Will. 4. c. 45. s. 26, to entitle him to be regis-
tered as a voter in respect of his interest in
the same until he had actually received such
rent or some part thereof. Webster v. The
Overseers of Ashton-under-Lyne-Orme's Case,
C.P., 38

-

rent-

rent-

PARLIAMENT (continued) — county vote:
charge: actual possession: previous decisions]
-Where the conveyance granting a
charge operates under the Statute of Uses,
27 Hen. 8. c. 10, the person to whose use
the rent-charge is granted is, by force of the
statute, in the actual possession of such rent-
charge, within the meaning of section 26 of
the Reform Act, 2 Will. 4. c. 45, as soon
as the grant is executed, according to the
decision in Heelis v. Blain, which the Court
followed. Webster v. The Overseers of Ashton-
under-Lyne; Hadfield's Case, C.P., 146
Semble, the Court is not bound by its former
decision, though it is a Court of ultimate appeal
in registration cases, and its decision in such
cases is made final by 6 & 7 Vict. c. 18. s. 66;
but the Court will not overrule such former
decision unless it be shewn to be clearly wrong.
Ibid.

·county vote: qualification: incapacity: peer
of Parliament]-A peer of Parliament is in-
capacitated by law from voting at elections for
members of the House of Commons, and is
therefore not entitled to have his name on the
register of voters. Earl Beauchamp v. The
Overseers of Madresfield; Marquis of Salisbury
v. The Overseers of South Mimms; Same v.
Bontems; Same v. Bulwer, C.P., 32

county vote: qualification for borough vote]
-A., a minister of a church, was stated to have,
as minister, such a freehold interest in the rents
received from the letting of pews in the church
as entitled him to a vote for the county. He
occupied as such minister the parsonage house,
and in respect of such occupation acquired a
right to a vote for the borough:-Held, that
there was no such unity of occupation as would,
according to section 24 of 2 Will. 4. c. 45, dis-
entitle A. to the county vote. Beswick v.
Alker, C.P., 26

county vote: rating members of a firm: des-
cription on rate amendable as inaccurate]-A.,
who had been solely rated in respect of the pre-
mises occupied by him in his business, got the
overseers to alter the rating to "A. & Sons
on the occasion of his taking his two sons into
partnership, and carrying on business with them
on the said premises under the partnership
name of " A. & Sons." When A. retired from
the business, which he did some time after-
wards, the two sons continued the business under
the same name of "A. & Sons," and paid the
rates when called for:-Held, that the sons
were rated within the meaning of section 6 of the
Representation of the People Act, 1867 (30

& 31 Vict. c. 102), being described on the rate,
though inaccurately, by the partnership name,
and that such inaccuracy was cured by 6 & 7
Vict. c. 18. sec. 75. Little v.
Overseers of
Penrith, C.P., 28

county vote occupation franchise: rateable
value]-The rateable value of the premises re-
quired by section 6, sub-section 2 of the Re-
presentation of the People Act, 1867 (30 &
31 Vict. c. 102), for the 121. occupation fran-
chise in counties, is the real rateable value
(which the Revising Barrister is at liberty to
ascertain for himself), and is not necessarily
the value at which such premises are rated in
the rate-book. Cooke v. Butler, C.P., 25

county vote: inmates of a hospital: interest
in land: rent-charge: tenement]-A hospital,
consisting of a master and three "ancient
brethren," was incorporated, and by the terms
of its constitution, as afterwards regulated by
statute, its revenues, derived from lands vested
in the corporation, were received by the master,
who annually, after paying thereout taxes and
other outgoings and reserving one-third to
himself, was to pay 25l. to each of the three
ancient brethren, 70l. to the chaplain, and after
reserving a balance, not exceeding 60., to
meet current expenses, was to divide the residue
between certain other brethren called " "younger
brethren," who were added to the number of
the brethren from time to time, as the revenues
of the charity increased, but no younger brother
was to take under such division more than 25%.,
and the surplus, if any, was left to accumulate
until further additional brethren were ap-
pointed:-Held, that the younger brethren had
no equitable estate in the lands of the hospital
and that the annual payment to which they were
entitled, not being a rent-charge nor a free tene-
ment within the statute 8 Hen. 6. c. 7, they were
not entitled to the county franchise. Simey v.
Marshall, C.P., 49

-consolidated appeal: notice to respondent]—
A consolidated case of appeal, naming the re-
turning officer of a borough as respondent, was
signed on the 31st of October; notice of appeal
was not given to him till the 4th of November;
the first day appointed for hearing appeals was
the 13th of November:-Held (the respondent
not appearing), that the appeal could not be
heard. Brown v. Tamplin, C.P., 37

PARTIES-to actions. See Amendment. Carriers
by Railway. Marine Insurance.

