CHAPTER FIRST. EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY. §. 369. Of the sentient states of the mind in general. HAVING, in the second Part of this Work, completed, in a very considérable degree, what was necessary to be said on the intellect, it is now time to enter on the consideration of that part of our nature, which is sometimes denominated the heart, in distinction from the pure understanding or intellectual part of man. The obvious and acknowledged grounds of distinction between these two parts of our mental constitution have been explained in another place, (chap. x1, Part I;) and it will not perhaps be thought necessary to resume the consideration of them here. We may safely appeal to the terms used in all languages, to the speculations of philosophers, and to each one's consciousness in confirmation of the principle, that such a distinction is well founded, and has a reality in nature. The topics, accordingly, which we are now about to enter upon, have their specific character, and relate to the emotions, desires, volitions, feelings of obligation, &c; all of which states of mind, whether they appear under a simple or a complex form, may be considered as included under the epithet sentient. We do not ordinarily apply that epithet to the merc perceptions and deductions of the understanding; but under the general head of Sensibility or SENTIENCE, (if that term were allowable by the established usage of the language,) is included every thing, which involves some degree of feeling.-And it may be asserted without hesitation, that subjects of this kind present very high claims to our notice. If man had been made of intellect only; if he could merely have perceived, compared, associated, and reasoned, without a single desire, without a solitary emotion, without sorrow for suffering or sympathy in joy; if he had been all head and no heart; the human soul would have shown a depressed and different aspect, compared with what it does at present. It was this part of human nature, which Socrates particularly turned his thoughts to; and on account of which he was pronounced by the Oracle the wisest of all men living. In these inquiries we are let into the secrets of men's actions, for here we find the causes, that render them restless and inquisitive, that prompt to efforts both good and evil, and make the wide world a theatre, where vice and virtue, hope and fear, and joy and suffering mingle in perpetual conflict. §. 370. Of the general division of the sentient states of the mind into emotions, desires, &c. We no sooner carefully direct our attention to the sentient states of the mind, to the feelings in distinction from the thoughts and intellections, than we find them susceptible of being arranged into the four general classes of EMOTIONS, DESTRES, FEELINGS OF OBLIGATION, and VOLITIONS. These various species of feeling sometimes closely approximate, and may even mingle together, forming a new and complex one; and yet our consciousness is able to distinquish them from each other. When we come to feelings of obligation and volitions, it will be proper to say something on their distinctive nature. But as the two other classes are first considered, it is an inquiry more naturally arising here, What is the distinc tion between Emotions and Desires?-As the original feelings, expressed by both of these terms, are simple, it would be of no avail to attempt to define them; nor do we profess. to ascertain the difference between them in this way. We can learn this difference by own internal examination and by consciousness alone; nor can any form of mere words illustrate to our comprehension either their nature or their distinction, independently of such internal experience, excepting perhaps in the single circumstance, that emotions are instantaneous, while there is apparently a greater permanency in desires. These last continue the same as when they first arose, so long as the objects, towards which they are directed, are the same; while the emotions are in general more transitory.But even this distinction, which we are able to understand, without having recourse to our consciousness of the feelings themselves, may fail at times; at least apparently so. It is not unfrequently the case, that objects, which are fitted to call forth emotions, remain before the mind a considerable period, and that emotions, mingling with those that went before, arise in succession to emotions, and with such rapidity as to give them all, though many in number, an appearance of actual sameness, continuity, and permanency. §. 71. Explanations' and characteristics of emotions of beauty. It is presumed, that no one is ignorant of what is meant, when we speak of a melancholy emotion, of a cheerful emotion, of emotions of pain, of pity, of wonder, of cheerfulness, of approval and the like. Among other feelings of this nature are those, which have particular relation to objects external to the mind, such as emotions of beauty, grandeur, and sublimity.--In the present chapter our attention will be particularly directed to those of BEAUTY. Of the emotions of beauty it will be as difficult to give a definition, so as to make them clearer to any one's comprehension than they already are, as to define the simple |