their desires and passions, and, without the aid of force, or the splendor of ránk, becomes the arbiter of the fate of nations!"*

§. 431. Of the desire of happiness.

We shall not attempt to explore this part of our sentient nature any further than to add, that the desire of enjoyment or happiness is a part of our mental constitution. No one will presume to assert, that the desire of suffering is natural; that we ordinarily rejoice in the prospect of coming woes, and endure them with gladness of heart. Nor are there satisfactory grounds for the opinion, that enjoyment and suffering are indifferent to the human mind; and that there is no choice to be had between them. Such a supposition would be contrary to the common experience and the most obvious facts. On the contrary, our own consciousness, and what we witness in others, effectually teach us, that the desire of happiness is as natural as that of knowledge or of society, and even hardly less so, than it is to desire food and drink, when we experience the uneasy sensations of hunger and thirst.

Under the instigation and guidance of this strong propensity, men fill their granaries in anticipation of a day of want, prepare raiment and houses, resort to medicines. in seasons of sickness, and take other measures for the prolonging of life, health, and comfort. It is kindly provided that they are not left, in taking precautions subservient to their preservation and well-being, to the suggestions and the law of reason alone, but are guided and kept in action by this decisive and permanent principle. And it is proper to add, that this desire operates not only in reference to the outward and bodily comforts, but also in relation to inward consolations, the inspirations and solaces of religion in the present life, and the anticipated possession of that more glorious happiness, which religious faith attaches to a future state of existence.

*Philosophy of the Moral and Active Powers, Chap. II, 4.

CHAPTER FOURTH.

THE AFFECTIONS OR PASSIONS.

§. 432. Nature and general division of the affections.

The feeling of

UNDER the general head of Desires, it seems proper to include the Affections, or passions; although the latter are complex, and not simple states of mind. desire, however, makes a characteristic and prominent part of them. The term affections is used, therefore, to denote a state of mind, of which some simple emotion is always a part, but which differs from any single simple emotion, in being combined with some form of that state of the mind called desire. "As to every sort of passion, (says Kaimes* who uses the word passions as synonymous with affections,) we find no more in the composition but an emotion pleasant or painful, accompanied with desire." -It may properly be added here, that, in consequence of this complexity, the passions have a character of permanency, which is not found to belong to any separate emotions.

The Affections might conveniently be divided into three classes; the Benevolent, or those which consult the good and happiness of others; the Selfish, or those which chiefly consult our own preservation and pleasure; and the Malevolent, or those which imply a feeling of ill-will, and a desire of injury to others. We merely refer, how

* Elements of Criticism, Part I, Ch. 2.

ever, to these distinctions, the recollection of which may perhaps aid in the clearer understanding of the subject, and in the correct application of epithets; but without designing, or considering it necessary to make them particularly prominent.

§. 433. Of the affection of love.

In going into an examination of this subject we shall first consider the affection or passion of LOVE; (it may be remarked here that we employ the terms affections and passions as of essentially the same import.) There are many modifications or degrees of this passion; the mere preference of regard and esteem, the warmer glow of friendship, and the increased feeling of devoted attachment. There are not only differences in degree, the passion itself seems to be modified and to be invested with a different aspect according to the circumstances, in which it is found to operate. The love, which we feel for our friends, is different from that, which we feel for a parent or brother; and both are different from that, which we feel for our country. But it is impossible to convey in words the precise distinctions, which may justly be thought to exist both in kind and degree. Such an attempt would only involve the subject in greater confusion.

The passion under consideration is a complex one, and we may discover in it at least two elements; viz., an emotion of vivid delight in the contemplation of the object, Hence there will aland a desire of good to that object.

ways be found in the object some quality, either some excellence in the form, or in the intellect, or in the moral traits, or in all combined, which is capable of exciting a pleasurable emotion. There is a pleasing emotion, antecedent to the desire of good to the object, which causes it; but this happy feeling continues to exist, and to mingle with the subsequent kind desire. And there may be supposed to be a constant action and reaction,-the desire of good increasing the strength of the pleasurable emotion, and the mere feeling of delight enhancing the benevolent desire. When the kind desire, which is one of the ele

ments of love, is not excited merely in consequence of our having experienced the antecedent pleasurable emotion, but in consequence of regarding that pleasurable emotion, as indicative of qualities, to which the unalterable voice of nature pronounces, that our affections may be justly given, it is then a pure and exalting feeling.

As to how far this purity of feeling exists, there may undoubtedly be a difference of opinion; but just so far as it does, there is a glow of the heart, analogous to the devotional feelings of a higher and happier state of being.

§. 434. Of sympathy.

Sympathy, by the common use of languages, implies an interest in the welfare of others, and may be considered in two respects, being either an interest in their joy, or an interest in their sorrow. The sympathetic man falls in with the requisition of Scripture, rejoicing with those, who rejoice, and weeping with those, who weep. His heart kindles up with happiness at beholding the happy, and he sheds the tear for the miserable.But that sympathy, which rejoices with the rejoicing, is only one of the forms of love. In an analysis of our passions, it is entitled to no separate place. Like love it is a feeling of delight, combined with benevolent desires towards the object of it. It is only the sympathy for sorrow, which can have a distinct consideration in the list of our passions.

Some have thought, that sympathy for sorrow is only a modification of love; but we may discover a difference between them. We can sympathize in the griefs of those, in whom we are able to discern no pleasing qualities, and even with those, who are positive objects of hatred. We leave it to the feelings of any one to determine, Whether,if he saw even his enemy perishing with hunger in a dungeon, or his limbs broken on the rack, he would not harbour a relenting emotion, and be glad at his rescue? If so, sympathy for grief is different from love, for we may sympathize with those, whom we do not, and cannot love; and consequently, is to be considered a distinct passion.

§. 435. Of gratitude.

The affection of GRATITUDE also, which we are next to consider, approaches in its character to the more general passion of love. Like the last named passion, it includes an emotion of pleasure or delight, combined with a desire of good or a benevolent feeling towards the object of it. But we never give the name of gratitude to this combination of pleasing and benevolent feeling, except it arises in reference to some benefit or benefits conferred,

-No small part of that strong feeling, which is exercised by children toward parents, is that species of love, which is termed gratitude. They think of them, not only as possessing many qualities, which are estimable and lovely in themselves; but as fond and unwearied benefactors. They cannot behold, without having their feelings strongly moved, their earnest disposition to relieve their sufferings, to supply their wants, to enhance their enjoyments.

Different individuals exhibit considerable diversity in the exercise of grateful emotions. Some receive the favours heaped upon them without exhibiting any visible returns of benevolent regard; others are incapable of a passive reception of benefits, and are strongly affected, whenever they are conferred. This difference is probably owing in part to original diversities of constitution; and is partly to be ascribed to different views of the characters and duties of men, or to other adventitious circumstances.

§. 436. Of the parental affection.

If there be any affection whatever, which is entitled to be considered a natural affection, it is that, which is entertained by parents for their children. Commencing at the birth of its beloved object, it does not merely maintain its original vigour and freshness, but increases them. In all the vicissitudes of life, amid all suffering and dishonour and ingratitude, it remains a sacred and imperishable monument of the wisdom and goodness of the being, who has implanted it. Can it be thought necessary to enter into a formal proof of the existence of an affection,