be found to teach us nothing; and although it was in the times of the Scholastic philosophy, employed as an axiom, and thought to be of much consequence in aiding as a medium in argument, the proof which it brings, in any case whatever, amounts to no more than this, that the same word may with certainty be predicated of itself. When we say that man is man, or that blue is blue, we receive as much information and as valuable, as when we say, that whatever is, is ; that is, we know no more afterwards than we did before the enunciation of the proposition. The same of all, which belong to this class.

There is a second class of unineaning propositions, slightly differing in form, from the above, but are the same in substance, viz., THOSE, WHERE A PART ONLY OF

THE COMPLEX IDEA IS PREDICATED OF THE WHOLE.

Hence to this class belong all those, where the genus is predicated of the species; when for instance, it is said, that lead is a metal. If we know the meaning of the term, lead, which is the subject of the proposition, we of course know, that it is a metal. The propositions, that gold is yellow, and that man is rational, are of this kind. We are supposed to know the meaning of the separate terms of these propositions; one of these terms is the subject; and this evidently involves and implies the meaning of the proposition, taken as a whole. When, on the contrary we are told, that man has a notion of God, or that man is cast into sleep by opium, we then learn something, since the ideas here expressed are not contained in the word, man.—When a single word is employed with vagueness and inconsistency, it is rightly considered to be a proper subject of criticism, and may fairly be objected to; and the same liberty, and for the same reasons, may properly be taken with unmeaning propositions, which have the appearance of carrying us onward in the investigation of a subject, but which, when truly estimated, leave us no wiser, than before we heard them.

§. 340. (V.) Avoid the introduction of acknowledged and common-place propositions.

There is another rule, relating to the practice of reasoning, which is of a like nature with the last mentioned viz. Not to burden the argument with acknowledged and common-place propositions.-The common feelings and experience of mankind have so firmly established many things as true, that the great mass would no more think of controverting them, than would the geometrician of questioning the truth of axioms. These propositions differ from those, considered in the last section, in having meaning, and perhaps important meaning. But it ought not to be forgotten, that we are supposed to reason with those, who have had some experience and possess share of common sense; and who need not to be reminded of truths, however significant, which are already as familiar to them as the letters of their mother tongue. If the question depend directly upon such truths, then there is no need of discussion; and if it do not, then it is certainly a prejudice to our cause to let them take up our attention, while there are other points of moment more closely connected with its issue. A studious enumeration and arrangement of common-place statements offends the hearer or reader,because it intimates, that we consider them more ignorant, than they will be willing to admit; and besides, it causes fatigue and listlessness. But a worthy and powerful dialectician, while he sedulously seeks the truth, is always found to observe two things; first, to keep down all feelings of disgust and prejudice in the minds of his opponents and others; and second, to preserve their attention interested and fully alive. This last can be done only by presenting the select and prominent views of a subject, by investing them with every appropriate attraction, and urging them home by awakened and constant appeals.

§. 341. (VI.) Reject the aid of false arguments or sophisms.

There is a species of false reasoning, which we call a

SOPHISM. A sophism is an argument, which contains some secret fallacy, under the general appearance of correctness. The aid of such arguments, which are intended to deceive, and are inconsistent with a love of the truth, should be rejected.

(1) IGNORATIO ELENCHI, or misapprehension of the question, is one instance of the sophism. It exists, when the arguments advanced do not truly apply to the point in debate. Let it be supposed, that some person has founded a literary institution. The question is, Whether he be a man of learning, a sholar? It is argued, that he is, in consequence of having founded a seminary for scientific purposes. Here we may deny the connection between the premises and the conclusion, although the argument is somewhat specious; because we know it to be the fact, that many men of but small information have been the patrons of science. That is, an argument is applied, which, it is supposed, would not have been brought forward, if there had been a proper understanding of the import and spirit of the question, and of what was justly ap plicable to it.

