assume a more exalted position, and, immediately afterwards his Department was subdivided and placed under the command of different Generals. The "Department of West Tennessee" was assigned to General Grant, with Corinth as his head-quarters. From its creation, however, until the middle of September, with the exception of a few skirmishes which invariably terminated in the success of the Union troops, there was no fighting, nor indeed any military movements of importance.

During this interval, however, two important orders were issued by General Grant, the first of which was promulgated on the eleventh of August, and was worded as follows:

HEAD-QUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF WEST TENNESSEE, “CORINTH, MISSs., August 11th, 1862.

"The recent Act of Congress prohibits the army from returning fugitives from labor to their claimants, and authorizes the employment of such persons in the service of the government. The following orders are therefore published for the guidance of the army in this matter.

"1. All fugitives thus employed must be registered; the names of the fugitives and claimant given, and must be borne upon the morning report of the command in which they are kept, showing how they are employed.

"2. Fugitives may be employed as laborers in the quartermaster's, subsistence, and engineer's department; and whenever by such employment a soldier may be saved to its ranks, they may be employed as teamsters and as company cooks, not exceeding four to a company, or as hospital attendants and nurses. Officers may employ them as private servants, in which latter case the fugitives will not be paid or rationed by the government. Negroes thus employed must be secured as authorized persons, and will be excluded from the camps.

3. Officers and soldiers are positively prohibited from enticing slaves to leave their masters. When it becomes necessary to employ this kind of labor, the commanding officer of the post or troops must send details, all under the charge of a suitable commissioned officer, to press into service the slaves of persons to the number required.

"4. Citizens within reach of any military station, known to be disloyal and dangerous, may be ordered away or arrested, and their crops and stock taken for the benefit of the government or the use of the army.

"5. All property taken from rebel owners must be duly reported and used for the benefit of the government, and be issued to the troops through the proper department, and, when practicable, the act of taking should be accompanied by the written certificate of the officer so taking to the owner or agent of such property.

"It is enjoined on all commanders to see that this order is executed strictly under their own direction. The demoralization of troops subsequent upon being left to execute laws in their own way without a proper head must be avoided.

"By command of

"JOHN A. RAWLINS, A. A. G."

· Major-General Grant.

The other, intended for a number of disreputable characters who had fled from their respective States to Tennessee to escape the draft, read as follows:

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HEAD-QUARTERS, Department of WEST TENNESSEE, CORINTH, MISS., August 16th, 1862. "1. All non-residents of this department, found within the same, who, if at home, would be subjected to draft, will at once be enrolled under the supervision of the local commanders where they may be found, and, in case of a draft being made by their respective States, an equal proportion will be drawn from persons thus enrolled. Persons so drawn will at once be assigned to troops from the States to which they owe military service, and the executive thereof notified of such draft.

"2. All violation of trade by army followers may be punished by confiscation of stock in trade, and the assignment of offenders to do military duty as private soldiers.

"By command of "Major-General U. S. GRANT. "JOHN A. RAWLINS, A. A. G."

THE BATTLE OF IUKA-GENERAL GRANT'S OFFICIAL REPORT.

In the early part of September, 1862, the rebel forces having been greatly strengthened, commenced an advance towards the positions occupied by General Grant's army, a portion of their number at the same time being sent northward to threaten Cincinnati. Their movements, however, were well known to General Grant, who made such dispositions of his men as would thwart their designs in Tennessee, and he also sent several of his regiments to defend Cincinnati.

On the seventeenth of September, 1862, he ordered a general advance towards Iuka, where the rebel General Sterling Price had concentrated his army, and two days later the advance of General Hamilton's division encountered the enemy's pickets and drove them back. This was the commencement of the fiercely-contested battle of Juka, the official report of which, made by General Grant to the War Department, was as follows:

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'HEAD-QUARTERS, DISTRICT WEST TENNESSEE, "JACKSON, TENN., October 22d, 1862.

"Colonel J. C. Kelton, A. A. G., Washington, D. C.:

COLONEL-I have the honor to make the following report of the battle of luka, and to submit herewith such reports of subordinates as have been received.

"For some ten days or more before the final move of the rebel army under General Price, eastward from the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, it was evident that an attack upon Corinth was contemplated, or some change to be made in the location of that army. This caused great vigilance to be necessary on the part of our cavalry, especially that to the southern front under Colonel Mizner. The labor of watching, with occasional skirmishing, was most satisfactorily performed, and almost every move of the enemy was known as soon as commenced.

"About the 11th of September, Price left the railroad, the infantry and artillery probably moving from Baldwin, and the cavalry from the roads north of Baldwin, toward Bay Springs. At the latter place a halt of a few days seems to have been made; likely for the purpose of collecting stores, and reconnoitering on eastern flank. On the 13th of September, the enemy's cavalry made their appearance near Inka, and were repulsed by the small garrison under Colonel Murphy, of the Eighth Wisconsin infantry, still left there to cover the removal of stores not yet brought into Corinth. The enemy appearing again in increased force on the same day, and having cut the railroad and telegraph between there and Burnsville, Colonel Murphy thought it prudent to retire to save his forces.

