the depositions taken before the same Judge. Ibid. Quere, whether the Extradition Act, 1870, applies to criminals who have taken refuge in this country before the date of the Act. (But see 36 & 37 Vict. c. 60. s. 2.) Ibid.

FALSE IMPRISONMENT-railway company: power to apprehend: implied authority to station inspector] -Plaintiff travelled by defendants' railway with a ticket which entitled him to leave the train at N. Before the train arrived at N. it stopped at E., whereupon plaintiff got out of the carriage, and, upon being asked for his ticket, handed it to the collector. He was told by the collector that it was not available, and that he must pay the sum of 2d. excess fare. He refused to do so, unless a receipt was given to him, and was given into custody by the inspector of the station at E., and charged with having, on arriving at the station at E., refused to deliver up his ticket or pay his legal fare, and thereby defrauding the company of 2d. The charge was preferred before a magistrate, and dismissed. Plaintiff brought an action against defendants for false imprisonment, but was nonsuited, upon the ground that there was no evidence that the inspector had any authority either express or implied from defendants to give plaintiff in charge-Held, in accordance with Goff v. The Great Northern Railway Company (30 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Q.B. 148), that the question was one for the jury, and that the nonsuit was wrong. Moore v. The Metropolitan Rail. Co., Q.B., 23

FALSE REPRESENTATION. See Banking Company. FEME COVERT. See Debtor and Creditor. Married Woman,

is

FENCES-obligation to repair. See Negligence. FOREIGN ATTACHMENT -render: imprisonment: the Debtors Act, 1869] - Where in a procecding by foreign attachment, the defendant renders himself in dissolution of the attachment, and the plaintiff goes on in the action and recovers judgment, the defendant entitled to be discharged from custody by virtue of section 4 of the Debtors Act, 1869. The 29th section of that Act which preserves the custom of foreign attachment does not operate so as to make the defendant, under such circumstances, liable to be detained in custody. Waine v. Wilkins, Q.B., 95

FRAUD. See Banking Company.

FRAUDS, STATUTE OF. See Contract.

FREIGHT. See Bill of Lading. Charter-party. Marine Insurance. Shipping.

FRIENDLY SOCIETY-Insanity is sickness entitling member to relief. Burton v. Eyden (M.C. 115), Q.B., 168

GARNISHEE ORDER. See Attachment of Debt. GOVERNESS—Action by. See Master and Servant.

GUARANTEE continuing guarantee]-Plaintiffs (of whom D. had been in the habit of buying goods) having heard of a bill of sale given by D. to defendants declined to let D. have certain goods he had then bought of them without a telegram from defendants that defendants would be answerable for them. Defendants sent such telegram, and D. had the goods, and in due time paid for them. By the post of the same day on which the telegram was despatched, defendants sent to plaintiffs a letter, in which, after referring to the telegram, and stating that they had done business with D. for five years, and had never known anything dishonest in his transactions, they wrote, "what you have heard was done to protect him from a dishonest tradesman, and will in no way we hope be to the injury of his creditors. Having every confidence in him he has but to call upon us for a cheque, and have it with pleasure, for any account he may have with you. When to the contrary we will write you:"-Held, that this letter was a continuing guarantee for the amount of goods D. should buy of plaintiffs until they should hear from defendants to the contrary. Nottingham Hide, &c. Market Co. v. Bottrill, C.P., 256

HABEAS CORPUS. See Infant.

HARBOUR, DOCKS, AND PIER CLAUSES ACTDamage to pier by inevitable accident. Liability of owner of vessel. Dennis v. Tovell, (M.C., 33), Q.B., 40

out.

HIGHWAY-footpath: limited dedication: right to plough up: nuisance]-The public had a right to use a footpath across the field of A., but subject to the right of A. to plough it up when he ploughed the rest of the field. He did so plough it up, and having done so, did not set out or mark the line of the path, but left the public to tread it The public continued to walk across the field in the direction in which the path had been, but soon finding the path in a muddy and bad condition, turned out of it, and walked on either side thereof. To prevent them from doing so, A. placed hurdles on the parts upon which the public so walked, leaving a space of about six feet in width where the path had been. The respondent having thrown down the hurdles, an action was brought against him by A. in a County Court. The Judge having given judgment in favour of the respondent, the Court reversed such judgment, holding that the respondent could not claim a right to go off the line of the footpath or a right to pull down the hurdles. Arnold v. Holbrook, Q.B., 80

non-user by public of highway created under an inclosure act]-A highway cannot be created

by statute unless the provisions of the statute
Cubitt v.
creating it are strictly followed.
Maxse, C.P., 278

