Will. 4. c. 45. s. 26, to entitle him to be regis- tered as a voter in respect of his interest in the same until he had actually received such rent or some part thereof. Webster v. The Overseers of Ashton-under-Lyne-Orme's Case, C.P., 38
PARLIAMENT (continued) — county vote: charge: actual possession: previous decisions] -Where the conveyance granting a charge operates under the Statute of Uses, 27 Hen. 8. c. 10, the person to whose use the rent-charge is granted is, by force of the statute, in the actual possession of such rent- charge, within the meaning of section 26 of the Reform Act, 2 Will. 4. c. 45, as soon as the grant is executed, according to the decision in Heelis v. Blain, which the Court followed. Webster v. The Overseers of Ashton- under-Lyne; Hadfield's Case, C.P., 146 Semble, the Court is not bound by its former decision, though it is a Court of ultimate appeal in registration cases, and its decision in such cases is made final by 6 & 7 Vict. c. 18. s. 66; but the Court will not overrule such former decision unless it be shewn to be clearly wrong. Ibid.
·county vote: qualification: incapacity: peer of Parliament]-A peer of Parliament is in- capacitated by law from voting at elections for members of the House of Commons, and is therefore not entitled to have his name on the register of voters. Earl Beauchamp v. The Overseers of Madresfield; Marquis of Salisbury v. The Overseers of South Mimms; Same v. Bontems; Same v. Bulwer, C.P., 32
county vote: qualification for borough vote] -A., a minister of a church, was stated to have, as minister, such a freehold interest in the rents received from the letting of pews in the church as entitled him to a vote for the county. He occupied as such minister the parsonage house, and in respect of such occupation acquired a right to a vote for the borough:-Held, that there was no such unity of occupation as would, according to section 24 of 2 Will. 4. c. 45, dis- entitle A. to the county vote. Beswick v. Alker, C.P., 26
county vote: rating members of a firm: des- cription on rate amendable as inaccurate]-A., who had been solely rated in respect of the pre- mises occupied by him in his business, got the overseers to alter the rating to "A. & Sons on the occasion of his taking his two sons into partnership, and carrying on business with them on the said premises under the partnership name of " A. & Sons." When A. retired from the business, which he did some time after- wards, the two sons continued the business under the same name of "A. & Sons," and paid the rates when called for:-Held, that the sons were rated within the meaning of section 6 of the Representation of the People Act, 1867 (30
& 31 Vict. c. 102), being described on the rate, though inaccurately, by the partnership name, and that such inaccuracy was cured by 6 & 7 Vict. c. 18. sec. 75. Little v. Overseers of Penrith, C.P., 28
county vote occupation franchise: rateable value]-The rateable value of the premises re- quired by section 6, sub-section 2 of the Re- presentation of the People Act, 1867 (30 & 31 Vict. c. 102), for the 121. occupation fran- chise in counties, is the real rateable value (which the Revising Barrister is at liberty to ascertain for himself), and is not necessarily the value at which such premises are rated in the rate-book. Cooke v. Butler, C.P., 25
county vote: inmates of a hospital: interest in land: rent-charge: tenement]-A hospital, consisting of a master and three "ancient brethren," was incorporated, and by the terms of its constitution, as afterwards regulated by statute, its revenues, derived from lands vested in the corporation, were received by the master, who annually, after paying thereout taxes and other outgoings and reserving one-third to himself, was to pay 25l. to each of the three ancient brethren, 70l. to the chaplain, and after reserving a balance, not exceeding 60., to meet current expenses, was to divide the residue between certain other brethren called " "younger brethren," who were added to the number of the brethren from time to time, as the revenues of the charity increased, but no younger brother was to take under such division more than 25%., and the surplus, if any, was left to accumulate until further additional brethren were ap- pointed:-Held, that the younger brethren had no equitable estate in the lands of the hospital and that the annual payment to which they were entitled, not being a rent-charge nor a free tene- ment within the statute 8 Hen. 6. c. 7, they were not entitled to the county franchise. Simey v. Marshall, C.P., 49
-consolidated appeal: notice to respondent]— A consolidated case of appeal, naming the re- turning officer of a borough as respondent, was signed on the 31st of October; notice of appeal was not given to him till the 4th of November; the first day appointed for hearing appeals was the 13th of November:-Held (the respondent not appearing), that the appeal could not be heard. Brown v. Tamplin, C.P., 37
PARTIES-to actions. See Amendment. Carriers by Railway. Marine Insurance.