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This caused a considerable amount of commissary stores to fall into the hands of the enemy, which property should have been destroyed. Price's whole force soon congregated at Inka. Information brought in by scouts, as to the intention of the enemy, was conflicting. One report was, that Price wanted to cross Bear creek and the Tennessee river, for the purpose of crossing Tennessee and getting into Kentucky. Another, that Van Dorn was to march by way of Ripley and attack us on the southwest, while Price should move on us from the east or north

west.

A third, that Price would endeavor to cross the Tennessee, and, if pursuit was attempted, Van Dorn was in readiness to attack Corinth.

"Having satisfied myself that Van Dorn could not reach Corinth under four days, with an army embracing all arms, I determined to leave Corinth with a force sufficient to resist cavalry, and to attack Price at Iuka. This I regarded as eminently my duty, let either of the enemy's plans be the correct solution. Accordingly, on the 16th, I gave some general directions as to the plan of operations.

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General Rosecrans was to move on the south side of the railroad to opposite Iuka, and attack from that side with all his available force, after leaving a sufficient force at Rienzi and Jacinto, to prevent the surprise on Corinth from that direction. Major-General Ord was to move to Burnsville, and from there take roads north of the railroad and attack from that side. General Ord having to leave from his two divisions, already very much reduced in numbers, from long-continued service and the number of battles they had been in, the garrison at Corinth; he also had one regiment of infantry and a squadron of cavalry at Kossuth, one regiment of infantry and one company of cavalry at Cheuvall, and one regiment of infantry that moved, under Colonel Mower, and joined General Rosecrans' command, reduced the number of men of his command, available to the expedition, to about 30,000.

"I had previously ordered the infantry of General Ross' command at Bolivar to hold themselves in readiness to move at a moment's warning; had also directed the concentration of cars at Jackson to move these troops.

"Within twenty-four hours from the time a despatch left Corinth for those troops to come on,' they had arrived-3,400 in number. This, notwithstanding the locomotive was thrown off the track on the Mississippi Central Road, preventing the passage of other trains for several hours. This force was added to General Ord's command, making his entire strength over 6,000 to take into the field. From this force two regiments of infantry and one section of artillery were taken, about nine hundred men, for the garrison or rear guard, to be held at Burnsville. Not having General Ord's report, these figures may not be accurate. General Rosecrans was moving from Jacinto eastward, with about 9,000 men, making my total force with which to attack the enemy about 15,000. This was equal to or greater than their number, as I estimated them.

"General Rosecrans, at his suggestion, acquiesced in by me, was to move northward from his eastern march in two columus -one, under Hamilton, was to move up the Fulton and Eastport road; the other, under Stauley, où the Jacinto road from Barnett's.

"On the 18th, General Ord's command was pushed forward,

driving in the enemy's pickets and capturing a few prisoners, taking position within six miles of Iuka. I expected, from the following despatch, that General Rosecrans would be near enough by the night of the 18th to make it safe for Ord to press forward on the morning of the 19th, and bring on an engagement:

"September 18th, 1862.

"One of my spies, in from Reardon's, on the Bay Spring Road, tells of a continuous movement, since last Friday, of forces eastward. They say Van Dorn is to defend Vicksburg, Breckinridge to make his way to Kentucky, Price to attack luka or go to Tennessee. If Price's forces are at Iuka, the plan I propose is, to move up as close as we can to-night, conceal our movements; Ord to advance from Burnsville, commence the attack, and draw their attention that way, while I move in on the Jacinto and Fulton road, and, crushing in their left, cut off their retreat eastward.

"I propose to leave, in ten minutes, for Jacinto, whence I will despatch you by line of videttes to Burnsville. Will wait a few minutes to hear from you before I start. What news from

Burnsville?

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"'Signed:

"W. S. ROSECRANS,
"Brigadier-General.'

"To which I sent the following reply:

"HEAD-QUARTERS, DISTRICT WEST TENNESSEE, "Burnsville, MISS., September 18th, 1862.

"GENERAL ROSECRANS:

"General Ross' command is at this place, McArthur's divi· sion is north of the road, two miles to the rear, and Davis' division south of the road, north. I sent forward two regiments of infantry, with cavalry, by the road north of the railroad toward Iuka, with instructions for them to bivouac for the night at a point, which was designated, about four miles from here, if not interrupted, and have the cavalry feel where the enemy are. Before they reached the point on the road (you will see it on the map-the road north of the railroad), they met what was supposed to be Armstrong's cavalry. The rebel cavalry were forced back, and I sent instructions there to have them stop for the night where they thought they could safely hold.

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"In the morning troops will advance from here at 43 A.M. An anonymous despatch, just received, states that Price, Magruder, and Breckinridge have a force of 60,000 between Iuka and Tupelo. This, I have no doubt, is the understanding of citizens, but I very much doubt this information being correct.. Your reconnoissances prove that there is but little force south of Corinth for a long distance, and no great force between Bay Spring and the railroad. Make as rapid an advance as you can, and let us do to-morrow all we can. It may be necessary to