By the General Inclosure Act, 41 Geo. 3. c. 109. ss. 8 & 9, the Commissioner, before making the allotments of the land to be enclosed, was to set out such roads as he should judge necessary, and to appoint a surveyor to form and complete the same, and until so formed and completed the parish was not to be bound to repair such roads, but after that time they were to be for ever after kept in repair by the parish. An Inclosure Commissioner appointed to act under a local Inclosure Act, subject to the provisions of 41 Geo. 3. c. 109, duly set out a road which he described in his award made in 1808, but although such road was staked out on the ground and fenced off from the adjoining allotments on either side, it was never formed and completed as required by the 41 Geo. 3. c. 109, nor was it ever used by the public:-Held, that as the requirements of the statute had not been complied with, the road so set out was not a highway created by statute, and as there had been no user, and therefore no acceptance of the road by the public, it was not otherwise a highway. Ibid.

Proceedings for stopping up. Sufficiency of notice of vestry meeting. R. v. Powell (M.C., 129), Q.B., 220

HUSBAND AND WIFE-chose in action: money borrowed and received for improvement of wife's separate estate: set-off of husband's debt: parties to action]--A married woman entitled to property for her separate use was desirous of raising money for the improvement of her estate, while her husband also wished to raise money to discharge a debt. They accordingly arranged through defendant, their solicitor, to borrow money upon mortgage of the separate estate, and upon policies upon the lives of each of them respectively. The money was to be advanced by instalments, and when the first instalment was due the husband and wife signed a joint authority for defendant to receive it for them. Defendant received the money, and claimed to retain part of it in respect of a separate debt due to him as solicitor of the husband: - - Held, by the Exchequer Chamber, affirming the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench (41 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Q.B. 145), that in an action by husband and wife defendant could not retain the money, or set off against it a debt due to the husband, as it was received upon the express understanding that it was to be held for the husband and wife jointly, so that there never was any reduction into possession on the part of the husband. Jones v. Cuthbertson (Ex. Ch.), Q.B., 221

INDEMNITY. See Auction. Company.

INFANT-custody of: religious education: testamentary guardian]-Upon an application for a habeas corpus to secure the custody of an infant affidavits were read, which stated that before marriage an arrangement was made between the parents of the infant (the father being a Roman Catholic and the mother a Protestant) that sons of the marriage should be brought up as Roman that Catholics and the daughters as Protestants;

a daughter, the infant, who at the date of the application was about ten years old, was, with the sanction of the father, who died a few months after her birth, baptized as a Protestant, and that when she was about a year old she was left in the custody of her maternal grandmother, by whom she was brought up as a Protestant, and at whose expense she was maintained and clothed until the date of the application. It was alleged that two days before the father's death he had executed a document appointing the applicant, his brother, testamentary guardian of his children, but it did not appear that the applicant made any claim to the custody of the child until it was about eight years old:-Held, notwithstanding the lateness of the application, that the Court had no power to refuse the writ, so as to give effect to the arrangement made by the father as to the religious education of his child, but as there 'appeared to be some doubt upon the affidavits as to the validity of the document appointing issue must be the applicant guardian, an directed in order that the question might be submitted to a jury. In re Edwards, Q.B., 99

INFERIOR COURT-Mayor's Court of London Procedure Act, 1857 points reserved for superior court: jurisdiction of mayor's court over cause]The 10th section of the Mayor's Court of London Procedure Act, 1857 (20 & 21 Vict. c. clvii.), enables either party to a suit in that Court, if leave be given to him by the Judge on the trial, to move in any of the Superior Courts to enter a verdict or nonsuit, as the case may be, and gives the Superior Court power to make such order therein as it may think proper, and directs judgment to be entered accordingly:Held, that the disposal by the Superior Court of a rule to enter a nonsuit moved for under that section, does not take away the jurisdiction of the Judge of the Mayor's Court to entertain an application for a new trial. Lebeau v. The General Steam Nav. Co., C.P., 76

See County Court. Prohibition.

INNKEEPER-liability of manager holding license for company]-The salaried manager of an hotel belonging to a company is not an innkeeper so as to be by law responsible for the goods and property of the guests, although the usual license under 1 Geo. 4. c. 61, has been granted to him personally. Dixon v. Birch, Ex., 135

с

INSANITY-a sickness. See Friendly Society.