PATENT-effect of dating back grant of patent to day
of application]-To an action for infringing
letters patent granted to the plaintiff and sealed
as of the date of his application for the same,
it was held to be no answer that the alleged
infringements were done in exercise of certain
letters patent for a similar invention granted

to the defendant and sealed as of a subsequent
date, i.e., the date of his application for the
same, although the complete specification of the
plaintiff's patent was not filed in the patent
office till after the defendant's specification had
been filed. Saxby v. Kennet, Ex., 137

PAWNBROKER-loss of ticket]—A person who had
pledged goods, having unknowingly given the
ticket amongst other matters to a third person,
obtained under the (now repealed) statute, 39 &
40 Geo. 3. c. 99. ss. 15, 16, the form of affidavit,
&c., therein mentioned, went immediately with
it to a magistrate as therein provided, and
shewed it afterwards to the pawnbroker:-
Held, that under that statute the pawnbroker
was not justified in afterwards delivering the
goods to the ticket-holder, as the ticket was
"lost or mislaid," and it was not necessary to
deliver the affidavit and redeem the goods.
Burslem v. Attenborough, C.P., 102

PAYMENT-proof of. See Evidence. Executor.
PAYMENT INTO COURT-bond to secure payment of
money by instalments: penalty]-Plaintiff sued
for the penalty in a bond conditioned for avoid-
ance if half the penalty with interest were paid
by instalments on several fixed days, and alleged
as a breach the non-payment of one of the instal-
ments, the time for the payment of the sub-
sequent instalments not having yet arrived.
Defendant paid into Court the sum due in re-
spect of the one instalment, with interest :-
Held, a bad plea, such a bond not being within
section 25 of the Common Law Procedure Act,
1860. Preston v. Dania, Ex., 33

PEDLARS ACT-carrying a missionary basket is not
trading. Gregg v. Smith (M.C., 121), Q.B., 170
PENALTY-Local Government Act, 1858. Bye-
laws. Structure of party-walls. Continuing
offence. New buildings. Public Health Act, 1848.
Marshall v. Smith (M.C., 108), C.P., 155

Evidence of Scienter. Contagious Diseases
(Animals) Act, 1869. Animals Order of 1871,
part II. sect. 19. Discovery of Disease. Appeal
from Justices. Costs. Nicholls v. Hall (M.C.,
105), C.P., 157

A judgment for a sum of money obtained by
a pauper in receipt of relief is a valuable secu-
rity for money belonging to the pauper within
12 & 13 Vict. c. 103. s. 16. The Guardians of
the West Ham Union v. Owens (M.C. 29); Ex.,

15

POOR LAW AUDIT--Proceedings against overseer
to recover sum certified to be due. Certificate
of treasurer, R. v. Fordham (M.C., 153), Q.B.,

243

POOR RATE-Sunday and ragged schools (exemp-
tion from Rating) Act, 1869, 32 & 33 Vict. c. 40.
Discretion of rating authority. Bell v. Crane
(M.C., 122), Q.B., 155

Occupation. Rateable value. Cemetery.
Sale of plots of land. R. v. The Abney Park
Cemetery Co. (M.C., 124), Q.B., 245

Docks, warehouses, and machinery occupied
as one estate. Warehouses capable of beneficial
occupation apart from docks. Increased value
by connection with docks. Separate rating.
Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. The Over-
seers of the Poor of Birkenhead (M.C., 141),
Q.B., 236

PRACTICE new trial in Liverpool Court of Passage:
verification of assessor's signature to notes]-In
moving in the Court of Exchequer for rules for a
new trial or to enter a nonsuit in cases tried in
the Liverpool Court of Passage, a rule to shew
cause will not be granted unless either the coun-
sel moving was present at the trial, or the asses-
sor's notes are produced with an affidavit verify-
ing the assessor's signature. When cause is
shewn the assessor's notes must be produced with
a similar affidavit. Welsh v. Mercer, Ex., 52

See Amendment. Attachment of Debt. At-
torney and Solicitor. Bills of Exchange. Infe-
rior Court. Interrogatories. Jurisdiction.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT foreign correspondent:
commission agent: right of principal against
third person]-Where a foreign correspondent
instructs his English agents to order goods for
him in this country the person contracting with
the agent to supply such goods is not, although
he knew for whom the goods were intended,
liable to an action for breach of his contract
at the suit of the principal. Die Elbinger Actien-
Gesellschaft für Fabrication von eisenbahn-
Materiel v. Claye, Q.B., 151

contracting and signing as agent: evidence of
custom making agent liable]-Where a person
contracts in the body of a charter-party and
signs "as agent," his principal being undis-
closed, evidence is admissible to shew a custom
that he shall be personally liable if he does not
disclose his principal's name within a reasonable
time, Hutchinson v. Tatham, C.P., 260

See Stock Exchange.

