forward as soon as possible, explaining to them the position of Logan's division. Proceeding still further forward, expecting every moment to see the enemy, and reaching what had been his line, I found he was retreating. Arriving at the Raymond road, I saw to my left and on the next ridge a column of troops which proved to be Carr's division and McClernand with it in person; and to the left of Carr, Osterhaus's division soon afterward appeared with his skirmishers well in advance. I sent word to Osterhaus that the enemy was in full retreat, and to push up with all haste. The situation was soon explained, after which I ordered Carr to pursue with all speed to Black river and across it if he could, and to Osterhaus to follow. Some of McPherson's troops had already got into the road in advance, but having marched and engaged the enemy all day, they were fatigued and gave the road to Carr, who continued the pursuit until after dark, capturing a train of cars loaded with commissary and ordnance stores and other property.

"The delay in the advance of the troops immediately with McClernand was caused, no doubt, by the enemy presenting a front of artillery and infantry, where it was impossible, from the nature of the ground and the density of the forest, to discover his numbers. As it was, the battle of Champion's Hill, or Baker's Creek, was fought mainly by Hovey's division of McClernand's corps, and Logan's and Quinby's division (the latter commanded by Brigadier-General M. M. Crocker) of McPherson's corps.

"Ransom's brigade, of McPherson's corps, came on to the field where the main battle had been fought immediately after the enemy had begun his retreat.

"Word was sent to Sherman, at Bolton, of the result of the day's engagement, with directions to turn his corps toward Bridgeport; and to Blair to join him at this latter place.

"At daylight, on the seventeenth, the pursuit was renewed, with McClernand's corps in the advance. The enemy was found strongly posted on both sides of the Black river. At this point on Black river the bluffs extend to the water's edge on the west bank. On the east side is an open, cultivated bottom of near one mile in width, surrounded by a bayou of stagnant water, from two to three feet in depth, and from ten to twenty feet in width, from the river above the railroad to the river below. Following the inside line of the bayou the enemy had constructed rifle-pits, with the bayou to serve as a ditch on the outside and immediately in front of them. Carr's division occupied the right in investing this place, and Lawler's brigade the right of his division. After a few hours' skirmishing, Lawler discovered that by moving a portion of his brigade under cover of the river bank, he could get a position from which that place could be successfully assaulted, and ordered a charge accordingly. Notwithstanding the level ground over which a portion of his troops had to pass without cover, and the great obstacle of the ditch

in front of the enemy's works, the charge was gallantly and successfully made, and in a few minutes the entire garrison with seventeen pieces of artillery were the trophies of this brilliant and daring movement. The enemy on the west bank of the river immediately set fire to the railroad bridge and retreated, thus cutting off all chance of escape for any portion of his forces remaining on the east bank.

Sherman, by this time, had reached Bridgeport, on Black river above. The only pontoon train with the expedition was with him. By the morning of the eighteenth he had crossed the river, and was ready to march on Walnut Hills. McClernand and McPherson built floating bridges during the night, and had them ready for crossing their commands by eight A.M. of the eighteenth.

"The march was commenced by Sherman at an early hour by the Bridgeport and Vicksburg road, turning to the right when within three and a half miles of Vicksburg, to get possession of Walnut Hills aud Yazoo river. This was successfully accomplished before the night of the eighteenth. McPherson crossed Black river above the Jackson road, and came into the same road with Sherman, but to his rear. He arrived after nightfall with his advance to where Sherman turned to the right. McCler. nand moved by the Jackson and Vicksburg road to Mount Albans, and there turned to the left to get into Baldwin's Ferry road. By this disposition the three army corps covered all the ground their strength would admit of, and by the morning of the nineteenth, the investment of Vicksburg was made as complete as could be by the forces under my command.

"During the day there was continuous skirmishing, and I was not without hope of carrying the enemy's works. Relying upon the demoralization of the enemy in consequence of repeated defeats outside of Vicksburg, I ordered a general assault at two P.M. on this day.

"The Fifteenth army corps, from having arrived in front of the enemy's works in time on the eighteenth to get a good position, were enabled to make a vigorous assault. The Thirteenth and Seventeenth corps succeeded no further than to gain advanced positions, covered from the fire of the enemy. The twentieth and twenty-first were spent in perfecting communications with our supplies. Most of the troops had been marching and fighting battles for twenty days, on an average of about five days' rations, drawn from the commissary department. Though they had not suffered from short rations up to this time, the want of bread to accompany the other rations was beginning to be much felt. On the twenty-first my arrangements for drawing supplies of every description being complete, I determined to make another effort to carry Vicksburg by assault. There were many reasons to determine me to adopt this course. I believed an assault from the position gained by this time could be made

successfully. It was known that Johnston was at Canton with the force taken by him from Jackson, reinforced by other troops from the east, and that more were daily reaching him. With the force I had, a short time must have enabled him to attack me in the rear, and possibly succeeded in raising the siege. Possession of Vicksburg at that time would have enabled me to have turned upon Johnston and driven him from the State, and possess myself of all the railroads and practical military highways, thus effectually securing to ourselves all territory west of the Tombigbee, and this before the season was too far advanced for campaigning in this latitude. I would have saved Government sending large reinforcements, much needed elsewhere; and, finally, the troops themselves were impatient to possess Vicksburg, and would not have worked in the trenches with the same zeal, believing it unnecessary, that they did after their failure to carry the enemy's works. Accordingly on the twenty-first orders were issued for a general assault on the whole line, to commence at ten A.M. on the twenty-second. All the corps commanders set their time by mine, that there should be no difference between them in movement of assault. Promptly at the hour designated, the three army corps, then in front of the enemy's works, commenced the assault. I had taken a commanding position near McPherson's front, and from which I could see all the advancing columns from his corps, and a part of each of Sherman's and McClernand's. A portion of the commands of each succeeded in planting their flags on the outer slopes of the enemy's bastions, and maintained them there until night. Each corps had many more men than could possibly be used in the assault, over such ground as intervened between them and the enemy. More men could only avail in case of breaking through the enemy's line, or in repelling a sortie. The assault was gallant in the extreme on the part of all the troops, but the enemy's position was too strong, both naturally and artificially, to be taken in that way. At every point assaulted, and at all of them at the same time, the enemy was able to show all the force his works could cover. The assault failed, I regret to say, with much loss on our side in killed and wounded; but without weakening the confidence of the troops in their ability to ultimately succeed.