(2) PETITIO PRINCIPII, or begging of the question, is another instance of sophism. This sophism is found, whenever the disputant offers, in proof of a proposition, the proposition itself in other words. The following has been given as an instance of this fallacy in reasoning ;-A person attempts to prove, that God is eternal, by asserting, that his existence is without beginning and without end. Here the proof, which is offered,and the proposition itself, which is to be proved, are essentially the same.-When we are told, that opium causes sleep, because it has a soporific quality, or that grass grows by means of its vegetative power, the same thing is repeated in other terms.— This fallacy is very frequently practised; and a little care in detecting it would spoil many a fine saying, and deface many a elaborate argument.What is called arguing in a circle is a species of sophism very nearly related to the above. It consists in making two propsitions reciprocally prove each other.

(3) NON CAUSA PRO CAUSA, or the assignation of a false cause. People are unwilling to be thought ignorant; rather than be thought so, they will impose on the credulity of their fellow men, and sometimes on themselves, by assigning false causes of events. Nothing is more coinmon, than this sophism among illiterate people; pride is not diminished by deficiency of learning, and such people, therefore, must gratify it by assigning such causes of events as they find nearest at hand. Hence, when the appearance of a comet is followed by famine or a war, they are disposed to consider it as the cause of those calamities. If a person have committed some flagrant crime, and shortly after suffer some heavy distress, it is no uncommon thing to hear the former assigned, as the direct and the sole. cause of the latter.-This was the fallacy, which historians have ascribed to the Indians of Paraguay, who supposed the baptismal ceremony to be the cause of death, because the Jesuit missionaries, whenever opportunity offered, administered it to dying infants, and to adults in the last stage of disease.

(4) Another species of sophistry is called FALLACIA ACCIDENTIS. -We fall into this kind of false reasoning, whenever we give an opinion concerning the general nature of a thing from some accidental circumstance. Thus, the Christian religion has been made the pretext for persecutions, and has in conquence been the source of much suffering; but it is a sophism to conclude, that it is, on the whole, not a great good to the human race, because it has been attended with this perversion. Again, if a medecine have operated in a particular case unfavourably, or in another case, have operated very favourably, the universal rejection or reception of it, in consequence of the favourable or unfavourable result in a particular instance, would be a hasty and fallacious induction of essentially the same sort. That is, the general nature of the thing is estimated from a circumstance, which may be wholly accidental.

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§. 342 (VII.) On the sophism of estimating actions and character from the circumstance of success merely.

The foregoing are some of the fallacies in reasoning, which have found a place in writers on Logic. To these might be added the fallacy or sophism, to which men are obviously so prone, of judging favourably of the characters and the deeds of others, from the mere circumstance of success. Those actions, which have a decidedly successful termination, are almost always applauded, and are looked upon as the result of great intellectual forecast; while not less frequently actions, that have an unsuccessful issue, are not only stigmatized as evil in themselves, but as indicating in their projector a flighty and ill-balanced mind.— The fallacy, however, does not consist in taking the issues or results into consideration, which are undoubtedly entitled to their due place in estimating the actions and characters of men, but in too much limiting our view of things, and forming a favourable or unfavourable judgment from the mere circumstance of good or ill success alone.

While there is no SOPHISM, more calculated to lead astray and perplex, there is none more common than this; so much so, that it has almost passed into a proverb, that a hero must not only be brave, but fortunate. Hence it is, that Alexander is called the Great, because he gained victories, and overran kingdoms; while Charles XII of Sweden, who the most nearly resembles him in the characteristics of bravery, perseverance, and chimerical ambition, but had his projects cut short at the fatal battle of Pultowa, is called a madman.

"Machiavel has justly animadverted, (says Dr. Johnson) on the different notice taken by all succeeding times, of the two great projectors, Cataline and Cæsar. Both formed the same project, and intended to raise themselves to power by subverting the commonwealth. They pursued their design perhaps with equal abilities and equal virtue; but Cataline perished in the field, and Cæsar returned from Pharsalia with unlimited authority; and from that time, every monarch of the earth has thought himself honoured