PRINCIPAL AND SURETY

master and servant:
alteration of terms of service: discharge of
surety]-A bond was given by the obligor
as surety that a servant would from time
to time, and at all times during the service,
satisfactorily account for and pay over to
the master all moneys received by the ser-
vant for the master's use. One of the terms
of the service was that it should be terminable
by one month's notice on either side, but this
was not known to the surety. After the com-
mencement of the service the master and servant
agreed, without the knowledge of the surety,
that the service should be terminable at three
months' notice :-Held by KELLY, C.B., PIGOTT,
B., and POLLOCK, B., dubitante MARTIN, B., that
the surety was not discharged. But the ser-
vant having failed satisfactorily to account for
or pay over moneys which he had received for
the master's use, and the master, having with
knowledge and without informing the defendant
thereof, retained the servant in his service,-
Held, that the surety was discharged as to
defaults committed by the servant after he
was so retained. Sanderson v. Aston, Ex., 64

-joint and several debtor: release of debtor as
if discharged in bankruptcy: discharge of
surety]-Of two obligors of a joint and several
bond one executed it as surety for the other,
whereof the obligee then had notice. After-
wards, and without the consent of the surety,
the principal debtor by deed conveyed to the
obligee of the bond, as trustee for the creditors
of the principal debtor, all his estate to be
administered for the benefit of the creditors,
in like manner as if the principal debtor had
been at the date thereof duly adjudged bank-
rupt, and in consideration thereof each of the
creditors did thereby release the principal
debtor "from his and their respective debts in
like manner as if" the principal debtor "had
obtained a discharge in bankruptcy." The
obligee having sued the surety on the bond,—
Held, by KELLY, C.B., and BRAMWELL, B.
(dissentiente PIGOTT, B.), that the obligee by
executing the deed had released the surety.
Gragoe v. Jones, Ex., 68

PRISONER-Debtors Act: discharge: imprisonment
after judgment]—A defendant who has been ar-
rested and imprisoned before final judgment,
under the 6th section of the Debtors Act, 1869, is
entitled to be discharged under the 4th section
after final judgment has been obtained, notwith-
standing that the judgment is still unsatisfied, and
that the absence of the defendant from England
may prejudice the plaintiff in obtaining the fruits
of the judgment. Hume v. Druyff, Ex., 145
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION.

See Defamation.
PROHIBITION-Admiralty Court: cause of damage
by collision: foreign ship: sovereign potentate]—

The ship C. ran down the ship B. in the river
Thames. The C. was arrested under a warrant
of the Court of Admiralty issued in a cause
of damage instituted in the said Court on behalf
of the owners of the B. A rule nisi was granted
for a prohibition on the ground that the C. was
the property of the Khedive of Egypt. In
shewing cause against the rule, affidavits were
used alleging that the C. was, at the time of the
collision, in reality used for carrying cargo and
passengers. The Court declined to issue the
prohibition: the question whether or not the
C. was the property of a sovereign potentate,
so as by the law of nations to be exempt from
liability being one which might properly be
decided in the Court of Admiralty. In re The
Steam-ship Charkieh," Q.B., 75

inferior court jurisdiction: cause of action]
-The Mayor's Court of London being an in-
ferior Court, the whole cause of action must
arise within its jurisdiction, and therefore,
where a material fact necessary to be proved in
order to sustain the plaintiffs' case occurs out of
the jurisdiction of such Court, the garnishee
against whom process of foreign attachment
has been issued to attach moneys owing by him
to the defendant, is entitled to a prohibition
against such Court proceeding with the suit.
Cooke v. Gill, C.P., 98

QUARTER SESSIONS-Signature to notice of appeal.
R. v. The Justices of Kent (M.C., 211), Q.B., 170

Invalidity of rule of practice as to entry of
appeals. R. v. Paulett (M.C., 157), Q.B., 241