"No troops succeeded in entering any of the enemy's works, with the exception of Sergeant Griffith, of the Twenty-first Iowa volunteers, and some eleven privates of the same regiment. Of these, none returned except the Sergeant and, possibly, one man. The work entered by him, from its position, could give us no practical advantage, unless others to the right and left of it were carried and held at the same time.

"About twelve M., I received a despatch from McClernand, that he was hard pressed at several points; in reply to which I directed him to reinforce the points hard pressed from such

troops as he had that were not engaged. I then rode round to Sherman, and had just reached there, when I received a second despatch from McClernand, stating positively and unequivocally that he was in possession of and still held two of the enemy's forts; that the American flag then waved over them; and asking me to have Sherman and McPherson make a diversion in his favor. This despatch I showed to Sherman, who immediately ordered a renewal of the assault on his front. I also sent an answer to McClernand, directing him to order up McArthur to his assistance, and started immediately to the position I had just left, on McPherson's line, to convey to him the information from McClernand by this last despatch, that he might make the diversion requested. Before reaching McPherson I met a messenger with a third despatch from McClernand, of which the following is a copy:

"HEAD-QUARTERS, THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS

"IN THE FIELD, NEAR VICKSBURG, MISS., May 22d, 1863. "GENERAL: We have gained the enemy's intrenchments at several points, but are brought to a stand. I have sent word to McArthur to reinforce me if he can. Would it not be best to concentrate the whole or a part of his command on this point? 'JOHN A. McCLERNAND, "Major-General Commanding.

666

"MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. GRANT.' "P.S.-I have just received your despatch. My troops are all engaged, and I cannot withdraw any to reinforce others.

666 McC.'

"The position occupied by me during most of the time of the assault gave me a better opportunity of seeing what was going on in front of the Thirteenth army corps than I believed it possible for the commander of it to have. I could not see his possession of forts, nor necessity for reinforcements, as represented in his despatches, up to the time I left it, which was between twelve м., and one P.M., and I expressed doubts of their correctness, which doubt the facts subsequently, but too late, confirmed. At the time I could not disregard his reiterated statements, for they might possibly be true; and that no possible opportunity of carrying the enemy's stronghold should be allowed to escape through fault of mine, I ordered Quinby's division, which was all of McPherson's corps then present, but four brigades, to report to McClernand, and notify him of the order. I showed his despatches to McPherson, as I had to Sherman, to satisfy him of the necessity of an active diversion on their part to hold as much force in their fronts as possible. The diversion was promptly and vigorously made, and resulted in the increase of our mortality list full fifty per cent., without advancing our position or giving us other advantages.

"About half-past three P.M., I received McClernand's fourth despatch, as follows:

"HEAD-QUARTERS, THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS,

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'May 22d, 1863. "GENERAL: I have received your despatch in regard to General Quinby's division and General McArthur's division. As soon as they arrive I will press the enemy with all possible speed, and doubt not I will force my way through. I have lost no ground. My men are in two of the enemy's forts, but they are commanded by rifle-pits in the rear. Several prisoners have been taken, who intimate that the rear is strong. At this moment I am hard pressed. JOHN A. McCLERNAND, "Major-General Commanding.

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"MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. GRANT,

"Department of the Tennessee.'

"The assault of this day proved the quality of the soldiers of this army. Without entire success, and with a heavy loss, there was no murmuring or complaining, no falling back, nor other evidence of demoralization.

"After the failure of the twenty-second, I determined upon a regular siege. The troops now being fully awake to the necessity of this, worked diligently and cheerfully. The work progressed rapidly and satisfactorily until the third of July, when all was about ready for a final assault.

"There was a great scarcity of engineer officers in the beginning, but under the skilful superintendence of Captain F. E. Prime, of the Engineer corps, Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson, of my staff, and Captain C. B. Comstock, of the Engineer corps, who joined this command during the siege, such practical experience was gained as would enable any division of this army hereafter to conduct a siege with considerable skill in the absence of regular engineer officers.

"On the afternoon of the third of July a letter was received from Lieutenant-General Pemberton, commanding the confederate forces at Vickburg, proposing an armistice, and the appointment of commissioners to arrange terms for the capitulation of the place. The correspondence, copies of which are herewith transmitted, resulted in the surrender of the city and garrison of Vicksburg at ten o'clock A.M., July fourth, 1863, on the following terms: The entire garrison, officers and men, were to be paroled, not to take up arms against the United States until exchanged by the proper authorities; officers and men each to be furnished with a parole, signed by himself; officers to be allowed their side-arms and private baggage, and the field, staff, and cavalry officers one horse each; the rank and file to be allowed all their clothing, but no other property; rations from their own stores sufficient to last them beyond our lines; the necessary cooking utensils for preparing their food; and thirty wagons to transport such articles as could not well be carried These terms I regarded more favorable to the Government than