require a difference of style; but these qualities must never be totally sacrificed to each other.

"If," says Dr. Armstrong, "I was to reduce my own private idea of the best language to a definition, I should call it the shortest, clearest, and easiest way of expressing one's thoughts, by the most harmonious arrangement of the best chosen words both for meaning and sound. The best language is strong and expressive, without stiffness or affectation; short and concise, without being either obscure or ambiguous; and easy, and flowing, and disengaged, without one undetermined or superfluous word."

The want of precision is an unpardonable error in a writer who treats of philosophical subjects. On this account, the style of Lord Shaftesbury is highly exceptionable. The noble author seems to have been well acquainted with the power of words; those which he employs are generally proper and sonorous; and his arrangement is often judicious. His defect in precision is not so much imputable to indistinctness of conception, as to perpetual affectation. He is fond to excess of the pomp and parade of language; he is never satisfied with expressing any thing clearly and simply; he must always give it the dress of state and majesty. Afraid of delivering his thoughts arrayed in a mean and ordinary garb, and allured by an appearance of splendour, he heaps together a crowd of superfluous words, and inundates every idea which he means to express with a torrent of copious loquacity. Hence perpetual circumlocutions, and many words

* Armstrong's Miscellanies, vol. ii. p. 133.

66

"the

and phrases employed to describe what would have much better been described by one. If he has occasion to introduce any author, he very rarely mentions him by his proper name. In the treatise entitled Advice to an Author, he employs two or three successive pages in descanting upon Aristotle, without naming him in any other manner than as the master critic," "the prince of critics," "the consummate philologist," "the grand master of art," "the mighty genius and judge of art." In the same manner, grand poetic sire," "the philosophical patriarch," and "his disciple of noble birth and lofty genius," are the only names by which he condescends to designate Homer, Socrates, and Plato. This method of distinguishing persons is extremely affected, but it is not so contrary to precision, as the frequent circumlocutions which he employs to express the powers and affections of the mind. In one passage, he denominates the moral faculty, "that natural affection and anticipating fancy, which makes the sense of right and wrong." When he has occasion to mention selfexamination, or reflection on our own conduct, he speaks of it as "the act of a man's dividing himself into two parties, becoming a self-dialogist, entering into partnership with himself, and forming the dual number practically within himself."

In the following paragraph he wishes to shew, that by every vicious action we injure the mind as much as a man would injure his body by swallowing poison, or inflicting on himself a wound.

Now, if the fabric of the mind or temper appeared to us such as it really is; if we saw it impossible to remove hence any one good or orderly affection, or to introduce an ill or disorderly one, without

drawing on, in some degree, that dissolute state which, at its height, is confessed to be so miserable; it would then undoubtedly be confessed, that since no ill, immoral, or unjust action can be committed, without either a new inroad and breach on the temper and passions, or a farther advancing of that execution already done; whoever did ill, or acted in prejudice of his integrity, good nature, or worth, would of necessity act with greater cruelty towards himself, than he who scrupled not to swallow what was poisonous, or who with his own hands should voluntarily mangle or wound his outward form or constitution, natural limbs or body.-Shafte bury's Inquiry concerning Virtue.

Such superfluity of words is offensive to every reader of a correct taste, and produces no other effect than that of embarrassing and perplexing the sense. Το commit a bád action, is first, "to remove a good and orderly affection, and to introduce an ill or disorderly one;" next it is, "to commit an action that is ill, immoral, or unjust ;" and then " to do ill, or to act in prejudice of integrity, good nature, or worth,' Nay, so very simple a thing as a man's wounding himself, is," to mangle or wound his outward form or constitution, natural limbs or body."

Dr. Crombie has justly remarked, "that a due attention to accuracy of diction is highly conducive to correctness of thought. For, as it is generally true that he whose conceptions are clear, and who is master of his subject, delivers his sentiments with ease and perspicuity, so it is equally certain that, as language is not only the vehicle of thought, but also an instrument of invention, if we desire to attain a habit of conceiving clearly, and thinking correctly, we must learn to speak and write with accuracy and precision."*

* Crombie's Etymology and Syntax of the English Language, p. 429, 3d edit. Lond. 1830, 8vo.

CHAP. V.

OF SYNONYMOUS WORDS.

MANY words are accounted synonymous, which are not so in reality; and indeed it has even been disputed whether two words can be found in any language, which express precisely the same idea. However closely they may approximate to each other in signification, still can the discriminating eye of the critic discover a line of separation between them. They agree in expressing one principal idea, but always express it with some diversity in the circumstances; they are varied by some accessory idea which severally accompanies each of the words, and which forms the distinction between them.

As they are like different shades of the same colour, an accurate writer can employ them to great advantage, by using them so as to heighten and to finish the picture which he gives us. He supplies by the one what was wanting in the other, to the force, or to the lustre of the image which he means to exhibit. But, with a view to this end, he must be extremely attentive to the choice which he makes of them; for the generality of writers are apt to confound them with each other, and to employ them with promiscuous carelessness, merely for the sake of filling up a period, or of diversifying the language. By using them as if their signification were precisely the same, they unwarily involve their ideas in a kind of mist.

Many instances might be given of a difference in meaning between words reputed synonymous. The following instances, which are chiefly selected from Dr. Blair and Mrs. Piozzi,* may themselves be of some use; and they will besides serve to shew the necessity of attending, with the utmost care, to the exact significations of words, if ever we would write with propriety or precision.

To abandon, forsake, relinquish, give up, desert, leave, quit.-A man forsakes his mistress, abandons all hope of regaining her lost esteem, relinquishes his pretensions in favour of another; gives up a place of trust which he holds under government, deserts his party, leaves his parents in affliction, and quits the kingdom for ever.

To abhor, detest.-To abhor, imports, simply, strong dislike; to detest, imports also strong disapprobation. A man abhors being in debt; he detests treachery.

Active, assiduous, sedulous, diligent, industrious.The king is happy who is served by an active minister, ever industrious to promote his country's welfare, nor less diligent to obtain intelligence of what is passing at other courts, than assiduous to relieve the

* Blair's Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres. Lond. 1783, 2 vols. 4to. Piozzi's British Synonymy. Lond. 1794, 2 vols. 8vo. This lady's design is commendable, but her work is full of errors. Mr. Crabb has since published a much better book, entitled "English Synonymes explained." Lond. 1816, 8vo. An edition, greatly enlarged, has more recently appeared under the title of "English Synonymes, with copious Illustrations and Explanations, drawn from the best Writers." Lond. 1826, 4to.