QUO WARRANTO-information in the nature of: want
of grievance: delay: discretion of court]-A rule
for an information, in the nature of a quo
warranto, in respect of an annual office of guar-
dian of the poor, the election to which was on
the 14th of May, on the ground that the mode
of election adopted was not a proper one, was
not applied for till the 13th of January fol-
lowing, and it was then not shewn that any
ratepayer had been prevented from voting, or
that the result of the election was affected by
the mode adopted. In the exercise of its dis-
cretion, the Court discharged the rule. R. v.
Cousins, Q.B., 124

irregularity immaterial as to the result]—
W. was chairman of a Local Board, and it
was his duty under 11 & 12 Vict. c. 63. s. 21
to conduct and complete the elections of mem-
bers for the ensuing year, and by the same
section if the chairman became unable to act,
some other person was to be appointed by the
Local Board to perform such of his duties as
then remained to be performed. F. was ap-
pointed by the Local Board to act as returning
officer in case of nomination of chairman as a
candidate. W. published a notice, fixing day of
election and day for receiving nomination papers.

He received a nomination paper nominating
himself, and afterwards continued to receive

other nomination papers. More candidates
were nominated than vacancies. W. filled up
the form of voting paper under section 23, and
sent it to be printed, with directions for the
printer to return it to F., and from that time
forward everything was done by F. W. was
elected, and returned by F. No improper
motive was imputed to W., nor did his acts
produce any inconvenience, or in any way in-
fluence the result of the election. The Court,
in the exercise of its discretion, refused leave
to file an information in the nature of a "quo
warranto." R. v. Ward, Q.B., 126

RAILWAY-Meaning of branch-line in Special Act.
See Covenant.

RAILWAY COMPANY-construction of special Act:
special services: tolls: six-mile clause]—A special
Act, relating to the above company, provided that
where goods were carried on the company's rail-
way, or partly on their railway and partly on some
other railway of which they were joint owners, or
which they had a right to use, for a less distance
than six miles, the company should be entitled to
take tolls as for six miles. The Act also pro-
vided that the tolls for goods carried over the
company's line and over portions of other lines
of which they were part owners, or which they
had a right to use, should be computed as if
the company's line and the said portions of the
said other lines formed one railway. Goods
were passed over the line of which the com-
pany were sole owners for a distance of less
than six miles; the same goods on their transit
to their ultimate destination passed over another
line of which the company was part owner for
a distance of more than six miles. This latter
line was under the sole management of another
company. The goods were accompanied by two
declaration notes, one made out in the name of
the first company and the other in the name of
the other company, but the station of ultimate
destination mentioned in both notes was the
same:-Held, that the company was not entitled
to split the contract, that the two lines must be
treated as one, and that the six-mile clause was
not applicable. Lancashire and Yorkshire Rail.
Co. v. Gidlow (H.L.), Ex., 129

The same Act of Parliament, while providing the
maximum rate of tolls to be charged, made an
exception in respect of special services to be
rendered by the company for loading, unloading,
collection and delivery of goods :-Held, that
the company were not entitled to charge for
special services, though found by a jury to have
been actually rendered by them; the customer
charged for such services, not having had the
offer and option first distinctly given him of
either availing himself of such services at the
company's rate of charge or of doing them him-
self, such services being incidental to the ordi-
nary business of a carrier, and such as the

customer, without notice, might have supposed
were covered by the company's charges for toll.
Ibid.

What is a branch railway. See Covenant.

Liability for wrongful conduct of servant.
See False Imprisonment.

Liability as Common Carriers, and for In-
juries to Passengers. See Carriers by Railway.
And see Negligence. Toll Traverse.

RAILWAY STATION-Wilful trespass on premises
connected therewith by a cab-driver. Foulger
v. Steadman (M.C., 3), Q.B., 16

RAILWAYS CLAUSES CONSOLIDATION ACT, 1845, s. 65
-Variation by Special Act. Revival of Gene-
ral Act. London, Chatham and Dover Railway
Co. v. Board of Works for the Wandsworth Dis-
trict (M.C., 70), C.P., 160

RENT-CHARGE-Conveyance of land charged: action
of debt for arrears: abolition of real actions] —
Plaintiff seized in fee of land granted it unto
and to the use of C., subject to the payment for
ever to plaintiff, his heirs and assigns, of a yearly
rent-charge payable out of the land. C. cove-
nanted for himself, &c., that he, his executors,
administrators and assigns would pay unto plain-
tiff, his heirs or assigns, the said rent-charge.
The land became vested in defendant, after
which the rent-charge fell in arrear:-Held,
that plaintiff might maintain an action of debt
against defendant for the arrears, the remedy
by real action having been taken away by 3 & 4
Will. 4. c. 27. s. 36. Thomas v. Sylvester, Q.B.,
237

is

REPLEVIN-recovery in, a bar to action for same
taking: trespass by tenant of tenant at suffer-
ance]-A judgment for plaintiff in replevin
a bar to an action for damages for the
same taking of the goods in respect of which
the replevin was brought. Gibbs v. Cruikshank,
C.P., 273

The tenant of a mortgagor, whose tenancy was
created after the mortgage, and has never been
recognised by the mortgagee, cannot maintain
trespass against the mortgagee for entering and
distraining on the land under the powers of the
mortgage. Ibid.

