625. The Cumberland road was constructed under a covenant with the State of Ohio, that a portion of the proceeds of public lands lying within that State, should be applied to the opening of roads leading to it, with the consent of the States through which the road might pass.

626. But after the expenditures upon that road had exceeded the proceeds of the lands appropriated for its construction, bills passed by both houses of Congress at different times, appropriating funds for continuing it, as well as subsequent bills for similar objects, were severally objected to by successive Presidents of the United States, and eventually lost upon their return with the objections to Congress.

627. The Executive Department denied on those occasions, any such Constitutional power in Congress as the respective Bills assumed to exist; or that such power could be vested in the National Legislature, by the Act of a State consenting to its exercise.

628. Congress, however, still claim the power to lay out, construct, and improve Post roads and Military roads, with the assent of the States through which they pass, as well as to construct Canals through the several States, for promoting and securing internal Commerce, and for the more safe and economical transportation of troops and military stores in time of war; leaving the jurisdictional right over the soil to the respective States.

629. By an Act passed with the assent of the Executive in 1824, the necessary surveys, plans, and estimates, were authorized to be made of such roads and canals, as the President might deem of national importance, or necessary for the transportation of the public mail; and a large sum of money was ap

propriated from the Treasury for defraying the expences incurred by the execution of this Law..

630. But in the year 1830 a Bill passed by both Houses appropriating a sum of money from the Treasury as a Subscription to the Stock of a Turnpike road exclusively within a State, was returned with objections by the President, and was finally lost in the House of Representatives, in which it had originated.

631. The objections of the President to this particular appropriation were founded on the principle that Congress were not authorized to appropriate money to any other objects than such as were included amongst the enumerated powers vested in the National Government; and he, moreover, considered that the work proposed to be aided did not fall within any of those powers, as it was of a local and State, and not of a general and national charac

ter.

632. This distinction seems conformable to the principle already stated, that "the action of the General Government may be applied to all the external concerns of the Nation, and to those internal concerns which affect the States generally; but not to those which are completely within a particular State, which do not affect other States, and with which it is not necessary to interfere for the purpose of executing any of the general powers of the Government."

633. The Power "to coin money, and to regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coins," is rendered exclusive by a subsequent provision of the Constitution prohibiting the individual States from its exercise; whilst the power of fixing the Standard of

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weights and measures," seems also, for the sake of uniformity, proper for the exclusive exercise by Congress; but as they have not legislated on this subject, it is presumed that, until they do, each State retains the right of adopting and regulating its own standard.

634. The power of coining money is one of the ordinary prerogatives of Sovereignty, and is almost universally exercised in order to preserve a proper circulation of good coin of a known value; and to secure it from debasements, it is necessary that it should be exclusively under the control and regula~ tion of the Government.

635. The object of vesting this power in Congress, was to produce uniformity of value throughout the Union, and it is obvious that the exclusive possession of this power by the General Government, could alone secure a wholesome and uniform National currency; and prevent the embarrassments, vexations, and frauds, which the varying standards and regulations of the different States would introduce in the course of trade.

636. The Power of Congress "to provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the public securities and current coin of the United States," necessarily follows the powers to borrow money and regulate the coin; as, without this, the preceding powers would be devoid of any adequate sanction.

637. This Power seems to be exclusive of that of the States, as it is an appropriate means afforded by the Constitution to carry into effect other delegated powers not antecedently existing in the States; yet it appears to be taken for granted by the Acts of Congress relative to the offences in question, that

cognizance of them may, under certain circumstances, be concurrently exercised by the State Courts.

638. The Power" to establish an uniform system of Naturalization," is necessarily exclusive, especially as it is provided in a subsequent part of the Constitution, that "the Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of Citizens in the several States;" and accordingly this power has been judicially held to be exclusive, on the ground of its direct repugnancy or incompatibility with the exercise of a similar power by the States.

639. The Constitution contains no definition of the character of a Citizen; but the term is used in plain reference to the Common Law, which is regarded not only as the means or instrument of exercising the jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution, but in many instances must be resorted to as the interpreter of its meaning.

640. At the time the Constitution was adopted, the Citizens of each State, collectively, constituted the Citizens of the United States; and were either Native Citizens, or those born within the United States, or naturalized Citizens, or persons born elsewhere, but who, upon assuming the allegiance, had become entitled to the privileges, of native Citizens.

641. All who were resident Citizens at the time of the Declaration of Independence, and deliberately yielded to that measure an express or implied sanction, became parties to it, and are to be considered as natives; their social tie being coeval with the Nation itself.

642. All persons born within the Colonies whilst subject to the British Crown, were natural-born Bri

tish subjects; and it necessarily follows, that this character was changed by the separation of the Colonies from the parent State, and the subsequent acknowledgment of their independence.

643. The rule, as to the point of time at which Americans born before the separation, ceased to be British subjects, differs in the United States and in England; that established by the Courts in England adopts the date of the Treaty of Peace in 1783, whilst the Federal tribunals have fixed upon the date of the Declaration of Independence.

644. The settled doctrine in the United States is, that a person who left the country before the Declaration of Independence, and never returned, thereby became an Alien; and, as a general rule, the character in which Americans born before the Revolution are to be considered, depends on the situation of the party, and the election made by him, at the Declaration of Independence, according to our rule, and at the Treaty of Peace, according to the British rule.

645. Difficulties have occurred in cases where rights have accrued between these dates; but if the right of election be admitted at all, it must be determined by what took place during the Revolution, and between the Declaration of Independence and the Treaty of Peace.

646. It is the doctrine of the English Law, that natural-born subjects owe an allegiance which is intrinsic and perpetual, and cannot be divested by any act of their own; but it is a question which has been. frequently and gravely debated in the Courts, whether this doctrine applies in its full extent to the United States.

647. The best writers upon public Law, although