INSURANCE-against fire : ship]—A steamship was
insured against fire as "lying in the V. docks,
with liberty to go into dry dock." She was
taken along the Thames to a proper dry dock,
and on her return stopped in the Thames to put
on part of her paddles, which had been taken off
to admit her into the dry dock, a proceeding
usual under the circumstances, and during such
stoppage was burnt:-Held (affirming the de-
cision below), that this was not a loss within
the insurance. Pearson V. The Commercial
Union Assur. Co. (Ex. Ch.) C.P., 164

See Marine Insurance.

to run,

INTERPLEADER-mortgage of trade fixtures: re-
gistration]-An indenture of lease for a term,
of which about sixteen years were
was assigned in the year 1868 to H., and
by the indenture of assignment the trade
fixtures upon the premises were absolutely
assigned to him. By an indenture of mort-
gage, dated 20th March, 1872, H. demised
the premises to plaintiffs for the residue of the
said term except the last two days, and he also
assigned to plaintiffs the trade fixtures, subject
to redemption on payment of the amount of
mortgage debt and interest. The indenture of
mortgage was not registered under the Bills of
Sale Act. A judgment having been obtained
against H., the sheriff, on 14th April, 1872, by
virtue of a fi. fa. seized the said trade fixtures,
as well as the moveable and unfixed machinery
and effects, all of which were at the time of the
seizure in the apparent possession of H.
Plaintiffs thereupon claimed the trade fixtures
as being their property:-Held, upon an inter-
pleader issue that the indenture of mortgage of
20th March, 1872, ought to have been registered
under 17 & 18 Vict. c. 36, and that plaintiffs
were not entitled to claim the trade fixtures
which had been assigned to him. Hawtrey v.
Butlin, Q.B., 163

INTERROGATORIES--before plea: libel: particulars
under plea of justification]-Though there is
no rule to preclude a defendant from being
allowed to deliver interrogatories to the plaintiff
before he has pleaded, yet if he seeks to be
allowed to deliver them before plea, he must
first disclose the nature of his defence, in order
to shew that the interrogatories are for the
Gourley
purpose of supporting such defence.
V. Plimsoll, C.P., 244
Where, therefore, in an action for libel the de-
fendant pleaded a justification in a general form
he was not allowed to deliver interrogatories to
the plaintiff until, either by affidavit or by
particulars, he had first disclosed the matters
on which his justification was founded. Ibid.

cross interrogatories to discredit witness resi-
dent abroad]—An action having been brought

against defendant for the unskilful spinning of
yarn, defendant obtained an order for the exami-
nation by interrogatories of a person whom he
had employed as manager of his works, and
who had gone to America. Plaintiff proposed
to examine him upon cross-interrogatories, seve-
ral of which were directed to the quesion whe-
ther or not he had left his wife and children in
England, and whether or not he had taken
another woman with him to America:-Held,
that as these questions were not relevant to the
issue, and had a tendency to deter the witness
from coming to England to give evidence, they
could not be allowed. Stocks v. Ellis, Q.B., 241

JURISDICTION-trial of issue of nul tiel record:
evidence: certified copy of record of acquittal]-
The issue of nul tiel record is tried by the
Court and not by a jury. Richardson v. Willis,
Ex., 15

An action in a Superior Court is a "proceeding"
in which a certified copy of a record is admis-
sible as evidence of the record under 14 & 15
Vict. c. 99. s. 13. Ibid.

LANDLORD AND TENANT-breach of covenant :
house taken by railway: damages]—Where a
railway company give the lessee for years of
a house notice to treat, an award is made,
and eventually a conveyance executed, and
thereupon possession given to them, such
lessee is liable to his landlord at all events
up to that time, on a covenant to repair
and keep in repair, and the measure of damages
is the diminution of the market value of the
reversion at that time. Mills v. The Guardians
of the East London Union, C.P., 46

after twenty years: county court: time for appealing]-Where a demise for a term of 1,000 years by way of mortgage is created in land, and no payment of principal or interest or acknowledgement is made for more than twenty years, and the mortgagor and those claiming under him remain in possession of the premises without interruption, the title of the mortgagee under the mortgage is thenceforth barred, therefore a payment of arrears of interest and the principal to the mortgagee under a decree in the foreclosure suit, after that time has elapsed, does not revive the title in the mortgagee, and an ejectment does not then lie to recover the possession. Hemming v. Blanton, C.P., 158