Defendants, a Scotch railway company, having
their line of railway and their principal office in
Scotland, employed an ordinary booking clerk
to issue tickets at the Carlisle station of the
Caledonian Railway, over the southernmost
portion of whose line defendants had running
powers-Held, that such clerk, although the
only officer of defendants resident in England,
was not a "head officer" or "clerk," within the
16th section of the Common Law Procedure
Act, 1852, so as to render service on him of an
ordinary writ of summons a good service on the
company. Mackreth v. The Glasgow and South-
Western Rail. Co., Ex., 82

SET-OFF. See Banker and Banking Company.
Husband and Wife.

SHARES-Registration of. See Married Woman.

Transfer of. See Company.

SHIPPING-insurance on chartered freight: loss of
freight where no total loss of ship]-By a charter-
party, which contained the usual exceptions of
dangers and accidents of navigation, the vessel
was to proceed with all convenient speed from
Liverpool to Newport, and there load a cargo of
iron rails for San Francisco, and the freight
was to be paid on right delivery of the cargo.
The vessel duly proceeded on her voyage from
Liverpool to Newport, but before arriving there
she took the rocks at Carnarvon Bay. She was
ultimately got off the rocks, and though the
damage she sustained was not such as to consti-
tute a total loss, either actual or constructive,
the time necessary for getting her off and re-
pairing her so as to be a cargo-carrying ship,
was so long as to put an end, in a commercial
sense, to the commercial speculation entered
upon by the shipowner and the charterers, and
the latter accordingly abandoned the contract
and hired another vessel, by which they for-
warded the rails to San Francisco:-Held, by
KEATING, J., and BRETT, J. (BOVILL, C.J., dis-
sentiente), that under these circumstances there
was a total loss of chartered freight by perils
of the sea within the meaning of a policy of
insurance on chartered freight on the above
voyage. Jackson v. The Union Marine Insur.
Co. (Lim.), C.P., 284

-freight: right to lump freight where part
of cargo lost]-By charter-party, the ship was
to be loaded with a full cargo, and to have a
deck cargo, and being so loaded was to proceed
to London, and "deliver the same on being
paid freight as follows: a lump sum of 3157.

the freight to be paid in cash, half on
arrival, and remainder on unloading and right
delivery of the cargo." The ship arrived in
London with the whole of the cargo, with which
the charterer had loaded her, with the excep-
tion of the deck load, which had been lost during
the voyage by one of the excepted perils in the
charter-party, and without any default on the

STOCK EXCHANGE-defaulting broker: liability of
principal]-Plaintiffs, brokers on the Stock Ex-
change, who had at the request of defendant con-
tracted for the purchase of shares for him, were on
the 13th of July, the "carrying over day" for the
15th, instructed by him to carry over or continue
the contract from the 15th till the 29th of July,
the next account day. On the 15th they paid
for him (as was necessary in order to have the
contract carried over), the difference on the
shares at the price of the 13th, amounting to
1,6881. On the 18th of July plaintiffs, by
reason of many persons for whom they had
entered into contracts failing to meet their en-
gagements, became defaulters on the Stock Ex-
change, whereupon, in accordance with the rules
of the Exchange, all their bargains were closed
and made up by the official assignees at the
prices of that day. The price of the shares
purchased for the defendant having fallen, the
amount due in respect thereof (including the
1,688. differences) was 6,0137., which plaintiffs
then became liable to pay to the official assig-
nees, and now sought to recover from defendant:
-Held, that plaintiffs' insolvency having been
brought about by want of means to meet their
other primary obligations, and not by reason
of their having entered into any contract on
behalf of defendant, no promise could be im-
plied on the part of defendant, as their princi-
pal, to indemnify them against the conse-
quences of the enforcement of the Stock Ex-
change rules with regard to defaulters, and that,
therefore, plaintiffs could only recover from de-
fendant the sum of 1,688., the amount of the
differences they had actually paid for him—