Consciousness, therefore, involving a relative idea, can never exist without at least two others; and any proposition, expresssive of consciousness, is necessarily expressive of a complex, and not of a simple state of mind.

It may be objected here, that this makes consciousness a mental law, and a mental state at the same time. True; but what is a law of belief? Only the existence of those general circumstances, in which belief necessarily arises; and of course there is no incompatibility in its so being. And in point of fact it will be found, that every case of consciousness, whether it embrace a greater or less number of simple ideas, furnishes occasion for belief, and is infallibly accompanied by it.

§. 71. Of the proper objects or subjects of consciousness.

As there are some things, to which consciousness, as the term is usually employed, relates, and others, to which it does not, it is proper to consider it in this respect in particular.As to those thoughts, which may have arisen, or those emotions, which may have agitated us in times past, we cannot with propriety be said to be conscious of them at the present moment; although we may be conscious of that present state of mind, which we term the recollection of them; that is to say, of other feelings of the same kind, and having relation to a particular antecedent occasion.

Again, consciousness has no direct connection with such objects, whether material or immaterial, as exist at the present time, but are external to the mind, or in other words have an existence independent of it. It has relation only to things in the mind, as we sometimes say; or more definitely to states of the mind.

§. 72. The objects of consciousness wholly internal and

mental.

As the remark at the close of the last section has relation both to material and immaterial existences, it seems proper to consider it distinctly in these two respects.

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I, We are not, strictly speaking, conscious of any material existence whatever; of the earth we tread, of the food that nourishes us, of the clothes that protect, or of any thing else of the like nature, with which we are conversant. In accordance, however, with the view which has been given of this subject, we can rightly assert our consciousness of the effects they produce within us, of the sensations of taste, of heat and cold, of resistance and extension, of hardness and softness, and the Our consciousness does not, in strictness of speech, hold a direct relation to the existence of the material world in any form, whether particular or general; that is to say, we are not directly conscious of such existence, but only of that state of mind, which we term a firm belief or knowledge of it.

II,-This view holds also in respect to immaterial things, even the mind itself, as we have had occasion already to see. We are not directly conscious, using the term in the manner which has been explained, of the existence even of our own mind, but merely of its qualities and operations, and of that firm belief or knowledge of its existence, necessarily attendant on those operations. "According to the common doctrine, (says Mr. Stewart, Philos. Essays, I, CH. I,) of our best philosophers, it is by the evidence of consciousness we are assured that we ourselves exist. The proposition, however, when thus stated, is not accurately true; for our own existence is not a direct or immediate object of consciousness, in the strict and logical meaning of that term. We are conscious of sensation, thought, desire, volition; but we are not conscious of the existence of mind itself; nor would it be possible for us to arrive at the knowledge of it (supposing us to be created in the full possession of all the intellectual capacities that belong to human nature) if no impression were ever to be made on our external senses. The moment that, in consequence of such an impression, a sensation is excited, we learn two facts at once; the existence of the sensation, and our own existence as sentient beings in other words, the very first exercise of my con

sciousness necessarily implies a belief, not only of the present existence of what is felt, but of the present existence of that which feels and thinks; or (to employ plainer language) the present existence of that being, which I denote by the words I and myself. Of these facts, however, it is the former alone of which we can properly be said to be conscious, agreeably to the rigorous interpretation of the expression. The latter is made known to us by a suggestion of the understanding consequent on the sensation, but so intimately connected with it, that it is not surprising that our belief of both should be generally referred to the same origin."

In the same way we are not said to be conscious of any higher spiritual beings, although we may be conscious of a firm belief, that such exist. We are not conscious of God and of his existence; althongh we are so, as all men of the least moral and religious tendencies of mind will readily and gratefully acknowledge, of the idea or notion of a Supreme Author, and of the unalterable belief of his existence.*

§. 73. The belief from consciousness of the most decided and highest kind.

Consciousness is not only a law of our belief, but it undoubtedly is one of the most authoritative and decisive'; in other words, the belief, attendant on the exercise of it, is of the highest kind. It appears to be utterly out of our power to avoid believing beyond a doubt, that the mind experiences certain sensations, or has certain thoughts, or puts forth particular intellectual operations, whenever in point of fact that is the case. We may be asked for the

* The views here expressed may be supposed to hold good also in respect to all abstractions whatever, which have a real and objective existence. Accordingly we are not conscious of space and time, on the common supposition of their possessing a distinct and real entity, although we are of the ideas of them, or of those new states of mind, which exist, when space and time are the objects of contemplation,

reason of this belief, but we have none to give, except that it is the result of an ultimate and controlling principle of our nature; and hence that nothing can ever prevent the convictions, resulting from this source, and nothing can divest us of them.

How often men retire within their own bosoms, shutting up the outward senses, and pleasing themselves with the soul's inward contemplations, with new trains of thought, with many past remembrances, with melancholy or joyful affections! Now it would be not only as easy, but as rational, to disbelieve the existence of the soul itself, as to disbelieve the existence of these rich and varied experiences, of which it is the subject. In fact, neither the one, nor the other is possible; nor has the whole history of the mind made known any instances, that have even the appearance of being at variance with this view, except a few cases of undoubted insanity. A man may

reason against consciousness as a ground and a law of belief, either for the sake of amusing himself or of puzzling others, but when he not only reasons against it as such, but seriously and sincerely rejects it, it becomes quite another concern, and such an one has by common consent broken loose from the authority of his nature, and is truly and emphatically beside himself. It will be impossible to find a resting-place, where such a mind can fix itself and repose; the best established truths and the wildest and most extravagant notions will stand nearly an equal chance of being either rejected or received; fancy and fact will be confounded and mingled together; and the whole mind become a chaos like that of the world when it was without form and void.

CHAPTER FIFTH.

LAWS OF BELIEF. (II) THE SENSES.

§. 74. General statement as to the confidence placed in

the senses.

THE second law of belief, which it falls to us to consider, is that of the senses. In speaking of the senses in this light, what we mean to say in respect to them is, that the feelings, to which they give rise, are, by our very constitution, the occasion of belief, or are attended by it. In this sense they are a law.

This statement, it will be noticed, involves and takes for granted the truth of the proposition, that belief and sensations go together. Nor is this assumption made without abundant evidence to support it. It must without much inquiry be clear to all,that the convictions and actions of men are daily controlled by the senses. As a general statement, it is undoubtedly true, that in the judgments, which we constantly form of human conduct, and of the existence, forms, properties, and relations of the material world, no one refuses them his confidence.

What better evidence can there be of the correctness of this statement, than the accordant sentiment and declaration of the great mass of mankind! On this point the feelings, conduct, and sayings of men are prompt and coincident.

When one man states to another a report of what has happened at some time, the hearer yields to him a great