PATENT-effect of dating back grant of patent to day of application]-To an action for infringing letters patent granted to the plaintiff and sealed as of the date of his application for the same, it was held to be no answer that the alleged infringements were done in exercise of certain letters patent for a similar invention granted
to the defendant and sealed as of a subsequent date, i.e., the date of his application for the same, although the complete specification of the plaintiff's patent was not filed in the patent office till after the defendant's specification had been filed. Saxby v. Kennet, Ex., 137
PAWNBROKER-loss of ticket]—A person who had pledged goods, having unknowingly given the ticket amongst other matters to a third person, obtained under the (now repealed) statute, 39 & 40 Geo. 3. c. 99. ss. 15, 16, the form of affidavit, &c., therein mentioned, went immediately with it to a magistrate as therein provided, and shewed it afterwards to the pawnbroker:- Held, that under that statute the pawnbroker was not justified in afterwards delivering the goods to the ticket-holder, as the ticket was "lost or mislaid," and it was not necessary to deliver the affidavit and redeem the goods. Burslem v. Attenborough, C.P., 102
PAYMENT-proof of. See Evidence. Executor. PAYMENT INTO COURT-bond to secure payment of money by instalments: penalty]-Plaintiff sued for the penalty in a bond conditioned for avoid- ance if half the penalty with interest were paid by instalments on several fixed days, and alleged as a breach the non-payment of one of the instal- ments, the time for the payment of the sub- sequent instalments not having yet arrived. Defendant paid into Court the sum due in re- spect of the one instalment, with interest :- Held, a bad plea, such a bond not being within section 25 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1860. Preston v. Dania, Ex., 33
PEDLARS ACT-carrying a missionary basket is not trading. Gregg v. Smith (M.C., 121), Q.B., 170 PENALTY-Local Government Act, 1858. Bye- laws. Structure of party-walls. Continuing offence. New buildings. Public Health Act, 1848. Marshall v. Smith (M.C., 108), C.P., 155
Evidence of Scienter. Contagious Diseases (Animals) Act, 1869. Animals Order of 1871, part II. sect. 19. Discovery of Disease. Appeal from Justices. Costs. Nicholls v. Hall (M.C., 105), C.P., 157
A judgment for a sum of money obtained by a pauper in receipt of relief is a valuable secu- rity for money belonging to the pauper within 12 & 13 Vict. c. 103. s. 16. The Guardians of the West Ham Union v. Owens (M.C. 29); Ex.,
POOR LAW AUDIT--Proceedings against overseer to recover sum certified to be due. Certificate of treasurer, R. v. Fordham (M.C., 153), Q.B.,
POOR RATE-Sunday and ragged schools (exemp- tion from Rating) Act, 1869, 32 & 33 Vict. c. 40. Discretion of rating authority. Bell v. Crane (M.C., 122), Q.B., 155
Occupation. Rateable value. Cemetery. Sale of plots of land. R. v. The Abney Park Cemetery Co. (M.C., 124), Q.B., 245
Docks, warehouses, and machinery occupied as one estate. Warehouses capable of beneficial occupation apart from docks. Increased value by connection with docks. Separate rating. Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. The Over- seers of the Poor of Birkenhead (M.C., 141), Q.B., 236
PRACTICE new trial in Liverpool Court of Passage: verification of assessor's signature to notes]-In moving in the Court of Exchequer for rules for a new trial or to enter a nonsuit in cases tried in the Liverpool Court of Passage, a rule to shew cause will not be granted unless either the coun- sel moving was present at the trial, or the asses- sor's notes are produced with an affidavit verify- ing the assessor's signature. When cause is shewn the assessor's notes must be produced with a similar affidavit. Welsh v. Mercer, Ex., 52
See Amendment. Attachment of Debt. At- torney and Solicitor. Bills of Exchange. Infe- rior Court. Interrogatories. Jurisdiction.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT foreign correspondent: commission agent: right of principal against third person]-Where a foreign correspondent instructs his English agents to order goods for him in this country the person contracting with the agent to supply such goods is not, although he knew for whom the goods were intended, liable to an action for breach of his contract at the suit of the principal. Die Elbinger Actien- Gesellschaft für Fabrication von eisenbahn- Materiel v. Claye, Q.B., 151
contracting and signing as agent: evidence of custom making agent liable]-Where a person contracts in the body of a charter-party and signs "as agent," his principal being undis- closed, evidence is admissible to shew a custom that he shall be personally liable if he does not disclose his principal's name within a reasonable time, Hutchinson v. Tatham, C.P., 260
