§. 380. Of motion as an element of beauty.

Motion has usually been reckoned an element of beauty, and very justly.--A forest, or a field of grain, gently waved by the wind, affects us pleasantly. The motion of a winding river pleases; and this, not only because the river is serpentine, but because it is never at rest. We are delighted with the motion of a ship, as it cleaves the sea under full sail. We look on, as it moves like a thing of life, and are pleased without being able to control our feelings, or to tell, why they exist. And the waves too around it, which are contiuually approaching and departing, and curling upward in huge masses, and then breaking asunder into fragments of every shape, present a much more pleasing appearance, than they would, if profoundly quiet and stagnant.

With what happy enthusiasm we behold the foaming cascade, as it breaks out from the summit of the mountain, and dashes downward to its base! With what pleasing satisfaction, we gaze upon a column of smoke, ascending from a cottage in a wood;—a trait in outward scenery, which landscape painters, who must certainly be accounted good judges of what is beautiful in the aspects of external nature, are exceedingly fond of introducing. It may be said in this case, we are aware, that the pleasure, arising from beholding the ascending smoke of the cottage, is caused by the favourite suggestions, which are connected with it, of rural seclusion, peace, and abundance. But there is much reason to believe, that the feeling would be to some extent the same, if it were known to ascend from the uncomfortable wigwam of the Savage, from an accidental conflagration, or from the fires of a wandering horde of gypsies.And if motion, on the limited scale, on which we are accustomed to view it, be beautiful, how great would be the expansion and extacy of our feelings, if we could be placed on some pinnacle of the universe, and behold beneath us the worlds, suns, and systems of infinite space, with endless progress and perfect

regularity, "wheeling unshaken through the void im

inense."

§. 381. Of intellectual and moral objects as a source of the

beautiful.

But we are not to suppose, that there is nothing but matter, and its relations, and its accessories of rest, motion, and sound, which are the foundations of the beautiful. The world of mind also, so far as it can be brought before our contemplation, calls forth similar emotions.-The human countenance is a beautiful object; nature has decidedly given that character to the curving outline of the lips and forehead, the gentle illuminations of the eye, and the tints of the cheeks, but they convey ideas of mind; they may be regarded as natural indications and signs of the soul, which is lodged behind them; and although the human countenance is pleasing of itself, the thought and feeling and amiability, of which it is significant, are pleasing also. We may perhaps illustrate our meaning by another instance. If we fix our attention upon two men, whose outward appearance is the same, but one of them is far more distinguished than the other for clearness of perception, extent of knowledge, and all the essentials of true wisdom, we certainly look upon him with a higher degree of complacency. And this complacency is greatly heightened, if we can add to these intellectual qualities. certain qualities of the heart or of the moral character,such as a strong love of truth, justice, and benevolence.

It is true, that in the present life intellectual and moral objects are brought before our contemplation only in a comparatively small degree, surrounded and almost encumbered, as we are, with material things; but they are, nevertheless, proper objects of knowledge, and are among the great sources of beauty. There is no object of contemplation more pleasing or even enrapturing than the Supreme Being; but in contemplating the Deity, we do not contemplate an outward and accessible picture, or a statue of wood and stone, but merely a complex internal conception, which embraces certain intel

lectual and moral qualities and powers, and excludes every thing of a purely material kind. Now when we dwell upon the parts of this great and glorious conception, and follow them out into. the length and breadth, and height and depth of infinite wisdom, of infinite benevolence, of omnipotence and justice unsearchable, and of other attributes, which are merged together and assimilated in this great sun of moral perfection, we find such a splendour and such a fitness in them, that we cannot but be filled with delight; like the disciples, that were travelling to Emmaus, when we think upon these things, our heart burns within us.

CHAPTER SECOND.

OF ASSOCIATED BEAUTY.

§. 382. Objects may become beautiful by association merely.

THERE is another view to be taken of this interesting subject. While some of the forms, of which matter is susceptible, are pleasing of themselves and originally, while we are unable to behold bright colours, and to listen to certain sounds, and to gaze upon particular expressions of the countenance, and to contemplate high intellectual and moral excellence, without emotions, in a greater or less degree delightful; it must be admitted, that, in the course of our experience, we find a variety of objects, that seem,as they are presented to us, to be unattended with any emotion whatever; objects, that are perfectly indifferent. And yet these objects, however wanting in beauty to the great mass of men, are found to be invested, in the minds of some, with a charm, allowedly not their own. These objects, which previously excited no feelings of beauty, may become beautiful to us in consequence of the associations, which we attach to them. That is to say, when the objects are beheld, certain former pleasing feelings, peculiar to ourselves, are recalled.

The lustre of a spring morning, the radiance of a summer evening may of themselves excite in us a pleasing emotion; but as our busy imagination, taking advantage of the images of delight, which are before us, is ever at work and constantly forming new images, there is, in combination with the original emotion of beauty, a superadded delight. And if, in these instances, only a part of the beauty is to be ascribed to association, there are some others, where the whole is to be considered, as derived from that source.

Numerous instances can be given of the power of association, not only in heightening the actual charms of objects, but in spreading a sort of delegated lustre around those, that were entirely uninteresting before. Why does yon decaying house appear beautiful to me, which is indifferent to another? Why are the desolate fields around it clothed with delight, while others see in them nothing, that is pleasant? It is, because that house formerly detained me, as one of its inmates, at its fireside, and those fields were the scenes of many youthful sports. When I now behold them, after so long a time, the joyous emotions, which the remembrances of my early days call up within me, are, by the power of association, thrown around the objects, which are the cause of the remembrances.

§. 383. Further illustrations of associated feelings.

He, who travels through a well-cultivated country town, cannot but be pleased with the various objects, which he beholds; the neat and comfortable dwellings; the meadows, that are peopled with flocks, and with herds of cattle; the fields of grain, intermingled with reaches of thick and dark forest. The whole scene is a beautiful one; the emotion we suppose to be partly original; a person on being restored to sight by couching for the cataract, and having had no opportunity to form associations with it, would witness it for the first time with delight. But a greater part of the pleasure is owing to the associated feelings, which arise, on bebolding such a scene;