Semble, notice of appeal against the determination

of the Judge in a plaint in the County Court is in time where a nonsuit was entered at the trial, and an application to set aside the nonsuit afterwards refused, if it be given within ten days after the refusal to set aside the nonsuit. Ibid.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACT-adoption of the Act: place having a known and defined boundary]-By the Local Government Act, 1858 (21 & 22 Vict. c. 98), it is enacted that the Act may be adopted in corporate boroughs and places under the jurisdiction of a board of competent commissioners, and in all other places having a known or defined boundary, by a resolution of the owners and ratepayers, subject to appeal to the Local Government Board:-Held, that interpreting the words "place having a known or defined boundary" in the above statute, the word "place" is to be received with the widest possible signification, and is not restricted to the accustomed legal divisions of the country, such as manors, hamlets, townships or parishes, and may, therefore, consist of portions of different townships or parishes, and a place so composed has a "known or defined boundary," which has a physical, visible and notorious boundary, so that there can be no mistake as to its limits. R. v. The Local Board of Grasmere, Q.B., 131

LORD MAYOR'S COURT-Time for leave to appeal. See Appeal. And see Inferior Court. Pro

hibition.

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION-evidence of malice from pleadings]-Where in an action for maliciously giving plaintiff into custody and for slander, defendant pleaded to the latter cause of action a plea in justification, which would have been no answer to the former, and at the trial plaintiff failed to prove the slander,-Held, that the jury ought to disregard this plea in considering the former cause of action. Brooke v. Avrillon, C.P., 126

MANDAMUS-to register shares. See Company. Married Woman.

MANOR-manorial rights: reservation in inclosure act of right of sporting]-The reservation clause

in an enclosure act enacted that nothing in the Act should prejudice the right of the lord of the manor "of, in or to the seignory or royalties incident or belonging to such manor or lordship, or either or any of them, but that the lord should and might, from time to time, and at all times, hold and enjoy all rents, quit rents and other rents, reliefs, duties, customs and services, and all courts, perquisites and profits of courts, rights of fishery and liberty of hawking, hunting, coursing, fishing and fowling within the said manor, and all tolls, fairs," &c., "royalties, jurisdictions, franchises, matters and things whatsoever to the said manor, or to the lord or lady thereof incident. . . . other than and except such common right as could or might be claimed by the lord as owner of the soil and inheritance of the said commons or waste grounds:"-Held (HONYMAN, J., dissentiente), that this reservation clause reserved to the lord only his seignorial or manorial rights, and did not extend to his territorial right, as owner of the soil, of shooting over the allotted lands, and that the case was therefore within Bruce v. Halliwell (5 Hurl. & N. 609; s. c. nom. Bruce v. Helliwell, 29 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Exch. 297), and was distinguishable from Ewart v. Graham (7 H.L. Cas. 331; s. c. 29 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Exch. 88). Sowerby v. Smith, C.P., 233

MARINE INSURANCE-general average: damage to cargo by water to extinguish fire: practice of average staters: bill of lading: "average, if any, to be adjusted according to British custom"]-A ship was lying at anchor in port with a general cargo on board, when a fire broke out in the forehold. Every effort was made, but without success, to extinguish the fire by throwing water down the hatchways and upon the cargo. Finally, a hole was cut in the side of the vessel, and her fore compartment filled with water. This extinguished the fire, and if it had not been done the cargo would have been destroyed, and the ship seriously damaged if not rendered a total wreck. Part of a quantity of bark, shipped on board by the plaintiffs, was damaged or destroyed by the water which was poured or let into the vessel to extinguish the fire. The bark was shipped under a bill of lading, which contained the words, "average, if any, to be adjusted according to British custom." It is the practice of British average adjusters in adjusting losses to treat a loss occasioned by water in the manner above described as not a general average loss:-Held, affirming the judgment of the Queen's Bench, p. 84, but without determining whether the loss was (as held in the Court below), according to the general law of England, the subject of a general average contribution, that the words "British custom" in the bill of lading must be taken to mean the practice of British average adjusters, so that the claim for general average was expressly excluded. Stewart v. The West Indian and Pacific Steamship Co. (Ex. Ch.), Q.B., 191