master and servant: alteration of terms of service: discharge of surety]-A bond was given by the obligor as surety that a servant would from time to time, and at all times during the service, satisfactorily account for and pay over to the master all moneys received by the ser- vant for the master's use. One of the terms of the service was that it should be terminable by one month's notice on either side, but this was not known to the surety. After the com- mencement of the service the master and servant agreed, without the knowledge of the surety, that the service should be terminable at three months' notice :-Held by KELLY, C.B., PIGOTT, B., and POLLOCK, B., dubitante MARTIN, B., that the surety was not discharged. But the ser- vant having failed satisfactorily to account for or pay over moneys which he had received for the master's use, and the master, having with knowledge and without informing the defendant thereof, retained the servant in his service,- Held, that the surety was discharged as to defaults committed by the servant after he was so retained. Sanderson v. Aston, Ex., 64
-joint and several debtor: release of debtor as if discharged in bankruptcy: discharge of surety]-Of two obligors of a joint and several bond one executed it as surety for the other, whereof the obligee then had notice. After- wards, and without the consent of the surety, the principal debtor by deed conveyed to the obligee of the bond, as trustee for the creditors of the principal debtor, all his estate to be administered for the benefit of the creditors, in like manner as if the principal debtor had been at the date thereof duly adjudged bank- rupt, and in consideration thereof each of the creditors did thereby release the principal debtor "from his and their respective debts in like manner as if" the principal debtor "had obtained a discharge in bankruptcy." The obligee having sued the surety on the bond,— Held, by KELLY, C.B., and BRAMWELL, B. (dissentiente PIGOTT, B.), that the obligee by executing the deed had released the surety. Gragoe v. Jones, Ex., 68
PRISONER-Debtors Act: discharge: imprisonment after judgment]—A defendant who has been ar- rested and imprisoned before final judgment, under the 6th section of the Debtors Act, 1869, is entitled to be discharged under the 4th section after final judgment has been obtained, notwith- standing that the judgment is still unsatisfied, and that the absence of the defendant from England may prejudice the plaintiff in obtaining the fruits of the judgment. Hume v. Druyff, Ex., 145 PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION.
See Defamation. PROHIBITION-Admiralty Court: cause of damage by collision: foreign ship: sovereign potentate]—
The ship C. ran down the ship B. in the river Thames. The C. was arrested under a warrant of the Court of Admiralty issued in a cause of damage instituted in the said Court on behalf of the owners of the B. A rule nisi was granted for a prohibition on the ground that the C. was the property of the Khedive of Egypt. In shewing cause against the rule, affidavits were used alleging that the C. was, at the time of the collision, in reality used for carrying cargo and passengers. The Court declined to issue the prohibition: the question whether or not the C. was the property of a sovereign potentate, so as by the law of nations to be exempt from liability being one which might properly be decided in the Court of Admiralty. In re The Steam-ship Charkieh," Q.B., 75
inferior court jurisdiction: cause of action] -The Mayor's Court of London being an in- ferior Court, the whole cause of action must arise within its jurisdiction, and therefore, where a material fact necessary to be proved in order to sustain the plaintiffs' case occurs out of the jurisdiction of such Court, the garnishee against whom process of foreign attachment has been issued to attach moneys owing by him to the defendant, is entitled to a prohibition against such Court proceeding with the suit. Cooke v. Gill, C.P., 98
QUARTER SESSIONS-Signature to notice of appeal. R. v. The Justices of Kent (M.C., 211), Q.B., 170
Invalidity of rule of practice as to entry of appeals. R. v. Paulett (M.C., 157), Q.B., 241
QUO WARRANTO-information in the nature of: want of grievance: delay: discretion of court]-A rule for an information, in the nature of a quo warranto, in respect of an annual office of guar- dian of the poor, the election to which was on the 14th of May, on the ground that the mode of election adopted was not a proper one, was not applied for till the 13th of January fol- lowing, and it was then not shewn that any ratepayer had been prevented from voting, or that the result of the election was affected by the mode adopted. In the exercise of its dis- cretion, the Court discharged the rule. R. v. Cousins, Q.B., 124
irregularity immaterial as to the result]— W. was chairman of a Local Board, and it was his duty under 11 & 12 Vict. c. 63. s. 21 to conduct and complete the elections of mem- bers for the ensuing year, and by the same section if the chairman became unable to act, some other person was to be appointed by the Local Board to perform such of his duties as then remained to be performed. F. was ap- pointed by the Local Board to act as returning officer in case of nomination of chairman as a candidate. W. published a notice, fixing day of election and day for receiving nomination papers.
