CHAPTER FIRST.

IMMATERIALITY OF THE MIND.

§. 29. Of certain frivolous inquiries concerning the nature of

mind.

HAVING briefly disposed of those topics, which may properly be deemed auxiliary and introductory to the main inquiry, we are now ready to enter more directly and decisively into the consideration of our mental being. All men may well be supposed desirous of learning, as far forth as possible, the true and exact nature and state of the soul; and without question it is altogether proper to attempt to satisfy this desire. But it becomes necessary, in entering into this somewhat difficult subject, to intimate at the outset the importance of guarding against an undue tendency to speculation, and of excluding such topics as evidently do not admit of any satisfactory results. It was the fault of the Schoolmen to indulge in such unfathomable discussions; and the unfavorable decision, which subsequent ages have pronounced on their laborious efforts, should remain a warning to others. It is perhaps necessary to mention some of the speculations, which are here referred to, in order that each one may judge for himself of the probable utility of entering into them. Among other things they are understood to have attempted, with much ostentation and with no small effort of inquiry, to ascertain the mode of the soul's existence; the distinction between its existence and its essence; whether its essence

might subsist, when it had no actual existence; and what are the qualities of the soul, considered as a non-entity.

It requires no deep reflection to conjecture the folly of these inquiries, and of others of not much greater reasonableness and importance; and if it were otherwise, the point must now be considered as sufficiently settled by the literary history of the Grecian sects, and particularly of the Scholastic ages. There are, however, other points, connected with the nature of the soul, which we might be culpable in declining to consider; and in particular that of its immateriality. This is a subject, which for various reasons cannot wisely be dispensed with. We ought not to exalt our nature, at the expense of the truth; but nothing less than the truth at least should ever induce us to assign to it a low and degrading estimate. If it be true, as Addison with his usual felicity has remarked, that one of the best springs of generous and worthy actions is the having generous and worthy thoughts of ourselves, then sureJy, whether the soul be formed of matter or not, is a great inquiry.

§. 30. Origin and application of the terms, material and immaterial.

If we cannot assert directly and positively what the mind is, we may at least approximate to a more intimate acquaintance with it, by attempting to evince, and illustrate its immateriality. But this term itself, and its opposite

are first to be inquired into.

The words MATERIAL and IMMATERIAL are relative; being founded on the observation of the presence, or of the absence of certain qualities.

Why do we call a piece of wood or of iron material ? It is because we notice in them certain qualities, such as extension, divisibility, impenetrability, and colour. And in whatever other bodies we observe the presence of these qualities, we there apply the term. The term IMMATERIAL, therefore, by the established use of the language and its own nature, it being in its etymology the opposite of

the other, can be applied only in those cases, where these qualities are not found.

Hence we assert the mind to be immaterial, because in all our knowledge of it we have noticed an utter absence of those qualities, which are acknowledged to be the ground of the application of the opposite epithet. The soul undoubtedly has its qualities or properties; but not those, which have been spoken of. Whatever we have been conscious of and have observed within us, our thought," our feeling, remembrance, and passion are evidently and utterly diverse from what is understood to be included under the term materiality.

Such is the origin of these two terms, and the ground of the distinction between them. And thus explained, they can hardly fail to be understood. We may, therefore, now proceed to state the evidence of the actual existence. of that distinction between mind and matter, which is obviously implied in every application of them. In other words, we are to attempt to show, that the soul is not matter, and that thought and feeling are not the result of material organization.

§. 31. Difference between mind and matter shown from

language.

Is it a fact, that the being or existence, called the SOUL, is distinct and different from that existence, which we call MATTER?-We have already remarked on the propriety of sometimes referring to the structure of languages, in order to illustrate our mental nature; and in respect to the question now before us, we are warranted in saying, that Language in general is one proof of such a distinction. In the last section, we saw the use of certain terms in our own language, and the grounds of it. All other languages, as as well as our own, have names and epithets, distinctly expressive of the two existences in question. This circumstance, when we consider, that the dialects of men are only their thoughts and feelings embodied as it were, may be regarded as a decisive proof, that the great body of

mankind believe in both, and of course believe in a well founded distinction between them.

That such is the belief of men generally, as clearly evinced by the structure of languages and in various other ways, will not probably be denied. It is a matter too evident to permit us to anticipate a denial. When therefore, we take into view that there are grounds of belief fixed deeply and originally in our constitution, and that, in their general operation, they must be expected to lead to truth, and not to error, we are unable to harbour the opposition, that men are deceived and led astray in this opinion; that they so generally and almost universally believe in the existence of what in point of fact does not exist.

§. 32 Their different nature evinced by their respective

properties.

Again, the distinction between mind and matter is shown by the difference in the qualities and properties, which men agree in ascribing to them respectively. The properties of matter are extension, hardness, figure, solidity, and the like. The properties of mind are thought, feeling, volition, reasoning, the passions. The phenomena, exhibited by matter and mind, are not only different in their own naure, but are addressed to different parts of our constitution. We obtain a knowledge of material properties, so far as it is direct and immediate, by means of the senses; but all our direct knowledge of the nature of the mental phenomena is acquired by consciousness.

Every one knows that the phenomena in question are not identical. There is no sameness or similitude, for instance, in what we express by the terms hardness and desire, solidity and hatred, imagination and extension. Holding it to be unphilosophical to ascribe attributes so different to the same subject, we conclude the subjects of them are not the same. And accordingly we call the subjects of one class of phenomena Mind, and that of the other Matter. But there is one of the properties of matter, which,

considered as applicable to mind, is worthy of a more particular examination.

§. 33. The material quality of divisibility not existing in

the mind.

That there is an essential and permanent distinction between mind and matter, seems to follow in particular from an examination of that particular quality, expressed by the word, divisibility. All matter is divisible. However small we may imagine any particle to be, we must still suppose it to have a top and bottom, a right and left side; and therefore, to admit of being divided into dif ferent parts. All extension, which is acknowledged to be one of the primary qualities of matter, implies divisibility.

Now if divisibility and extension be not ascribed to the mind, all, that is contended for, is virtually conceded. But if, on the other hand, either or both of these qualities, for they reciprocally involve each other, belong to the mind, then the following difficulty arises.-If the mind itself be susceptible of division, as all matter is, then still more its thoughts and feelings may be thus divided. But this is contrary to all our consciousness; and consciousness is the only means or instrument, which we can directly employ in obtaining a knowledge of the mind. No man is ever conscious of a half, or a quarter, or a third of a hope, joy, sorrow, remembrance, or volition. In deed if the soul were separable into parts, one part might be filled with joy, and another with sorrow at the same time; one part might be occupied with a mathematical demonstration, and another in framing a poem or a ro

mance.

We may possess, at different times, different mental states both in kind and degree; but, however our feelings, when occuring at successive and different periods, may differ from each other in these respects, our consciousness never fails to ascribe to them individually an unity or oneness. And the unity, which we ascribe to the attributes or acts of the mind, still more we ascribe to the mind