MARINE INSURANCE (continued) - action where
no stamped policy executed: slip]-Defendants,
an Insurance Company at Liverpool, employed
E. & Co. as their agents in London to accept
risks and receive premiums in London for
policies of marine insurance. Plaintiffs in-
structed P. & Co., insurance brokers in London,
to effect an insurance upon a cargo of rails.
P. & Co. on the 16th of November, 1871, pre-
pared a slip which was initialed by E. & Co.,
and a copy was made out by P. & Co. who
sent it to E. & Co. On the same night E. &
Co. sent the copy to defendants at Liverpool.
A policy ought to have been executed and
sert soon after, but this was not done. An
account, including 2s. 6d. policy duty, was sent
by E. & Co. to P. & Co., who paid it on 13th
March, 1872. No stamped policy was ever pre-
pared or executed, and the ship on which the
cargo of rails was having been lost, defendants
refused to execute the policy or to pay the in-
surance money. The jury found that defendants
authorised E. & Co. to issue slips, accept risks
and receive premiums; that they had given
plaintiffs reasonable ground to believe, and that
plaintiffs did believe, that if they paid the pre-
mium and stamp on a slip initialed by E. & Co.
they, defendants, would issue a policy in accord-
ance with the slip. They also found that
plaintiffs were prevented by the conduct of de-
fendants from insuring elsewhere:-Held, by
QUAIN, J., and ARCHIBALD, J. (BLACKBURN, J.,
dissentiente), that no action was maintainable
by plaintiffs against defendants without con-
travening the provisions of ss. 7 and 9 of 30
Vict. c. 23, and, therefore, that plaintiffs could
not recover in any form of action against de-
fendants. Fisher v. The Liverpool Marine
Insur. Co., Q.B., 224

deck cargo: open policy: declaration of risks]
-A shipowner-who was in the habit of re-
ceiving shipments of cotton to be carried on deck,
sometimes at the request and risk of the
shippers, sometimes for his own convenience,
and under a clean bill of lading at his own risk
-to protect himself as to jettison in the latter
case, entered into open policies of insurance as
to which the usage was that he was bound to
declare all his risks in order of shipment, and
rectify any mistake even after loss known.
His agent, by negligence or mistake, gave a clean
bill of lading for a certain shipment and gave
no notice to him, but such shipowner on dis-
covering the omission altered his declarations
by inserting this shipment though after loss
known:-Held, that the shipowner had an insur-
able interest, as at law a written contract can-
not be varied on the ground of negligence or
mistake, and was entitled to alter the declara-
tions both according to the usage, which could
not be said to be unreasonable, and according
to the doctrine to be deduced from decided
cases, that by the usages of merchants and
underwriters, recognised by the Courts without
formal proof, such declarations may be altered

even after loss known, if the alterations be
made innocently and without fraud. Stephens
v. The Australasian Insur. Co., C.P., 12

-

slip and policy: additional terms: conceal-
ment of material fact: continuing policy]—
Defendants, on March 11, agreed to insure
freight by plaintiff's vessel on a certain voyage,
and a slip containing the terms of the insurance
was then drawn up by defendants, who on that
day accepted the risk. No question was then
asked as to the insurance on the hull of the
vessel, but on March 17, when the stamped
policy was issued, defendants required to know
the insurance on the hull, and upon learning it
issued the policy, with a warranty inserted
therein that the hull was not insured beyond
that amount:-Held, that the addition of such
warranty did not prevent the policy from being
drawn up in respect of the risk accepted on
March 11, and therefore it was not necessary
for plaintiffs to have communicated to defendants
the loss of the vessel, which had occurred on
March 16, as plaintiffs knew, before the stamped
policy was issued. Lishman v. The Northern
Maritime Insur. Co. (Lim.), C.P., 108

A policy of insurance was made on a vessel for a
year, by an insurance association, by the rules
of which the insurance was to be from year to
year, unless notice to the contrary be given, and
the managers, unless they receive ten days'
notice to the contrary, were to renew the policy
on its expiration:-Held, that according to the
terms of such rules, and 30 & 31 Vict. c. 23.
s. 8 (which makes null a policy exceeding
twelve months), the policy was not a continuing
one, but expired at the end of the year. Ibid.

Breach of warranty against contraband of
war. Judgment of the Queen's Bench (41 Law
J. Rep. (N.s.) Q.B. 193) affirmed. Seymour v.
The London and Provincial Maritime Insur.
Co., C.P. 111 n.

- prospective freight: total loss: notice of aband
onment]-Notice of abandonment need not
be given where there is nothing which on ab-
andonment can pass or be of value to the aban-
donee. Rankin v. Potter (H.L.), C.P., 169
Where there is a constructive total loss of the
ship and it is impossible for its owners to earn
the chartered freight, and there is therefore an
actual and not a constructive total loss of such
freight, no notice of abandonment is necessary.
Ibid.

No such notice is necessary where the ship never
having been ready to receive the chartered
cargo there was nothing to abandon to the un-
derwriter on freight. Ibid.

What amounts to constructive total loss of ship,
and what is sufficient notice of abandonment of
freight. Ibid.

prepayment of part of freight: insur-
ance on freight: interest insured]—The term
"freight" in a policy of insurance may be