He received a nomination paper nominating himself, and afterwards continued to receive
other nomination papers. More candidates were nominated than vacancies. W. filled up the form of voting paper under section 23, and sent it to be printed, with directions for the printer to return it to F., and from that time forward everything was done by F. W. was elected, and returned by F. No improper motive was imputed to W., nor did his acts produce any inconvenience, or in any way in- fluence the result of the election. The Court, in the exercise of its discretion, refused leave to file an information in the nature of a "quo warranto." R. v. Ward, Q.B., 126
RAILWAY-Meaning of branch-line in Special Act. See Covenant.
RAILWAY COMPANY-construction of special Act: special services: tolls: six-mile clause]—A special Act, relating to the above company, provided that where goods were carried on the company's rail- way, or partly on their railway and partly on some other railway of which they were joint owners, or which they had a right to use, for a less distance than six miles, the company should be entitled to take tolls as for six miles. The Act also pro- vided that the tolls for goods carried over the company's line and over portions of other lines of which they were part owners, or which they had a right to use, should be computed as if the company's line and the said portions of the said other lines formed one railway. Goods were passed over the line of which the com- pany were sole owners for a distance of less than six miles; the same goods on their transit to their ultimate destination passed over another line of which the company was part owner for a distance of more than six miles. This latter line was under the sole management of another company. The goods were accompanied by two declaration notes, one made out in the name of the first company and the other in the name of the other company, but the station of ultimate destination mentioned in both notes was the same:-Held, that the company was not entitled to split the contract, that the two lines must be treated as one, and that the six-mile clause was not applicable. Lancashire and Yorkshire Rail. Co. v. Gidlow (H.L.), Ex., 129
The same Act of Parliament, while providing the maximum rate of tolls to be charged, made an exception in respect of special services to be rendered by the company for loading, unloading, collection and delivery of goods :-Held, that the company were not entitled to charge for special services, though found by a jury to have been actually rendered by them; the customer charged for such services, not having had the offer and option first distinctly given him of either availing himself of such services at the company's rate of charge or of doing them him- self, such services being incidental to the ordi- nary business of a carrier, and such as the
customer, without notice, might have supposed were covered by the company's charges for toll. Ibid.
What is a branch railway. See Covenant.
Liability for wrongful conduct of servant. See False Imprisonment.
Liability as Common Carriers, and for In- juries to Passengers. See Carriers by Railway. And see Negligence. Toll Traverse.
RAILWAY STATION-Wilful trespass on premises connected therewith by a cab-driver. Foulger v. Steadman (M.C., 3), Q.B., 16
RAILWAYS CLAUSES CONSOLIDATION ACT, 1845, s. 65 -Variation by Special Act. Revival of Gene- ral Act. London, Chatham and Dover Railway Co. v. Board of Works for the Wandsworth Dis- trict (M.C., 70), C.P., 160
RENT-CHARGE-Conveyance of land charged: action of debt for arrears: abolition of real actions] — Plaintiff seized in fee of land granted it unto and to the use of C., subject to the payment for ever to plaintiff, his heirs and assigns, of a yearly rent-charge payable out of the land. C. cove- nanted for himself, &c., that he, his executors, administrators and assigns would pay unto plain- tiff, his heirs or assigns, the said rent-charge. The land became vested in defendant, after which the rent-charge fell in arrear:-Held, that plaintiff might maintain an action of debt against defendant for the arrears, the remedy by real action having been taken away by 3 & 4 Will. 4. c. 27. s. 36. Thomas v. Sylvester, Q.B., 237
REPLEVIN-recovery in, a bar to action for same taking: trespass by tenant of tenant at suffer- ance]-A judgment for plaintiff in replevin a bar to an action for damages for the same taking of the goods in respect of which the replevin was brought. Gibbs v. Cruikshank, C.P., 273
The tenant of a mortgagor, whose tenancy was created after the mortgage, and has never been recognised by the mortgagee, cannot maintain trespass against the mortgagee for entering and distraining on the land under the powers of the mortgage. Ibid.
