685. The power of Congress being to secure the exclusive rights of authors and inventors for limited times, a concurrent power in a State over the subject, must arise from the unceded portion of its sovereignty, and must consequently be a power without limit of time; but Congress could not secure to the inventor for a limited time the enjoyment of that which a State might grant to another forever.

686. The power of Congress seems, moreover, to be exclusive, in this case, from the nature of the grant;

because if each of the States have a concurrent right, its exercise by them would defeat the twofold object of the grant; which was to secure to the public the benefit and transmission of invention, as well as to reward authors and inventors for their productions and discoveries.

687. If the individual States have a concurrent power with the United States, it is evident that neither of those objects can be secured by Congress, for if Congress prescribe fourteen years as the limit of exclusive rights, and render them common at the expiration of that period; each State might fix a different period, or might secure a right of property to authors or inventors without limitation of time; or might reduce the term of exclusive enjoyment to a minimum, or even declare their writings and discoveries to be common property.

688. If a State in the exercise of any of the independent powers of legislation retained by it, comes into collision with this power of Congress, and privileges granted by the respective authorities of a State, and of the Union come into actual conflict, and are found repugnant or irreconcileable with each other, the State Law, or the right or privilege claimed under it, must, as in other cases of collision, yield to the superior power of Congress.

689. As a coasting licence not only ascertains the National character and the ownership of the vessel, but confers a right of Navigation ;-and as a right to import goods involves the right to sell them; so a Patent or a Copyright not only ascertains the title of the Patentee as an inventor or an author, but confers on him a paramount right of using, and vending to others to use, his discoveries or writings.

690. There is this distinction, however, between