Defendants, a Scotch railway company, having their line of railway and their principal office in Scotland, employed an ordinary booking clerk to issue tickets at the Carlisle station of the Caledonian Railway, over the southernmost portion of whose line defendants had running powers-Held, that such clerk, although the only officer of defendants resident in England, was not a "head officer" or "clerk," within the 16th section of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, so as to render service on him of an ordinary writ of summons a good service on the company. Mackreth v. The Glasgow and South- Western Rail. Co., Ex., 82
SET-OFF. See Banker and Banking Company. Husband and Wife.
SHARES-Registration of. See Married Woman.
Transfer of. See Company.
SHIPPING-insurance on chartered freight: loss of freight where no total loss of ship]-By a charter- party, which contained the usual exceptions of dangers and accidents of navigation, the vessel was to proceed with all convenient speed from Liverpool to Newport, and there load a cargo of iron rails for San Francisco, and the freight was to be paid on right delivery of the cargo. The vessel duly proceeded on her voyage from Liverpool to Newport, but before arriving there she took the rocks at Carnarvon Bay. She was ultimately got off the rocks, and though the damage she sustained was not such as to consti- tute a total loss, either actual or constructive, the time necessary for getting her off and re- pairing her so as to be a cargo-carrying ship, was so long as to put an end, in a commercial sense, to the commercial speculation entered upon by the shipowner and the charterers, and the latter accordingly abandoned the contract and hired another vessel, by which they for- warded the rails to San Francisco:-Held, by KEATING, J., and BRETT, J. (BOVILL, C.J., dis- sentiente), that under these circumstances there was a total loss of chartered freight by perils of the sea within the meaning of a policy of insurance on chartered freight on the above voyage. Jackson v. The Union Marine Insur. Co. (Lim.), C.P., 284
-freight: right to lump freight where part of cargo lost]-By charter-party, the ship was to be loaded with a full cargo, and to have a deck cargo, and being so loaded was to proceed to London, and "deliver the same on being paid freight as follows: a lump sum of 3157.
the freight to be paid in cash, half on arrival, and remainder on unloading and right delivery of the cargo." The ship arrived in London with the whole of the cargo, with which the charterer had loaded her, with the excep- tion of the deck load, which had been lost during the voyage by one of the excepted perils in the charter-party, and without any default on the
STOCK EXCHANGE-defaulting broker: liability of principal]-Plaintiffs, brokers on the Stock Ex- change, who had at the request of defendant con- tracted for the purchase of shares for him, were on the 13th of July, the "carrying over day" for the 15th, instructed by him to carry over or continue the contract from the 15th till the 29th of July, the next account day. On the 15th they paid for him (as was necessary in order to have the contract carried over), the difference on the shares at the price of the 13th, amounting to 1,6881. On the 18th of July plaintiffs, by reason of many persons for whom they had entered into contracts failing to meet their en- gagements, became defaulters on the Stock Ex- change, whereupon, in accordance with the rules of the Exchange, all their bargains were closed and made up by the official assignees at the prices of that day. The price of the shares purchased for the defendant having fallen, the amount due in respect thereof (including the 1,688. differences) was 6,0137., which plaintiffs then became liable to pay to the official assig- nees, and now sought to recover from defendant: -Held, that plaintiffs' insolvency having been brought about by want of means to meet their other primary obligations, and not by reason of their having entered into any contract on behalf of defendant, no promise could be im- plied on the part of defendant, as their princi- pal, to indemnify them against the conse- quences of the enforcement of the Stock Ex- change rules with regard to defaulters, and that, therefore, plaintiffs could only recover from de- fendant the sum of 1,688., the amount of the differences they had actually paid for him—
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